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ABSTRACT
Microeconornic and Relational Exchange theories provide guidance within a
Transaction-cost Economics theoretical framework for analysis of conflict in franchising
The literature is reviewed in support of a definition of franchising as an inter-
organisational form.
Conflict is operationalised using a four item scaled construct of satisfaction. Six
hundred twenty-one franchisee respondents from nine different franchises were clustered
on the conflict construct scale with a three-cluster solution emerging. Factor analysis is
also used to condense and describe data as well as reveal latent variables. Franchisees are
categorised as "satisfied," "ambivalent" or "angry" with approximately a third of the cases
represented in each cluster.
SPSS CHAID (Chi-square Automatic Interaction Detector) is used as the primary
statistical application to develop nineteen models which represent varying perspectives of
independent variable correlation with the dependent conflict variable. Correlations among
independent variables are also depicted in the tree diagram output. These models are
statistically tested to show both descriptive and predictive value. Principal areas of
analysis include franchisee goals, perceived exit costs, and franchisor provided services.
Exit costs are analysed with strong support for psychic barriers to exit and little
support for the traditionally accepted franchise specific assets being viewed as irretrievable
investments by the franchisee. However, the more specific the asset to the franchise
relationship, the greater the positive correlation with franchisee satisfaction. Also,
franchisees exhibit great difficulty in quantifying the value of the trade mark.
Results of the study reveal cooperation as a prerequisite of satisfaction in the
franchisee-franchisor relationship. Coordination of transactions between the parties to the
franchise contract (license agreement) is particularly important, especially regarding a host
of marketing functions in the alliance. Transaction-cost's theory of bounded rationality is
empirically modelled. A clear and definable tolerance zone of acceptable franchisor
performance is illustrated.
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"The three guiding principles of my life are integrity, intensity, and intimacy. Integrity is
'doing the right thing' when no one is looking. Intensity is focusing your energy to
accomplish a goal. It is the third principle that is the most important.. .and the most
misunderstood Intimacy means love; not closeness or liking, but love. It is a passion for
life that is all encompassing. Give me a hundredfranchisees who believe in these
principles and we can conquer any market."
Taken from a speech to a Babson College entrepreneurship class, November 1994 by
W.J. Hindman
founder, WJ Hindman and Associates
founder, Jiffy Lube International, Inc.
founder, Youth Services International, Inc.
former head football coach, Western Maryland College
Mentor
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CHAPTER I
IMPORTANCE AND DEFINITION OF FRANCHISING
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis provides a multi-theoretic framework for analyzing franchising. From
that foundation we build a research proposal which defines the issues, states the
propositions, and outlines a research methodology. Our conclusions are directed to both
academics and practitioners.
The historically and theoretically supported definition of franchising we have
developed clearly illustrates the importance of the relationship between the franchisee and
franchisor. This research centers on the manifestation of conflict in that relationship.
Because the franchise body of literature is still emerging from other literatures we have
extracted our propositions from a number of these divergent sources of academic work.
This broad literature search, which includes neo-classical economics, transaction-cost
economics, relational exchange theory, and conflict theory helped us identify the issues
and operationalise the analysis.
1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF FRANCHISING
The importance of franchising is evident in the magnitude of its use as an
organizational form. Five hundred sixty-two thousand franchised outlets had sales of over
$750 billion in the U.S.A., accounting for one third of all retail sales in 1994 ("Franchising
in the Economy" 1994). The International Franchise Association believes that sales
generated through franchising will rise to $1 trillion by the year 2000. The number of
business format franchisors has grown from 909 in 1972 to almost 3,200 in 1994. In the
same period individual outlets grew from 189,640 to 562,000 (Franchising in the
Economy, 1994), with over twenty-three thousand franchised outlets added in the U.S. in
1994 (Entrepreneur Magazine, January 1995). Indeed, franchising has experienced real
growth (inflation adjusted) in every year since the US Commerce Department began
keeping statistics in 1972.
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In 1994, The British Franchise Association commissioned National Westminster
Bank to conduct a survey of franchising in the United Kingdom. That survey revealed
23,200 franchised outlets with sales of over 6.0 billion pounds which were forecasted to
rise to over 10 billion pounds in 1996 (1994 NatWestIBFA Franchise Survey). The
International Franchise Association estimates there are approximately 90,000 franchised
outlets outside of the United States and the United Kingdom (IFA interview with Terrien
Barnes, Director of Pesearch, January 1994). Stern and El-Ansary (1988) estimate that
10% of all retail sales in Europe are through franchised outlets.
Eighty-seven percent of the outlets within the franchise system in the United States
are operated by franchisee companies with the remaining thirteen percent operated by the
franchisor (Franchising in the Economy, 1994). Types of businesses generally included in
business format franchising are restaurants, food and non-food retailing, personal and
professional services (Justis, 1986).
1.3 DEFINITIONS OF FRANCHISING
1.3.1 THE INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTIVE
BENEFITS
Miller and Grossman (1986) described franchising as an organizational form
structured by a long-term contract, whereby the owner, producer, or distributor
(franchisor) of a service or trade marked product grants the non-exclusive rights to a
distributor (franchisee) for the local distribution of the product or service. In return the
franchisee pays an up front fee and on-going royalties and agrees to conform to quality
standards (Justis and Judd, 1986). In a later study, Achrol and Etzel (1992, p.2) describe
a franchise as "...an incentive distribution system for organising individual firms
pursuing their own rewards" (emphasis added). Taking this latter perspective of
franchisor and franchisee firms being independently liable organisations, we prefer to
describe the phenomenon as an inter-organisationalform. This is consistent with Stern
and El-Ansary's (1988) definition of a marketing channel of distribution as sets of
interdependent organisations in the process of making a product
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or service available for use or consumption. Channel structure refers to the nature of the
firms involved in the channel, the nature and extent of their inter-related roles, and the
allocation of the channel's productive value (Stern and El-Ansary, 1988).
A key aspect of franchising is the central role of the trade mark (Caves and
Murphy, 1976). In this inter-organisational structure, the franchisee cloaks himself in the
identity of the trade mark but operates as a separate legal entity, described as
independently liable (Eaton and Joseph, 1988). Therefore franchising is the establishment
of a relationship between independent firms who share an intangible asset, customer
goodwill, embodied in the trademark. The intangible asset is enhanced or diminished by
the delivery of the product or service to the consumer. The value of the asset is derived
by capitalizing the stream of earnings it will generate. The capitalization value is the basis
for the franchise fee and royalty payment. The up front fee, generally termed a franchise
fee, is usually paid at the time the license agreement is executed. A royalty is a scheduled
payment made on a monthly or weekly basis, calculated as a percentage of the total
revenue generated by the franchisee firm. There is considerable variation in the magnitude
of both types of fees (Sen, 1991) but all are the apportionment of the value of the benefits
derived from the shared intangible asset, the trademark (Caves and Murphy, 1976;
Michaels, 1993).
1.3.2 HIsToRIcAL DEVELOPMENT AND EvoLUTIoN OF FRANCHISING
1.3.2.1 PRODUCT FRANCHISING
Two distinct types of franchising have developed and are described by Dicke
(1990). Product franchising was created by the makers of complex durable goods who
found existing wholesalers either unable or unwilling to market their products. These
manufacturers built their own distribution systems and franchises were created as
alternatives to the high cost of company-owned outlets. Thus, product franchising is
characterized by franchised dealers who concentrate on a company's product line and to
some extent identify their business with that company (U.S. Department of Commerce
1988). Product franchises include gas stations, car dealership, and soft-drink bottlers.
1.3.2.2 BUSINESS FORMAT FRANCHISING
The focus of this research is business format franchising. Business format
franchising grew out of the concept of distribution channel development and control. It
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was formalized in the late 1950's by entrepreneurs who believed that the outlet itself could
be a product. Initially the motivation was to enhance efficiency through minimizing cost
(franchised outlet versus company owned outlets) and later as a method of expanding
revenue by prescribing detailed operational practices to protect, and ultimately enhance,
the trade mark. Thus, franchising was used to create bilateral gains for channel members
through vertical integration (Williamson, 1991).
With the development of the modern economy and the evolution of contract law,
the franchisor was able to extract economies of scale from channel development which
gave the franchisees competitive advantages over completely independent business
ownership. National and regional advertising and product purchasing are important
examples of these economies of scale in building the trade name and trademark value
which are sold to the franchisee on a limited, non-exclusive basis. The main difference
between business format franchising and other market channels is that the downstream
channel members play a significant part in the quality control of the final product or
service (J'ven and Kluglanski, 1970).
Business format franchising accompanies the trademark and distribution rights with
information on the production processes and delivery system. Inherent in this is the
assumption that the information exchange will ensure the maintenance of the trademark
value (Caves and Murphy, 1976). The value is then enhanced through the development
and exploitation of economies of scale. Business format franchising usually includes a
marketing plan, documented and enforced procedures, process assistance, and business
development and innovation (Achrol and Etzel, 1991). It is an entire way of doing
business and is a more complex relationship than product franchising because the method
by which the asset is to be shared is stipulated in the franchise contract, often called the
license agreement (Dant, Wortzel, and Subramanian, 1992). For example, the McDonald's
franchisee must staff and market per the contractually agreed upon methods whereas the
product franchisee, say the Pepsi bottling franchise, centers on the soft drink formula and
the packaging of the product.
This complex channel system raises the question of coordination and control over
the marketing functions (Simpson, 1991). Each franchisee, as a downstream channel
member, impacts the value of the intangible asset as the trademark becomes manifest in
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the delivery of the product to the consumer. Thus, the performance of each outlet has pro
rala impact on the total income stream. Direct cost and benefits of individual performance
are associated with both the formal and informal governance structures of the franchise
relationship which ultimately affect the trade mark value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Clearly, the relationship must necessarily be dynamic because no long term contract can
cover all contingencies (Boyle, 1991). There is an interdependent effect of actions taken
by the parties either bilaterally or independently (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991). This is
due to the continuing interaction between the franchisee and the franchisor involving
general business discussion, feedback on marketing, and operations process adjustments.
The level of interaction varies by franchise system but often exceeds the strictly interpreted
contractual requirement (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987; Kaufman and Stern, 1988; Jakki
and Nevin, 1990).
1.3.2.3 FRANCHISING AND STANDARDIZED VALUE APPORTIONMENT
As noted, the franchise fee is paid and royalties stipulated in the license agreement
which is executed in advance of the actual franchisee firm commencement of operation
(Austin, 1989). A franchisor will have only one royalty rate at any point in time
(LaFontaine, 1992). Thus, two independent businesses agree in advance on the probable
outcome of a somewhat unknown series of events well into the future and memorialize it
in a contract. Because franchisors seldom negotiate their standard form of license
agreement (LaFontaine, 1988; Stanworth, 1985), the economic apportionment of value is
used over a number of such relationships. That is, all franchisees in a system typically pay
the same franchise fee and royalty to the franchisor regardless of the particular input mix
of the franchisee like site location, local market potential, and entrepreneurial capacity of
the franchisee. This provides the business researcher the opportunity to study the
relational issues in franchising, controlling for the share contract within any given franchise
organization.
1.3.2.4 THE FRANCHISE DEFIMTION AND A LITERATURE REVIEW BLUEPRINT
From the literature we have defined franchising as an inter-organizational form
which creates a contractual alliance between two firms to generate and allocate a
productive benefit. This definition points to a literature review to analyze franchising as
follows:
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The theoretical foundation for the allocation of the productive benefits in
franchising. We chose neo-classical economics.
2. The theoretical basis for governing the long term relationship between
franchisee and franchisor inherent in franchising. We chose transaction -cost
economics.
3. A theoretical measure of the strength and stability of the franchisee-
franchisor relationship. We chose exchange theory.
4. Because our research focuses on issues of conflict in franchising we also review
channel conflict literature.
1.4 AN OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this chapter we set a foundation for analysing the franchisee-franchisor
relationship.
The Neo-classical economic perspectives are used to set forth the micro economic
structures of the typical franchisee firm and typical franchisor firm. Cost and revenue
functions and the subsequent profit maximising behaviour are reviewed.
Transaction-cost economics is used to characterise the governance of the
relationship between the franchisee and franchisor. Transaction-cost analysis requires
attention to the role of shared assets. In franchising this directs us to the trade mark.
relational exchange theory allows us to measure the satisfaction of the franchisee
in the relationship. This allows us to probe the issues which drive satisfaction (or
dissatisfaction).
Finally, the conflict literature bridges the previous three theoretical tools by placing
them in the context of a generalisable conflict paradigm.
CHAPTER ifi: THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND PROPOSITIONS
The theoretical foundation built in Chapter H presents a platform for the research
question and three propositions. This chapter presents the research question and
propositions and discusses the way in which those questions and their component parts are
operationalised.
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CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METhODOLOGY
The research instrument used was a mail questionnaire sent to 2,912 franchisees.
The questionnaire was segmented into five parts; each designed to reflect the requirements
of the theoretical foundation and subsequent research questions. In this chapter we review
sampling methodology and support the validity and reliability of the instrument and of
each operationalisation. Further, we discuss the pilot study used to test the questionnaire.
CHAPTER V: UN1VARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
2,912 franchisees from nine franchise systems were mailed questionnaires. 621
franchisees responded. In this chapter we describe the data with specific attention to
characteristics of the franchisee, franchisee firm, and franchisee conflict variables. Also,
the pattern of responses to the survey is described.
The intention of the chapter is to begin inspection and investigation of the data to
enlighten and reveal information to answer the research question and propositions. Goals,
franchisor provided services and perceived exit costs are factor analysed with discussion
of components.
CHAPTER VI: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Multivariate analysis of the data is accomplished in a series of statistical
applications. Included in our statistical regimen is cluster analysis, CHAID (chi-square
automatic interaction detector) analysis, Wilcoxon matched pairs test, Kruskal-Wallis one-
way analysis of variance, and chi-square goodness of fit. In this chapter the research
question, regarding the measurement of conflict in franchising, is answered and nineteen
CHAID models are displayed, culminating in addressing the propositions.
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The aim of this thesis, to provide guidance for improvement of the franchisee-
franchisor relationship, is brought to fruition in this chapter. Here we discuss both the
academic conclusions and the implications of those findings for the practitioner. Through
a discussion of our findings and an outline of that which will further this research agenda
we make recommendations to promulgate a better franchise environment. Conclusions
and implications are extracted for franchising in both the United States and internationally.
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A discussion of the limitations of the research is an important aspect of outlining the
research agenda for the future.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 THE FRANCHISE DEFINITION AND THE LITERATURE REVIEW
A theoretical framework from which to analyze franchising was developed from a
review of the literature. Theories used in the development of the research question and
data collection instrument are neo-classical microeconomics, transaction-cost economics,
exchange theory (including Mcneil, 1976, 1980 and Parson 1959), and channel conflict
literature. A multi-theoretic approach is taken to define the existence and history of
franchising, formulate the research propositions, and construct the research instrument.
Adhering to the belief that franchising is an inter-organisational form, we use the literature
review to examine both the franchisee and franchisor firms.
2.2 NEO-CLASSICAL MICROECONOMICS
Traditional microeconomic theory links the central franchise theme of intangible
asset sharing to a theoretical framework inasmuch as the reduction in cost or the increase
in revenues results from a division of tasks between independent firms (Williamson, 1975).
As Caves and Murphy (1976) note, "The logical motivation for two independent
enterprises to divide activities are the advantages of cost reduction or revenue
enhancement." We endeavor to illustrate the structures of the two firms with a specific
analysis of their differences. In doing so, we establish the theoretical basis for conflict
between the franchisor and franchisee.
2.2.1 COST AND REVENUE FUNCTIONS OF THE FRANCHISEE AND FRANCHISOR FIRMs
Microeconomic theory assumes that both the franchisor and the franchisee are
attempting to maximize profit (Coase, 1952; Hayek, 1945). The channel literature which
addresses microeconomic considerations has concluded that the franchisee's hypothetical
demand or average revenue (AR) function is downward sloping and to the right (McGuire
and Staelin, 1983; Mittelstaedt and Stassen, 1990). This reflects product and location
differentiation which gives the franchisee the ability to vary price from their competitors in
the marketplace. The coefficient of elasticity is different at every point along the AR line
and decreases as price decreases. The only AR function which would not exhibit this
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property is one which has a constant elasticity to price over its entire range (Mansfield,
1990).
The role of the franchisee in the franchising relationship is delivery of units of
product or service to the consumer. Each unit of good or service carries a cost. To
deliver the unit some overhead is usually in place. Therefore, in the depiction of cost the
franchisee exhibits both fixed and variable costs (see figure 2.2). Thus there is a positive
marginal cost to sales for the franchisee firm (Brickley and Dark, 1987).
Franchisor revenue is principally generated through franchise fees, royalties, and
the sale of goods and services to the franchisees (Sen. 1991). Since a franchisor must put
in place much of its overhead to service even a single franchisee, initial fees are not
directly related to output levels; they are neither a marginal cost or a marginal revenue to
the franchisor (Ozanne and Hunt, 1971). Royalties arise from on-going operations and are
theoretically central to output levels. However, franchisors are loath to change the terms
of their license agreement among franchisees (Stanworth and Hough, 1984; see also
Lafontaine, 1988). This is especially true in the establishment of the royalty percentage.
Hence, the percentage of total revenue applied to royalties is generally fixed across the
system.
The sale of goods and services to the franchisee is clearly marginal both as to cost
and revenue. However, research has shown these sales to be inconsequential to altering
the basic cost or revenue function (Mittelstaedt and Stassen, 1990). Therefore the
franchisor's average revenue curve will substantively be the sum of the franchisee's average
revenue curves, already shown as downward sloping and to the right (Mittelstaedt and
Stassen, 1990). The elasticity of the AR curve will be the same at each price as the AR of
the system's average franchisee. The microeconomic perspective closely aligns the
revenue related economic structures of the franchisee and franchisor (Mittelstaedt and
Stassen, 1990).
Examining the franchisor's theoretical cost structure next, the assumption is that
the franchisor's cost is entirely fixed. This assumption is in line with the franchisor
overhead placement requirement previously stated. This assumption must be relaxed to
reflect the "tiered" placement of overhead and the marginal nature of product and service
sales to franchisees. Tiered placement of overhead occurs as a result of "staged" growth.
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The first tier of overhead is put in place as required to meet contractual obligations for a
prescribed number of stores. Pressure, vis a vis task failure or relational, builds and a
second layer of overhead is placed to relieve the pressure and secure support obligations
for a second tier of outlets. This tiering process continues until development ebbs as the
markets become saturated or exogenous forces cause a slowing of growth. The tiered
overhead effect aside for the moment, the franchisor has no cost directly attributable to the
sale of each unit of good or service made by the franchisee. Therefore, the franchisor has
no marginal cost.
Totai Revenue
Franc.hisor
Profit Maximisation
$
	 Total Fixed Cost Franchisor
Total Cost Franchisor
Price
Profit Maxin3ising Price
for the Franchisor
Figure 2.1	 Franchisor Demand and Cost Functions
2.2.2 PRICING BEHAVIOUR OF THE FRANCHISEE AND FRANCI{ISOR
With the franchisee having the previously explained downward sloping and to the
right demand curve, a reduction in product price yields an increase in the quantity of
goods sold. The franchisor incurs no cost for the production of the units which make up
these sales, including the increase. A firm with no marginal cost maximizes its profit with
the product price at which demand is exactly unit elastic and thus total revenue is
maximized. This is an important theoretical indicator of different behavioural motivations
between franchisee and franchisor. With marginal cost equal to zero, the franchisor is
motivated to increase sales to a non-optimal profit level for the franchisee. Because the
franchise structure encourages centralized economies of scale in marketing, especially
advertising and promotion, marketing is a likely tool for the franchisor to use as a product
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price adjusting mechanism. That is, because the franchisor is motivated to increase total
revenue, which can effectively be accomplished through a price reduction. While the
franchisee sets the unit price at the local level, a system-wide price reduction can be
implemented through centralised promotions, such as discount coupons. Thus, the
marketing mix, including pricing, is controlled by the franchisor. Also, because the density
of outlet development will affect the gross level of system sales, this is another likely area
for conflict between the franchisee and franchisor. The franchisor is motivated to develop
more outlets to increase system sales and the franchisee is motivated to under-invest to
maximise single outlet profitability. Simply stated, the franchisee is afraid that another
store in the general market in which they operate may take profitable business away from
the first outlet. However, the combined sales of the two outlets will likely be greater than
just the single outlet and therefore the franchisor increases their revenue.
For the franchisee, each unit of good or service sold has an associated cost.
Increased sales create marginal revenue and marginal cost. With positive marginal cost
the franchisee's profit is maximized at a price elasticity greater than 1.0. As previously
discussed, and displayed in figure 2.1, the franchisor's optimum price is set at an elasticity
of exactly 1.0, the point at which the total revenue curve is the greatest distance from total
cost (which is the same as fixed cost). This divergence in optimal pricing strategy means
the franchisee's profit maximizing price will be higher than the price which will maximize
the franchisor's profit. Remember, the franchisor's revenue is principally generated from a
fixed percentage of franchisee total revenue. Therefore the franchisor's pricing strategy is,
defacto, the franchisee's pricing strategy.
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Figure 2.2	 Demand Function of the Average Franchisee
Under the marginal cost scenario described above, total cost equals fixed cost for
the franchisor. The total cost curve is parallel to the X axis. The franchisee's total cost
equals variable plus fixed cost. The franchisee total cost curve is upward sloping and to
the right. For both entities profit equals total revenue less total cost. Also, the profit
maximizing price for both entities is the point at which marginal revenue equals marginal
cost. For the franchisor MCO. MRO where total revenue is maximized. Stated
differently, the franchisor will desire to drive revenue higher with lower pricing until
revenue is maximized. When a lower price no longer generates a sufficient increase in
quantity to make up for the per unit reduction in price, price will be stabilized. With each
unit increase in quantity of sales a marginal cost is incurred for the franchisee. With the
same pricing equation of MRMC the franchisee will be willing to lower price until it
equals marginal cost. Franchisee MC>O while franchisor MCO and therefore franchisee
price> franchisor price. This is the first indication that there is a potential for conflict in
the differences in microeconomic structures of the franchisee and franchisor firm and that
the potential conflict may manifest in the marketing functions as driven by profit
maximising behaviour.
Economists add some qualifications to the framework. To the extent that sales
increase in one outlet (as a result of a price decrease) is the result of the cannibalization of
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sales from another outlet in the same franchise system, then the revenue maximizing effect
to the franchisor is reduced (Rubin, 1976). Geographic dispersion of outlets in individual
franchise systems impacts carmibalisation. Territorial issues, especially the extent of
exclusive territory rights for franchisees are a key issue (American Franchise Association
National Convention 1994). Equally, new outlet development impacts the density of
outlets in a franchise system affects total system sales and the extent of cannibalisation.
Also, the comparison being made is between the franchisor and the "average" franchisee.
Clearly most franchisees will fall outside the average. For example, in a retail environment
labor is a significant contributor to total cost (Matthewson and Winter, 1985). Efficiency
in scheduling moves a greater portion of labor from fixed to variable expense. The
theoretical optimum is to schedule employees only at the exact time a customer requires
service. This enhances franchisee profitability but also widens the gap in profit
maximizing price strategy with the franchisor.
2.2.3 THE EFFECTS OF PRODUCT SALES FROM THE FRANCH1SOR TO THE
FRANCHISEE AN]) SALES CANNIBALIZATION
The effect of product sales from the franchisor to the franchisee is somewhat
unexplored. However, there is some evidence that the magnitude of this type of
transaction is between 0 and 16% (Mittelstaedt and Stassen, 1990). This does not seem to
be a strong enough influence to narrow the gap in optimal pricing to a trivial level. Caves
and Murphy (1976) describe the mandatory requirement to purchase inputs from the
franchisor as having the same microeconomic structural effect as the royalty. Revenue to
the franchisor vis a vis product sales is directly linked to unit sales and remains unaffected
by end user pricing, promotion, or store development. Unless the franchisor voluntarily
agrees to participate in the promotion via discounting product to the franchisee, product
sales have the same effect on the profit maximizing behavioural variance between
franchisee and franchisor as do royalties. Theoretically this variance is exacerbated if the
franchisor is not the producer and simply negotiates a supply contract for the franchisees
with a mark up for the franchisor.
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2.2.4 SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF NEO-CLASSICAL EcoNoMics ON THE ANALYSIS
OF THE FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHIP
Economic theory points to the role of pricing within and between firms. Hayek
(1945) proposes that the price system is an extraordinarily efficient mechanism for
communicating information and inducing change. He asserts that adaptation is the central
objective of economic organizations and focuses on the marketplace, with pricing as the
key element. In the ideal marketplace supply and demand is brought into equilibrium
through the actions of autonomous individual participants, the consumer and the producer.
Both pal-ties respond to price changes so as to maximize their individual utility and profit
(Williamson, 1991). This reinforces the theoretical basis for our research to focus on
actions which the franchisor can take to impact franchisee pricing of the product or
service. We have identified these as activities involving the franchisor provided services of
promotion and store development.
2.2.5 CONCLUSION REGARDING THE NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
Because of the proliferation of franchising it appears evident that if the problems of
divergent optimal pricing exist they are out-weighed by the advantages in the relationship.
However, do the differences in profit maximizing behaviour sub-optimize the relationship
(increased bureaucracy, litigation, hard bargaining, opportunity cost) and are there
ameliorating actions that could reduce the structural problem? The neo-classical
economic perspective, and specifically the micro economic structure of the firm, lends
strong theoretical support for the existence of divergent behavioural patterns between
franchisee and franchisor firms related to pricing, marketing, and new store development.
Thus, we clearly see the potential for conflict in the relationship.
2.3 TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS
The theory of the firm focuses on the market issues of supply and demand and the
interactive nature of the two in determining profit maximizing pricing (Coase, 1952).
Transaction-cost economics places the principal burden of analysis on comparisons of
transaction costs which, broadly, are the "costs of running the economic system" (Arrow,
1969, p.48). Transaction-cost economics also embraces the assumption that the parties
involved in the relationship are motivated by economic self-interest and will engage in
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opportunistic behaviour to maximize their own position (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker,
1992). Whereas the firm is the basis for analysis in microeconomic theory, the transaction
is the basic unit of analysis in transaction-cost economics (Williamson, 1975).
Transaction-cost's focus has led to an examination of the basic dimensions on which the
transactions differ and the implications of those differences for designing appropriate
governance structures. Central to the dimensional boundaries in TCA is asset specificity
(Williamson, 1985). This appears uniquely to link TCA with the central theme in
franchising, the sharing of an intangible asset, the trademark, and the particular issues of
governance that arise from that sharing. TCA is concerned with developing the most
appropriate safeguards that best protect the transactions against the hazards of
opportunism (Simpson, 1991). The formal safeguard employed in franchising is the
license agreement which delineates the specific nature of common ownership and the
behaviour between the parties in support of that asset. "As economics expands beyond its
central core of price theory, and its central concern with quantities of commodities and
money, we observe in it... a shift from a highly quantitative analysis, in which equilibrium
at the margin plays a central role, to a much more qualitative institutional analysis, in
which discrete structural alternatives are compared" (Simon, 1978, p.6-7). Transaction-
cost economics moves beyond the marginal analysis involving efficient allocation of
resources to what Williamson (1991) describes as "discrete structural alternatives."
2.3.1 TRANSACTION-COST EcoNoMics AND CONTRACT LAW
Williamson (1991, p.270) outlines the factors which support the importance of
expanding analysis beyond economic theory and to transaction-cost analysis:
1.) Firms are not merely extensions of markets but employ different means.
2.) Discrete contract law differences provide crucial support for and serve to define
each generic form of governance, and
3.) Marginal analysis is typically concerned with second-order refinements to the
neglect of first-order economizing.
"I maintain that hierarchy is not merely a contractual act but is also a contractual
instrument, a continuation of market relations by other means" (Williamson 1991, p.271).
Williamson's iterations of transaction-cost economics have evolved from a focus
on the specific transaction to the development of a spectrum of governance which depends
36
on the nature of the transaction (Williamson 1975, 1979, 1985, 1991). He finally
advances the hypothesis that this spectrum contains three generic forms of organizational
governance; market and hierarchy at opposite ends and the hybrid organisation in the
middle. Each form of governance is supported by a different form of contract law.
2.3.1.1 WILLIAMSON'S "MARKET" ORGANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND C0YrRACr
LAW
Classical contract law is described by Mcneil (1974, p.'738) as "sharp in by clear
agreement; sharp out by clear performance." The market form of organizational
governance is supported by classical contract law (Williamson, 1991). Individual buyers
and sellers are not dependent upon each other except in the completion of a distinct
transaction. If further interaction is to occur, it is because of a separate contract
predicated on the promulgation of individual self-interest. Typically the renewal of
contracts is predicated on the supplier meeting the market price at the expiration of a short
term contract. Or, each party can go their separate way without cost to each other. If
conflict or disagreement occurs, hard bargaining is ruled by a set of laws where more
formal terms supersede less formal ones (written over oral agreements, for example)
(Mcneil, 1974).
There are a number of factors in the franchise relationship which indicate it is not
best characterized by the market and classical contract forms of governance. The
franchise relationship is long term and the parties to the agreement have interdependency.
In discrete market interaction the asset focus is the individually traded item. Assets such
as a single purpose building and secret recipes are franchise asset specific, however, the
principal specific asset in franchising is the shared trademark.
2.3.1.2 WILLIAMSON'S "HIERARCHY" GOVERNANCE AND CONTRAcT FOREBEARANCE
Williamson's (1991) spectrum of generic governance modes includes the market at
one end, the hybrid in the center, and the internal organization at the polar opposite from
the market. In describing the firm as a nexus of contracts there is the suggestion that the
firm resembles the market in respect to contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama
1980). However, Williamson distinguishes the firm by its hierarchial versus bilateral
structure. This hierarchy must adapt through fiat because of the absence of standing in the
courts (Eaton, 1988). Denied access to the formal judicial system the firm must resolve
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differences internally. This makes intuitive sense. Consider the potential for inertia if a
subordinate could routinely use the courts to challenge the actions of superiors.
"Hierarchy is its own court of ultimate appeal" (Williamson, 1991, P. 274). It is upon this
distinction, access to the courts, that Williamson forms his belief that to judge the firm
akin to the market is a limited perspective. The use of fiat is tempered by the
organizational self-interest motive although the market is more high-powered in aligning
actions and incentives (Williamson, 1985). The employee who cooperates in a hierarchy is
perceived as cooperative. The buyer in the market is principally motivated to economize
and is less likely to link cooperative behaviour with future return. Otherwise stated, a
division of a firm can claim responsibility for gains and deny responsibility for losses.
Also, the internal organization can creatively account for profit through the use of
inventory pricing and expense allocation. Williamson (1985) argues that the court's
reasoning not to give access to the internal dispute is sound. The efficacy of the firm
would be threatened if the courts adjudicated internal disputes.
2.3.1.3 WILLIAMSON'S "HYBRID" ORCANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND NEo-
CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW
Pclief from the strict enforcement of a contract lies in the concept of the "excuse
doctrine," which apply to contracts in which the parties to the transaction maintain
autonomy but are interdependent (Williamson, 1991). The neo-classical contract supports
the hybrid form of governance in Williamson's spectrum. This modification of classical
contract law stands on the ground that it facilitates continuity and promotes more efficient
adaptation where adaptation is a core reason for promulgation of the contract and
maintenance of the relationship (Hadfield, 1990). The neo-classical contract anticipates
disturbances for which realignment may be required, provides for trivial or inconsequential
disturbances, expressly designates a range of adjustments for disturbances, calls for a high
level of information exchange to substantiate disturbances, and provides for voluntary
arbitration should bilateral agreement fail (Mcneil, 1974; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Non-
trivial disturbance is defined as one in which the cost of realignment is greater then the
benefit derived from such an adjustment (Pondy, 1967). However, when a disturbance
reaches the level where the gains of strict adherence exceed the discounted value of
continuing the relationship then arbitration can be expected to give way to litigation
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(Mcneil, 1974). Therefore the neo-classical contract is not completely adaptive nor is the
hybrid form of governance.
2.3.2 TRANSACTION-COST'S GOVERNANCE SPECTRUM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
FRANCHISING
The franchise license agreement seems to embody much of the neo-classical
rationale. It is born out of economic self-interest, memorializes a desire to have a
continuing, long term relationship, and anticipates disturbances specifically in the division
of tasks which gives the franchisor the discretion to implement change across the system
for all franchisees. This authority generally rests in the license agreement clause, among
others, allowing the franchisor to make alterations to the operations manual.
It is clear that franchising is a hybrid organisational form (Williamson, 1979).
Therefore, the excuse doctrine in contract law applies. This further supports the notion
that the franchisee and the franchisor are separate. Transaction-cost analysis provides a
clear understanding of the interdependency of the franchisee and franchisor within a
necessarily dynamic contractual relationship.
2.3.3 INCENTWES AND SPECIFIC CONTROL INSTRUMENTS
The key difference in the governance structures of market, hybrid, and hierarchy is
in the application of contract law. Other crucial differences lie in the use of incentives and
specific control instruments (Williamson, 1991).
In economic theory the adaptation mechanism is pricing. The reaction of price to
supply and demand in the market elicits spontaneous cooperation between the buyer and
the seller (Hayek, 1945). The ability to unilaterally adapt versus adaptation in a
coordinated fashion establishes the market at one end of Williamson's spectrum. The
other end of the spectrum is described by Barnard (1938, p.4) in his discussion of the
organization's role as an adaptive force in reacting to exogenous disturbances as "that kind
of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate, purposeful." As dependencies
proliferate and the need for coordinated adaptation increases, governance moves from the
market at one end to the hybrid in the middle and the hierarchy at the other end.
As discussed earlier, franchising is a hybrid and thus is used to describe the
incentive problems faced by the hybrid. The long term nature of the franchise contract
self-explains the need for adjustments in reaction to unexpected occurrences. Although it
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may be abundantly evident to both the franchisor and the franchisee that realignment is
advantageous, the allocation of the adjusted outcomes is unknown. The self-interest
motive predictably manifests. Potentially, hard bargaining can be expensive vis a vis
opportunity cost during the bargaining period. If opportunistic behaviour occurs, the
relationship can be threatened by the very activity necessary to ensure its survival,
adaptation. Williamson (1991) concludes that fiat has adaptive advantages over autonomy
for transactions of a bilaterally (or multilaterally) dependent nature because of the cost and
risk stated above. However, we are also left to conclude that in franchising the
mechanisms for coordination can be institutionalized through the careful use of process, a
control instrument contractually granted to the franchisors (John, 1991; Frazier and Ptdy,
1991; Jcsenberg and Stern, 1971; Lusch, 1976; Dant and Schul, 1992). The satisfaction
of the franchisee with the process is integral to conflict in the relationship (Frazier, Gill
and Kale, 1989).
Williamson (1991) also argues that the incentive problems faced in the hybrid
mode will exacerbate in hierarchy. Internal organizations reduce incentive intensity. The
focused incentive for personal gain in the market is diffused in the hybrid and further
diffused in the hierarchy. Simply stated, dependencies are fertile ground for shifting
responsibility. Franchising as a hybrid attempts to maximize the incentives inherent in the
market environment while at the same time governing the relationship of independent
firms in a hierarchial mode and thus leveraging the resources. This can be best described
by using Williamson's "Organizational Effectiveness Grid." This matrix vividly illustrates
the required interdependency of the franchisee and franchisor in the hybrid model.
2.3.4 TRANSACTION-COST EcoNoMics AND ORGANIISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
There are four areas and three levels of organizational effectiveness which can be
used to identi& the mode of governance structure. The grid below (Williamson, 1991) is
used to depict the spectrum:
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Table 2.1 Organizational Effectiveness Grid & Governance Structure
Mode of
	 Unilateral	 Coordinated	 Incentives	 Administrative Control
Governance	 Adaptation	 Adaptation
Market	 high	 low	 high	 low
Hybrid	 medium	 medium	 medium	 medium
Hierarchy	 low	 high	 low	 high
Transaction-cost Economics categorizes the franchise organization as a "hybrid."
This helps us understand the difficulty both franchisee and franchisor firms have in
unilateral adaptation to market conditions and in implementing administrative controls.
Both adaptation and administrative control must be shared and agreed upon. It also
explains that "incentives" are less than these experienced by the "stand alone" entrepreneur
because return is shared between franchisee and franchisor. This "grid" helps us more
clearly see that the franchise relationship is inter-organisational. The dynamics of the
relationship are reduced to four levels, all of which require "medium" or shared
responsibility between the parties. Coordination at all four levels of the spectrum creates
opportunity for conflict because the implications of negotiated change to the goals of each
the franchisee or franchisor are not immediately known (Williamson, 1991). Also, the
continuing nature of coordination and adaptation builds satisfaction or dissatisfaction over
a series of events (Mcneil, 1975).
TCA has established the requirement in franchising for coordination and adaptation
to occur interdependently, and the central theme in franchising is maintenance and
enhancement of the trade mark, the asset most specific to the franchise relationship.
Therefore, franchise interdependency centers on the trade mark. However, the nature of
interdependency requires a fuller discussion.
2.3.4.1 POWER-DEPENDENCE, INFLUENCE STRATEGIES AND INTERDEPENDENCE
The power-dependence model adheres to the belief that the contractual
relationship in franchising places the franchisee in a dependent position (Dant, Wortzel and
Subramian, 1992). The franchisor will then influence the franchisee to behave in a manner
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which advances the objectives of the franchisor. There are seven basic influence strategies
(Frazier and Rody, 1991):
1. Information exchange
2. Discussion of business strategy
3. Requests
4. Recommendations
5. Promises
6. Threats
7. Legalistic pleas
The first four strategies are non-coercive and the last three are coercive. Non-
coercive strategies place the emphasis on open, interactive information exchange. The
franchisor assumes the "pie" can be made larger by cooperative behaviour and therefore is
willing to risk a more fluent relationship. Often a charismatic leader can best use non-
coercive strategies.
2.3.4.2 RICIPROCAL AcTION THEORY
The use of any one or all of these influence strategies will invite a response,
generally known as "reciprocal action"(Lusch, 1976). Because the license agreement is
usually a long term arrangement and cannot cover all contingencies, the need for the
franchisor to develop and apply influence strategies is central to their system coordinating
role. Several studies (Frazier and Rody, 1991; Frazier and Summers, 1986; Beier and
Stern, 1969) have found that the use of coercive influence strategies will likely result in
reciprocal coercive behaviour. Because the license agreement is often weighted in favor
of the franchisor there might be a greater propensity for the coercive options. Later
discussion in this thesis of the license agreement can be used as a guideline in assessing the
weight of power in the relationship and the likelihood for coercive behaviour.
2.3.4.3 RECIPROCAL INTERDEPENDENCE
The complexity of franchising is clearly apparent when one discovers that the
principallagent roles are not exclusive to the franchisor/franchisee respectively. That is,
the roles of principal and agent are occupied by both the franchisor and the franchisee at
different times and in different circumstances in the relationship. Both the franchisor and
franchisee are party to a contract (license agreement) which enumerates specific
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obligations and implies others (Norton, 1988). Additionally, case law has supported an
increasing level of equality for the franchisee through access to, and redress from, the
courts (Joseph and Eaton, 1988). Clearly both parties have a responsibility to support the
trademark and an incentive to enhance its value and an expectation of the other party to
the agreement to do likewise. The degree to which these roles are played is particular to
the individual franchise system, its contractual network, the relationship between the
parties, and the respective power-dependence relationship at any given time. However,
because the franchisor usually perceives itself in the principle role, one of two over-riding
strategies is used. First, the franchisor can invest in monitoring systems and write a license
agreement which bases franchisee reward on information about his or her behaviour. The
second option is an outcome based contract. Rewards to the franchisee are based on the
realized outcomes such as total revenue. Some franchisors attempt to design their license
agreement to incorporate both frameworks (Bergen et al., 1992).
2.3.5 TRANSACTION-COST EcoNoMics ANI) ASSET SPECIFICITY
The critical differences in organizational form and governance mode are centered
on the frequency, uncertainty, and degree of asset specificity in supplying a good or
service in a transaction (Williamson, 1979). Asset specificity is defined as "the degree to
which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without
sacrifice of productive value" and are distinguished in six ways:
1. Site-specificity
2. Physical asset specificity
3. Human asset specificity
4. Brand name capital
5. General assets dedicated to a specific customer
6. Temporal specificity: site specificity which requires on-site human assets.
Clearly, the franchise company stakes its future on the shared development of
brand name capital. Continued investment in reputational and brand name asset is critical
to competitive advantage and success (Klein and Leffer, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). This may
also be crucial for debt acquisition. Intangible, firm specific assets can form a basis of
security for the lender (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1992). Temporal and site specificity, in
varying degrees, is also integral to the franchise organizational form (Mundstock, 1991).
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Human and physical asset specificity may be important to franchise success and dedicated
assets generally are not as important because business format franchising is usually retail
based and few assets are dedicated to specific customers. MacDonalds does not dedicate
any assets to a particular customer while a Postal Instant Press copy franchise might have
a high speed copier exclusively dedicated to a government contract.
This discussion leads to the theoretical rationale for how required adaptation and
interdependency, centered on the trade mark (which embodies the business format),
creates the opportunity for conflict.
2.3.6 TRANSACTION-COST ANALYSIS AND OPPORTUNISM
Williamson's theory of transaction-cost analysis helps bridge contract and
organizational theory to explain why different structures emerge, such as franchising.
Simply stated, transactions cost is the "cost of running the system" (Arrow, 1969). A
franchise relationship may induce actions related to self-interest and potentially opposed to
the best interest of the franchisor or the franchise system as a whole. Williamson (1975)
calls this "opportunism" or "self-interest with guile." Withholding promised information
would fall within the definition while hard bargaining would not. Clearly, opportunistic
behaviour sub-optimises system efficiency. That does not mean that the franchisor always
bears the full impact of the efficiency loss. Opportunity costs, especially as they relate to
the deterioration of the trade mark, may disproportionately affect the franchisees in a
system. Likewise, the franchisor may behave in a manner which deteriorates the trade
mark or adversely affects any individual franchisee in some way. Examples of this
behaviour would be using outlet monitoring personnel for new store development or in
support of company owned operations.
2.3.7 THEORETICAL IMPACT OF TRANSACTION-COST EcoNoMIcs ON THE
FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHIP
The franchise relationship shares a key asset (the trademark), requires coordinated
behaviour to adapt to disturbance, and the franchisor has certain rights of fiat, specifically
license agreement clauses which call for certain marketing initiatives, process refinements,
and termination rights. Yet, the existence of a formal contract in franchising and the
abundance of litigation (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker, 1992) refutes any belief that the
franchisor/franchisee relationship can be enveloped in a single hierarchial organization.
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The lack of an express tolerance zone, the rigidity of the fee structure, and absence of an
arbitration clause, all common in franchising, lends theoretical support to the potential for
conflict in this hybrid governance structure. The "cost of the conflictual transaction" is
assessed by the franchisee and franchisor against the value of maintaining the relationship.
Because the relationship is by definition related to building the business format, trade
mark, the cost-value assessment revolves around the perceived value of the trade mark.
2.4 EXCHANGE THEORY
2.4.1 McNEIL's RELATIONAL EXCHANGE
To assess the attitude of parties to a transaction Kaufman and Stern (1988) used
T'elational exchange theory. Both Transaction-cost economics and Exchange Theory fall
under the exchange literature umbrella, which focuses on the transactions between entities.
Kaufman and Stern found it most appropriate when operationalising conflict in the
exchange.
Ian rr Mcneil (1974, 1978, 1980, 1985,) is the principle proponent of relational
Exchange Theory. This theory suggests that the norms that govern commercial exchange
behaviour in discrete transactions are markedly different from those in relational exchange.
When parties to commercial exchange become involved in a conflict episode, it might be
expected that the types of norms which govern their relationship will affect their
characterization of each other's conflict behaviour. Franchise partners (franchisor and
franchisees) cooperate to create surplus and are in conflict over the division of that
surplus, as is common among all exchange partners (Boulding 1962). Patrick Kaufman
and Louis Stern (1988) propose a model of conflict in commercial exchange relationships.
This model focuses on how the prevailing exchange norms of solidarity, role integrity, and
mutuality impact a party's perception of unfair treatment and how causal attributions
mediate effects. The perception of unfairness is then linked to the level of hostility that is
retained after a conflict episode. In Kaufman and Stern's model the norm of solidarity and
its interaction with the causal attribution measure is found to be significantly related to
retained hostility.
According to Mcneil (1974), types of commercial exchange form a continuum
from purely discrete transactions (that is, a once only transaction exemplified by a tourist's
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purchase of a souvenir in a location far from home) to relational exchange, long term,
continuous, and complex relationships in which the individual transactions are of relatively
low importance compared to the relationship itself. Kaufinan and Stern specifically note
franchising as the prototype relational exchange. What distinguishes discrete and
relational exchange is the way general contracting norms are manifested in the parties'
relationship. Three of the most important general contracting norms are solidarity, role
integrity, and mutuality. Mcneil argues that all three norms are present in all transactions
from the discrete to the relational exchange. It is the strength and persistence of each
norm which dictates the exchanges positioning on the relational exchange spectrum.
2.4.1.1 SOLIDARITY
The common contracting norm of solidarity is the norm that holds exchanges
together (Mcneil, 1980). The focus of the discrete norm of solidarity is the completion of
the individual transaction, and is supported by contract law. The focus of the relational
norm of solidarity is on the preservation of the unique and continuing relationship in which
the various commercial transactions take place. In exchange relations the norm is
generally internalized by the parties who view this particular exchange relationship as
important in and of itself. The extent to which the solidarity norm reflects this
reorientation from the individual transaction to the relationship is one indication of how far
a particular commercial relationship is along the exchange relationship continuum.
We have noted in our discussion of transaction-cost economics that coordinated
adaptation is required in the franchise organization. This interdependence is central to the
long term enhancement of the trade mark value. However, neo-classical economic theory
outlined the potential sources of conflict. Transaction-cost analysis presents a theoretical
dynamic which requires interim adjustments to the relationship which can stress
governance structures. The solidarity norm helps us understand the rationale which
contributes to maintaining the relationship.
2.4.1.1.1 SOLIDARITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF UNFAIRNESS
Disputes that threaten the exchange process occur in both discrete transactions and
relational exchange. Kaufman and Stern (1988) state that acts which threaten the
exchange relationship are often difficult to identif'. The relational norm of solidarity is
established and evolves on a quid pro quo basis. Each channel member observes the
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actions of the other, establishes a general pattern of behaviour, and decides whether it is
supportive or destructive of the relationship. Responses to a party's behaviour are
influenced by the receiving party's perception of fairness in the first party's actions
(Axlerod, 1984). Each party upholds the norm preserving the relationship as long as the
other is apparently willing to take actions which cause the relationship to endure. Over a
period of time (which is subjectively selected) the perceived pattern of behaviour creates a
reputation. Those actions which are difficult to interpret as either supportive or harmful
will be partially determined by reputation.
In exchange relationships with a high relational norm of solidarity, the parties are
likely to develop a strong reputation for trust. In seeking to maintain perceptual
consistency, a party may discount observed behaviour interpreted as inconsistent with
those feelings. All else equal, when faced with manifest conflict behaviour, a party acting
under a relational norm of solidarity can be expected to interpret ambiguous behaviour as
fair. The same expectation cannot be made in the discrete transaction.
2.4.1.2 ROLE INTEGRITY
The parties to commercial transactions and exchange relationships enact roles that
reflect their promises and expectations. Mcneil has argued role integrity, the maintenance
of roles, is an important contracting norm. In discrete transactions the roles are
unidimensional. The exchange is highly focused and the roles reflect a single-mindedness
in the transaction. On the other hand, in relational exchange the parties enact roles that
not only govern the particular transaction but cover a multitude of issues not directly
related to any particular transaction. The continuum from discrete transaction to relational
exchange is characterized by the change from simple unidimensional to highly complex
roles.
Complexity is theoretically inherent in franchising (Kaufman and Stern, 1988).
The interdependence required to maintain the trade mark in the long term (Frazier and
Rody, 1991) induces a multitude of complex roles for both the franchisee and the
franchisor. However, if there is undue rigidity or strict enforcement of the license
agreement the roles become more unidimensional and the exchange less relational. This
would indicate an organization with diminished prospects for continuance. Virtually all
franchise license agreements have contractually obligated or implied services to the
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franchisees. These services are often the focus of the relationship and serve as a measure
of the state of tolerance within the relationship.
2.4.1.2.1 ROLE INTEGRITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF UNFAIRNESS
As role integrity becomes more relational, the roles enacted by the parties become
more complex. The heightened complexity of the exchange relationship implies greater
interdependence between the parties and therefore increases the probability of latent
conflict (Pondy, 1967, 1985; Kaufman and Stern, 1988). The multiple connections
between the parties also increase the number of uncontrollable precipitating factors that
could conceivably bring about a manifest conflict event (Boyle and Dwyer, 1990).
Of course not all such conflict is serious but over time the parties will develop a
method for resolving conflict, move toward a discrete transaction relationship or seek to
end the relationship (Mcneil, 1978). If the parties are in a highly relational form of
exchange we can expect them to cope, de-emphasize or deny conflict events. Because the
potential for conflict being precipitated by uncontrollable circumstances is high,
intentionally produced conflict can be particularly disturbing to the perceiving party. In a
highly relational exchange this behaviour will be seen as a breach of the role integrity norm
and the perception of unfairness may exceed the intent (Mcneil, 1985).
2.4.1.3 MUTUALITY
Franchising is an inter-organizational form that distributes the productive benefits
of a commercial relationship. Mcneil suggests that the norm of mutuality, while not
requiring an "equal" distribution of the exchange surplus, requires an "even" distribution.
In the context of franchising "even" is defined as a distribution to channel members that
assures adequate returns to each (Rubin, 1976).
If we assume an ongoing, recurring exchange relationship with a series of
individual transactions, two very different approaches to the "even" division of surplus are
possible. The parties may view each transaction as a distinct, discrete event. Division of
the surplus would be conducted on a transaction by transaction basis. These are discrete
transactions. On the other hand, the individual transactions might be viewed as nothing
more than the periodic enactments of the overall exchange relationship. That is, during
each transaction the parties could be conceived of as drawing against some long-term,
open account. This is relational exchange. The discrete norm of mutuality is
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characterized by the parties focus on the returns received from each individual transaction.
The relational norm of mutuality is characterized by focus on the continuous,
undifferentiated returns from the ongoing exchange relationship.
2.4.1.3.1 MUTUALITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF UNFAIRNESS
The relational norm of mutuality focuses the attention of the parties on the benefits
they derive from the ongoing relationship as a whole. The performance of each individual
transaction is not as closely specified or monitored as they are in discrete transactions.
This permits the parties to the relational exchange to put conflict behaviour relative to a
particular transaction in the context of the whole relationship. In discrete transacting,
isolated incidents of uncooperative or combative behaviour become more salient because
each transaction is being specified, monitored, and completed individually. A party in a
discrete transaction cannot expect losses suffered at the hands of the other party to be
washed away by future gains.
Wilful, opportunistic conflict behaviour is not easily distinguished from
uncooperative behaviour constrained by circumstances beyond the actor's control (Dant
and Schul, 1992). The long term monitoring horizon, characteristic of the relational norm
of mutuality, creates the flexibility necessary for an exchange relationship to withstand
harmful or destructive outside forces (Mcneil, 1978). However, it may also allow wilfi.il
destructive behaviour to go unchecked for longer periods. When identified such
behaviour may occasion strong feelings of betrayal (Kaufman and Stern, 1988).
2.4.1.4 PERCEWED UNFAIRNESS AND HosTILITY
In a study of international conflict, Lockhart (1978) found the type of tactics
employed by parties during a dispute were significantly related to subsequent wars and
alliances. Similarly, in commercial disputes a party's characterization of his or her
opponent's conflict behaviour will affect the level of hostility retained toward the opponent
after the conflict event is terminated (Kaufiian and Stern, 1988).
As previously defined, franchising involves a long term relationship between
franchisee and franchisor. Thus, the manner in which either franchisee or franchisor
charactenses the behaviour of the other party affects the level of satisfaction.
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2.5 CONFLICT LITERATURE
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION
We have described how neo-classical economic theory, transaction-cost
economics, and relational exchange theory all indicate the potential for conflict in the
franchisee-franchisor relationship. However, conflict comes in many forms.
2.5.2 A GENERAL MODEL OF CONFLICT
In 1967 Louis R. Pondy wrote a seminal work on conflict in commercial
organizations. He presented a model of conflict as a temporary outbreak in an otherwise
smooth flow of a stable and cooperative set of relationships that make up an organization.
Conflict was treated as a series of episodes, each including the five described as follows, in
order: latency, perception, felt, manifestation, and aftermath. The process of conflict,
sometimes with different labels, has been consistently supported in the literature (Barnard
and Simon, 1965; Pondy, 1967, 1992; Price, 1991; Morrill and Thomas, 1992). Latent
conflict is characterized by competition for scarce resources and a driving desire for
autonomy. The degree of latent conflict is described by the divergence of sub-unit goals
(Pondy and Huff, 1985). Perceived conflict deals with the misconceptions by parties
related to sub-unit goal divergence when in reality little divergence of goals exist. Felt
conflict is the personalization of conflict. Tension is created by inconsistency between
organizational demands and individual growth. The personality of the individual involved
is important regarding how and when felt conflict will manifest. Manifest conflict is the
behaviour that results when one or more forms of conflict exist. Aggression, apathy, and
a rigid adherence to the rule are common forms of manifest conflict. Manifest conflict
only exists if the parties perceive the behaviour as conflictual. Conflict aftermath is the
condition of the relationship following the perceived conflictual behaviour. If the conflict
is genuinely resolved, that is, both parties believe it is resolved, then the relationship tends
to a higher level of cooperation. If the conflict is suppressed then the relationship tends
toward deterioration.
Pondy (1967, 1992) emphasizes that conflict can be either functional or
dysfunctional. Conflict between interest groups is described as "bargaining conflict,"
characterized by competition for scarce resources. In a superior-subordinate relationship
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conflict is bureaucratic. This occurs along the lateral hierarchy in an organization and is
related to the dissemination of tasks and the monitoring of activity. Conflict in horizontal
relationships is described as systems conflict and involves parties common to a functional
task. This implies that the inter-organisational form can be described as systems conflict
and provides direction for this study to examine the functional tasks common to the
franchisee and franchisor.
Since 1967 conflict literature has evolved dramatically. Pondy and Huff (1985)
saw this 1967 model as flawed. Indeed, the assumption of a stable, cooperative
organizational environment upon which Pondy built his model is the issue in question. An
occasional temporary event in an otherwise cooperative environment is a flawed finding.
Pondy (1992) himself questioned this assumption and suggested the exact opposite may be
true. He put forth a "pure conflict system model." This model is based on the principle of
continual, often managed, conflict. Exhortations of organizational harmony are simply a
strategy employed to control a conflictual organizational environment and an attempt to
control the outcomes of conflict.
The current literature on conflict clearly follows Pondy's new perspective of
conflict as a persistent organizational reality (Brett, Goldberg, and Ury, 1990; Morrill and
Thomas, 1992; Witteman, 1992). Brett, Goldberg and Ury (1990) studied conflict as a
phenomenon which affects both inter and intra-organizational relationships. Retha Price
(1991) specifically investigated channel conflict. She concluded that management style in
conflict resolution had an effect on the optimal organizational form. Because conflict
resolution entailed interpersonal skills and inter-organizational negotiation, both formal
and informal channel structure were important. Price's (1991) thinking is expanded by
Morrill and Thomas (1992) who studied organizational management styles. Relational
strengths in an organization, especially personal and informal relational characteristics,
greatly impact organizational design.
The general model of conflict can then be linked to with theoretical perspectives
and organisational forms (Pondy, 1992). This gives insights into the specific issues that
should be investigated in the franchisee-franchisor relationship.
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2.5.3 C0NFLIcr Ai1) NEO-CLASSICAL EcoNoMics
Conflict literature is integrated with neo-classical economics through the work of
Nicholas Sarentis (1991). He found that inter-organizational conflict arises from the
adjustment of wages and the accumulation of assets. Basic to the concept of a franchise
organizational form is the allocation of the productive benefits of the relationship between
the franchisor and the franchisee ("wages"). Key to the long term success of the franchise
is the enhancement of the asset base through the development of the trademark ("asset
accumulation"). There is clear structural conflict in the relationship between the
franchisee firm and the franchisor firm. Hence we are given support for the direction of
our investigation as is articulated in the propositions found in Chapter III. However, it is
important to contextualise the dynamic nature of the conflict (Pondy, 1992). For that
purpose we investigate channel conflict.
2.5.4 CHANNEL CONFLICT
Magrath and Hardy (1989) developed a strategic paradigm for predicting
manufacturer-reseller conflict. They found that conflict in this distribution channel stems
from key goal variables such as differences in marketing (including, target customer and
product lines), the specific design of the channel, and interpersonal relations. Levels of
conflict were associated with the specificity of channel relations and the corresponding
monitoring activities. If the parties to the channel relationship understand mutual
expectations, responsibilities, and commitments
	 these issues were monitored, conflict
levels would be expected to be lower.
2.5.5 ACIIROL AND ETZEL'S USE OF PARSON'S FUNCTIONAL IMPERATIVE AS
DESCRIPTIVE OF THE FRANCHISEE GOAL STRUCTURE ANI) LINKAGE TO
CONFLICT
Having looked at conflict in a general model, in conjunction with theory, and in the
channel literature, we now focus directly on franchising. The literature supplies a useful
tool. Achrol and Etzel (1990) found that the franchisor and franchisee firms pursue a
number of goals as individual firms that sometime conflict with the other channel member.
Achrol and Etzel (1990) draw from work done by Grossman (1969) regarding Parson's
(1959) work on functional imperatives. We, in turn are using a portion of Achrol and
Etzel's construct as they directly applied it to the franchise relationship. Parson's four
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functional imperatives are described as a rational system model, the open system model,
the behavioural model, and the internal process model. This integration is used in studies
outside of franchising and found to be appropriate (Seashore 1983; Scott 1977). The
internal process model focuses on the flow of materials, energy, and information (Scott,
1977) within the organization. The model reflects Parson's pattern maintenance
imperative, and represents an extension of rational system principles of scientific
management (Achrol and Etzel, 1990). The franchise system is a complex inter-
organizational amalgamation of parts designed to maintain interdependent activities and
centered on communication, control and coordination. Key concepts in the internal
process model are formal structure, planning coordinating, and information systems, with
the emphasis on policy making and control mechanisms (Swinth, 1974). The behavioural
system model focuses on the patterns of belief, interaction and socialization that arise
within organizational structures. It emphasizes the common needs and expectations of its
members, personalized leadership and informal open communications. The franchise
system, by the nature of the interdependence of the upstream and downstream members,
attempts to induce channel members to continue their participation, satisfy their individual
goals and aspirations and negotiate the dynamics of the relationship over time to ensure
survival (Boyle and Dwyer, 1990).
For this study we accept Achrol and Etzel's integration of the behavioural system
and the internal process models of exchange theory as descriptive of franchisee goal
structures.
2.6 INTEGRATION OF NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS, TRANSACTION-
COST ECONOMICS, EXCHANGE AND CONFLICT THEORIES
By using micro economic structural analysis we have established the clear potential
for conflict. This conflict is based in differences in profit maximising behaviour. Yet,
franchising as an inter-organisational form continues to expand and flourish. Governance
in this hybrid organisational form, appears to manage conflict.
Williamson's (1975, 1981, 1985, 1992) Transaction-cost Analysis provides us with
a theoretical framework to analyse the way in which franchisee and franchisor firms
govern their relationship in both a formal, and arguably more important, informal manner.
Having established the potential for conflict and created a framework to understand the
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relationship between the parties in franchising, relational exchange theory gives a
perspective of the current status of the relationship and a way to operationalise conflict as
a level of satisfaction.
Because we are interested in the manifestation of potential conflict as franchisee
dissatisfaction we must define and understand what we mean by conflict. To accomplish
that, we investigate conflict theory, particularly channel conflict.
Having done that we now have a clear path to investigate conflict in the
relationship. This results in a research question and three propositions from our
theoretical foundation.
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CHAPTER ifi
THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND PROPOSITIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter H established the potential for conflict in the franchise relationship
through differences in micro-economic structures between the franchisor firm and the
franchisee firm. Also established is the requirement for congruence in relational goals if
stability is to be maintained in long term commercial relationships, including franchising,
founded in relational exchange theory. The governance of the relationship, both in a
formal and informal manner was established through transaction-cost economics. Issues
of governance center on the nature of the transaction between the parties. In franchising it
is clear that the maintenance and enhancement of the trade mark is the focus of the
transaction between the franchisee and franchisor. The formal governance instrument in
franchising is the license agreement. Therefore, it follows that the informal governance
structure is defined by the set of activities between the parties that support the commercial
development of the trade mark (Williamson, 1990).
In this chapter we define the research question and three propositions which are
consistent with our theoretical approach and set the stage for future research. Using the
previously established theoretical framework, the research question seeks to measure the
attitude of the franchisee toward the franchisor with a view toward measuring the level of
satisfaction with the transactional boundaries of the relationship. To do this, conflict must
be operationalised. This operationalisation of conflict is established by measuring
satisfaction, as established by a relational exchange construct taken from the literature
(Stern and Kaufman, 1988).
Three propositions follow the research question: Proposition (A) probes the role
of franchisee goals for the relationship with the franchisor in franchisee satisfaction.
Proposition (B) examines franchisor obligated services, key to governance in franchising.
Proposition (C) links both direct and indirect trade mark valuation with franchisee
satisfaction.
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3.2 ThE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT AND ITS MANIFESTATION AS
DISSATISFACTION
The Pcsearch Question
To what extent does the potential for conflict in the franchisee-franchisor
relationship manifest as franchisee dissatisfaction?
There is ample theoretical justification to assume the existence of conflict in the
franchise relationship. However, conflict can be a positive force in a commercial
relationship. Zonober (1990) lists seven potentially positive results of conflict in all
commercial relationships: stimulating problem solving, causing parties to the inter-
organisational relationship to unite around an issue, uncovering and defining problems,
creating new learning opportunities, forcing the prioritising of opportunities, preventing
escalation of unaddressed conflict, and increasing mutual understanding. The conflict
literature is also clear that the positive aspects of conflict dissipate when that conflict
manifests as dissatisfaction in the relationship (Schul, 1987). Dissatisfaction manifests for
any number of reasons (Gaski, 1984). It is the evolution of conflict, through its five stages
described in Chapter II, which can lead to the deterioration of the relationship if the parties
to the relationship are dissatisfied with the resolutions (Pondy, 1992). This is consistent
with transaction-cost economics which says that the relationship will be maintained as long
as the value of the transaction exceeds the costs of completing the transaction
(Williamson, 1990). In franchising that is interpreted as the value of the business format,
as embodied in the trade mark, versus the activities necessary to promulgate the
interdependent relationship. Therefore, we ask if the inherent conflict between the parties
to the license agreement manifests in dissatisfaction? Specifically, are franchisees
dissatisfied and if so, to what extent?
Schul (1985) believes that methodological weaknesses may explain inconsistencies
in previous work on intrachannel conflict (Brown, 1980; Gaski, 1984; Hunt, et al., 1985;
rtiekert and Churchill 1984). Defining franchising as an organisation established to
conduct channel ffinctions may be at the root of the methodological problems. Instead,
this research defines franchising as an inter-organisational form which may have channel
implications and thus requires a methodology which defines the franchisee as a distinct
entity and not as a part of the franchisor organisation. Defining the relationship differently
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may address some of the differences in methodological perspectives. The intrachanriel
perspective pre-supposes a channel leader role in the franchisee-franchisor relationship
(Brown and Day, 1981), a role filled by the franchisor. Lusch (1976) supports the notion
of economic and social power imbalance in favor of the franchisor because of the nature of
the contractual arrangement. Our research does not impose this prerequisite while also
not specifically excluding it as an antecedent to dissatisfaction and therefore does not
necessarily accept the franchisor as the channel leader, or, that the relationship exists
within a single organisational structure.
3.2.1 THE CoNFLIcT VARIABLE CONSTRUCT
We have taken the conflict construct variable from the relational exchange
literature. Kaufman and Stern (1988) studied conflict in long term wholesaler-retailer
relationships. They used the relational exchange theory framework which states that
commercial transactions occur along a spectrum from discrete individual transactions to
transactions which occur in the context of a long term relationship which is perceived as
valuable in and of itself and should be maintained. In franchising, the alliance between
franchisee and franchisor is established and maintained to promote the trade mark because
the trade mark embodies commercial value for both parties to the license agreement. If
the franchisee perceives the relationship as inadequate and therefore the value of the
trademark as not having long term potential to fulfil their return requirements, then the
franchisee, or any party to a transaction, will have a short term view of the relationship
(Kaufman and Stern, 1988; Pondy and Huff, 1985).
Venkatramen and Grant (1986) stress the need to move towards multi-item
measures in order to provide a higher level of discriminatory power and lower levels of
measurement error. Kaufman and Stern (1988) used four questions as follows:
1. If! were the supplier I would act in the same way as the supplier does now.
2. Our organisation feels the same way about the supplier before and after any
dispute.
3. If it were up to me I would use an alternate supplier.
4. Our organisation has retained anger toward the supplier because ofpast
disputes.
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These questions capture the theoretical framework of this thesis. They were modified to
reflect a franchising relationship in place of the wholesaler-retailer relationship. Therefore,
we state, from the perspective of the franchisee:
1. If I were the franchisor I would act in the same way as the franchisor does now.
The common contracting norm of solidarity is the norm that holds exchanges
together (Mcneil, 1980). The focus of the discrete norm of solidarity is the completion of
the individual transaction, and is supported by contract law. The focus of the relational
norm of solidarity is on the preservation of the unique and continuing relationship in which
the various commercial transactions take place. This is particularly important in studying
the franchise relationship. In exchange relations, which should characterise the franchise
relationship, the norm is generally internalized by the parties who view this particular
exchange relationship as important in and of itself. The extent to which the solidarity
norm reflects this reorientation from the individual transaction to the relationship is one
indication of how far a particular franchise relationship is along the exchange relationship
continuum. In that franchising is defined as a long term relationship, the view of each
transaction in the context of the larger relationship is important to continuing the
relationship. This interdependence is central to the long term enhancement of the trade
mark value as well as in the fulfillment of the franchise contract (license agreement).
Thus, the solidarity norm helps us understand the rationale which contributes to
maintaining the relationship.
2. Our organisation feels the same way about the franchisor before and after any
dispute.
The parties to commercial transactions and exchange relationships enact roles that
reflect their promises and expectations. Mcneil (1980) has argued role integrity, the
maintenance of roles, is an important contracting norm. In discrete transactions the roles
are unidimensional. The exchange is highly focused and the roles reflect a single-
mindedness in the transaction. On the other hand, in relational exchange the parties enact
roles that not only govern the particular transaction but cover a multitude of issues not
directly related to any particular transaction. The continuum from discrete transaction to
relational exchange is characterized by the change from simple unidimensional to highly
complex roles.
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Complexity is theoretically inherent in franchising (Kauflnan and Stern, 1988;
Michaels, 1992). The interdependence required to maintain the trade mark in the long
term induces a multitude of complex roles for both the franchisee and the franchisor
(Frazier and Rody, 1991). However, if there is undue rigidity or strict enforcement of the
license agreement the roles become more unidimensional and the exchange less relational.
This would indicate an organization with diminished prospects for continuance.
Importantly, if the franchisee understands the actions of the franchisor, even if disagreeing
with the results, relational rigidity is reduced and the prospect for continuance enhanced
(Achrol and Etzel, 1990).
3.	 If it was up to me we would not be apart of the franchise system any longer.
Franchising is an organizational form that distributes the productive benefits of a
commercial relationship. Mcneil (1974) suggests that the norm of mutuality, while not
requiring an "equal" distribution of the exchange surplus, requires an "even" distribution.
In the context of franchising "even" is defined as a distribution to channel members that
assures adequate returns to each.
If we assume an ongoing, recurring exchange relationship with a series of
individual transactions, two very different approaches to the "even" division of surplus are
possible. The parties may view each transaction as a distinct, discrete event. Division of
the surplus would be conducted on a transaction by transaction basis. These are discrete
transactions. On the other hand, the individual transactions might be viewed as nothing
more than the periodic enactments of the overall exchange relationship. That is, during
each transaction the parties could be conceived of as drawing against some long-term,
open account. This is relational exchange. The discrete norm of mutuality is
characterized by the parties focus on the returns received from each individual transaction.
The relational norm of mutuality is characterized by focus on the continuous,
undifferentiated returns from the ongoing exchange relationship.
The distinction in franchising is important. Any given franchisor is loath to vary
either the franchise fee or the royalty payment (Stanworth, 1985; LaFontaine, 1990).
Over the life of the contract the economic environment may from time to time favor one
party over the other (franchisee versus franchisor or franchisor versus franchisee) (Rubin,
1976). Mcneil's "drawing on account" characterisation is apt here. The environment will
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likely change in the long run and both parties to the agreement know this. The returns will
average to an adequate rate over the term of the agreement. Of course, this view can only
be taken if there is the perception of fairness in dealing and a prospect for long term
continuation of the relationship.
4.	 Our organisation has retained anger toward the franchisor because ofpast
dispute&
Disputes that threaten the exchange process occur in both discrete transactions and
relational exchange. Kaufman and Stern (1988) state that acts which threaten the
exchange relationship are often difficult to identify and are destructive to the relationship.
sponses to a party's behaviour are influenced by the receiving party's perception of
fairness in the first party's actions (Axlerod, 1984). Each party upholds the norm
preserving the relationship as long as the other is apparently willing to take actions which
cause the relationship to endure. Over a period of time (which is subjectively selected) the
perceived pattern of behaviour creates a reputation. Those actions, which are difficult to
interpret as either supportive or harmful, will be partially determined by reputation.
In exchange relationships with a high relational norm of solidarity, the parties are
likely to develop a strong reputation for trust. In seeking to maintain perceptual
consistency, a party may discount observed behaviour interpreted as inconsistent with
those feelings. All else equal, when faced with manifest conflict behaviour, a party acting
under a relational norm of solidarity can be expected to interpret ambiguous behaviour as
fair. The same expectation cannot be made in the discrete transaction.
As the role of integrity becomes more relational, the roles enacted by the parties
become more complex. The heightened complexity of the exchange relationship implies
greater interdependence between the parties and therefore increases the probability of
latent conflict (Pondy, 1967; Kaufman and Stern, 1988). The multiple connections
between the parties also increase the number of uncontrollable precipitating factors that
could conceivably bring about a manifest conflict event (Boyle arid Dwyer, 1990).
Of course not all such conflict is serious but over time the parties will develop a
method for resolving conflict, move toward a discrete transaction relationship or seek to
end the relationship (Mcneil, 1978). If the parties are in a highly relational form of
exchange we can expect them to cope, dc-emphasize or deny conflict events. Because the
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potential for conflict being precipitated by uncontrollable circumstances is high,
intentionally produced conflict can be particularly disturbing to the perceiving party. In a
highly relational exchange this behaviour will be seen as a breach of the role integrity norm
and the perception of unfairness may exceed the intent (Mcneil, 1985).
The relational norm of mutuality focuses the attention of the parties on the benefits
they derive from the ongoing relationship as a whole. The performance of each individual
transaction is not as closely specified or monitored as they are in discrete transactions.
This permits the parties to the relational exchange to put conflict behaviour relative to a
particular transaction in the context of the whole relationship. In discrete transacting
isolated incidents of uncooperative or combative behaviour become more salient because
each transaction is being specified, monitored, and completed individually. A party in a
discrete transaction cannot expect losses suffered at the hands of the other party to be
washed away by future gains.
Wilful, opportunistic conflict behaviour is not easily distinguished from
uncooperative behaviour constrained by circumstances beyond the actor's control (Dant
and Schul, 1992). The long term monitoring horizon, characteristic of the relational norm
of mutuality, creates the flexibility necessary for an exchange relationship to withstand
harmful or destructive outside forces (Mcneil, 1978). However, it may also allow wilful
destructive behaviour to go unchecked for longer periods. When identified, such
behaviour may occasion strong feelings of betrayal (Kaufman and Stern, 1988).
3.3 THE PERCEIVED CONTRACT
Proposition A
There is a relationship between the extent offranchisee satisfaction and their
perception of the goals particular to their relationship with the franchisor.
3.3.1 FRANCHISEE GOALS FOR THEIR RELATIONSHTP WITH THE FRANCIIISOR
"To a large extent effectiveness can be judged only in relation to an organisation's
goals" (Achrol and Etzel, 1990, p. 4). Etzioni (1964) and Thompson and McEwan (1958)
were equally strident in their belief that organizational effectiveness was measured in terms
of goal achievement. This dissertation clearly takes the position that franchising is an
interorganisational form. The individual organizations, franchisee and franchisor, ally for
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the purpose of producing a benefit which they believe would not be attainable, in total or
in scope, if not for the alliance (Rubin, 1978). This presumes a set of common goals
(March and Simon, 1958; Cummings, 1977). The interdependence of the two
organizations coordinates the tasks of the interorganisational members for the purpose of
achieving mutual benefit (Stern and El-Ansary, 1988). This is consistent with Barnard's
(1938) definition of organizations as incentive distributing systems. Understanding the
goals of the franchisee for their relationship allows us greater understanding of conflict in
the relationship. Achrol and Etzel (1990) state that" ... the way is open to categorizing
the kinds of goals and rewards individual firms pursue through franchise organizations,
and from there to understanding... the sources and types of organizational conflict" (p.6).
Achrol and Etzel (1990) used four franchisee goals for their relationship with the
franchisor. Their theoretical underpinning for these goals comes from Parson's (1959)
functional imperatives. Parson's functional imperatives have been used by Kumar, Stern
and Achrol (1991), and Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) for goal definition in marketing
channels, integrating organizational and channel literature. A successful organization must
achieve four functional imperatives: goal attainment, integration, adaptation, and pattern
maintenance (Parson, 1959). These four functional imperatives have been empirically
tested and integrated into the literature vis a vis a rational system model, open system
model, behavioural system model, and internal process model (Kumar, Stern and Achrol,
1991; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983).
The four franchisee goals are operationalised in statements which the franchisee
respondent is asked to score as to relative importance (1-5 Likert scale) among the four
goals. These statements reflect the theoretical position reflected by Parson's (1959) goal
attainment models.
1) At this point in time, developing a more cooperative relationship with your
franchisor is relatively...
The rational system model reflects Parsons' goal attainment imperative. This view
is one of the firm as a rational decision making organization. (March and Simon, 1958).
Decisions are made based on profit maximizing behaviour (Scott, 1987).
2) Compared with other goals, given current business conditions, improving
communications and information sharing between franchisee andfranchisor is...
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The pp system model relates to Parsons' adaptation imperative. An organization
must adapt to its environment. Flexibility is required to respond to changing market and
organizational demands. The principal concepts in an open system model concern
response to strategic external factors. Exploitation of these external factors can occur if
the organization is open to its environment.
3) Relative to other goals, at this point in time, better coordinatedfranchisee-
franchisor quality assurance is...
The internal process model reflects Parsons' pattern maintenance imperative. For
an organization must to maximize its position it must communicate, control, and
coordinate with other organizations with which it has interdependencies. An organization
will maximize relationships, in part, based on its capacity to perform these
communications and coordination functions. (Swinth, 1974).
4) Weighted against other goals, strengthening the mutual commitment between your
franchisor and you is...
Thebehavioural system model relates to Parsons' integration imperative. The
organization must integrate the needs of the individual organizational members and those
of the organization itself (March and Simon, 1958; Perrow, 1961). The key components
of the behavioural system model are commitment, cohesion, and morale among
organizational members (Seashore, 1983).
Achrol and Etzel (1990) argue that the long term goals of the franchisee must
necessarily include the franchisor. Specifically, mutual goals would include cooperation,
communication, coordination, and commitment. The dynamic perception of conflict
between the franchisee and franchisor by either party invariably includes goal congruency
(Schul, 1987). Therefore, if the franchisee's goals for the relationship are not being met
there is a heightened probability that conflict will become manifest as dissatisfaction
(Schul, 1987). Our theoretical (Williamson, 1985) and definitional (Dicke, 1990)
perspective of franchising relies on the principal goal of trade mark maintenance and
enhancement. From our literature review, we see that both Relational Exchange (Mcneil,
1985; Kaufman and Stern, 1989) and Transaction-cost Economics (Williamson,
1979,1985) employ a spectrum on which commercial interactions are measured regarding
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the nature and degree of the personal, long term expectation of the relationship to continue.
3.4 FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT iN
ThE FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RELA1TONSHIP
Proposition B
Franchisee satisfaction with the services provided by the franchisor is the
principal measure of contractuai performance. Contractual performance is an
antecedent of conflict in the franchisee-franchisor relationship.
3.4.1 BEHAVIOURAL TOLERANCE
There are few empirical studies which examine franchisor provided services.
These studies suggest that the quality of franchisor contractually provided services are
important to determining the effectiveness of the individual franchise interorganisation
(Goodard and Peterson, 1988; Lambert and Lewis, 1988; Achrol and Etzel, 1992). It is
clear that franchisees do not perceive or utilise franchisor provided services in equal
proportions (Saubert, 1988). However, no study measures the franchisee's perspective of
both the importance and adequacy of the franchisor provided services. Williamson (1985)
argues that strict adherence to a contractual arrangement precludes flexibility in a long
term relationship and therefore de-stabilises the relationship. This advances the argument
that there are boundaries surrounding the interorganisational transactions which
incorporate flexible interpretation of the implicit or explicit contractually required
franchisor provided services.
Setting the transaction specific boundaries of the relationship indicates a
behavioural zone of tolerance. That is, if the franchisee perceives the adequacy of the
service from the franchisor to be equal to or better than the level perceived of importance,
then the behaviour is seen to fulfil the contract, maintaining or enhancing the trade mark.
Conversely, if the adequacy of delivery of the service is perceived to be below the
perceived importance of the service then the behaviour may be outside of the tolerance
zone and create dissatisfaction. Based on the importance of maintaining and enhancing
the trade mark, this is a crucial area for conflict. But, at what level of importance and
performance does the franchisee perceive contractual fulfillment by the franchisor?
64
3.4.2 FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES
In the franchising interorganisational form the services from the franchisor require
interdependency between the franchisee and franchisor (Frazier, 1983; Stern and El-
Ansary, 1988). Achrol and Etzel (1990) developed a series of sixteen questions which
reflect the stated or implied contractually obligated services of the franchisor to the
franchisee. Achrol and Etzel (1990) describe these services as the principal points of
interaction between the franchisee and franchisor. Franchisor provided services are the
application of internal franchisor resources to fulfillment of the explicit contract and to
support of the goals of the relationship (Achrol and Etzel, 1990). This study adds two
questions which more fuliy explore advertising and development responsibilities. The first
relates to local advertising cooperatives as listed below and the second which addresses
the development of new stores. Our search of the economics literature indicates that local
advertising, specifically as it relates to discounting, is a price adjustment mechanism and
therefore a potential area for conflict. Also, new store development addresses the issue of
maximising total system sales versus individual store profitability. The franchisor is
motivated to maximise total system sales in an effort to maximise royalty receipts
(Mittelstaedt and Stassen, 1990). The franchisee has a tendency to under-invest to protect
the maximum amount of geographic territory for an individual outlet (Pubin 1976).
The perception of contract fulfillment is contingent on not only the ranked
importance of a service from the franchisor but also the adequacy with which that service
is delivered. Thus the transactional boundaries of the relationship can be clearly
established, from the perspective of the franchisee, if contractual obligations are rated by
both importance and adequacy. This provides for important theoretical consistency. Both
transaction-cost analysis and relational exchange theory rely on a spectrum of
transactional involvement between parties.
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3.5 TRADE MARK VALUATION
Proposition C
Perceived costs associated with leaving the franchise relationship reflect the
perceived value of the trade mark, which correlates with conflict in the franchisee-
franchisor relationship.
3.5.1 INTRODUCTION
As we have discussed, the franchise relationship is based on the belief that the
alliance will generate efficiencies which result in increased value to the participants. The
franchisor and franchisee share a common trade mark, which is the embodiment of the
value of franchise relationship. Generally accepted accounting practices define trade mark
value in two ways. The balance sheet accounts for the value of the trade mark as an
intangible long term asset. This is established as a matter of accounting convention. A
second method of defining trade market value is to estimate the price the market would
pay for a franchisee firm, above the value of the tangible assets. This is not listed in the
financial statements of the company but can be realised in the sale of the company. A
number of valuation models are available but ultimately market value is determined by the
actions of a buyer and seller agreeing on a price. For what price would a franchisee sell
the firm and would that price exceed the value of the tangible assets? Therefore, we must
understand if the franchisee knows the quantifiable ways in which the trade mark is valued
in order to understand if they believe there is value in the trade mark as opposed to other,
tangible assets. However, the trade mark value can be manifested in ways that are not
directly apparent to the trade mark beneficiary (Mundstock, 1990). In the case of this
study, the franchisee has contractual rights to the trade mark for local distribution and
therefore reaps the benefits of the trade mark. We therefore look to operationalise the
measure of trade mark value in other ways.
3.5.2 PERCEPTION OF Exrr/SwrrcmNG COSTS AS AN ESTIMATE OF TRADE MARK
VALUE
The literature regarding the antecedents and effects of exiting a channel
relationship clearly point to dissatisfaction as the principle motivation to exit a channel
relationship when structural alternatives are available (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh, 1987;
Duck, 1982; Ping and Dwyer, 1988; richins, 1987; Diener and Grayser, 1978; Ping, 1990;
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Baxter, 1986; Mcneil, 1980; Johnson, 1982). This body of knowledge argues that
satisfaction and structural alternatives to the present relational arrangement are major
determinants of a firm's propensity to maintain the current relationship. Probing the
attitudes of a channel player regarding the costs of exiting a current relationship ultimately
establishes an assessment of the channel member's evaluation of the value of the
relationship (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987; Johnson, 1982). In the case of franchising, the
franchisee is tied to a franchise system vis a vis the license agreement and thus maintains
the business format. This is consistent with Mcneil's (1983) discussion of relational
exchange. Important to exit/switching costs is their association with the distribution of the
productive benefits of the relationship in franchising. A relational exchange equates
preservation of the relationship with the fair distribution of the productive benefits
generated by the relationship (Mcneil, 1980; Kaufman and Stern, 1988). Fairness,
however, is subjectively assessed by a franchisee. If fairness is perceived to be absent in
the distribution, then the franchisee will assess alternatives to the current relationship.
That assessment ultimately values the trade mark as the trade mark embodies the brand
value which produces the productive benefits (Mundstock, 1991).
The decision to exit the relationship, if taken, carries with it both direct and
indirect costs (Ping and Dwyer, 1988). Understanding these costs is essential to making a
sound decision about the viability of continuing the relationship (Barney, 1991). Previous
research has shown that dissatisfaction may manifest in a conflictual situation when the
cost of remaining in the relationship exceeds the perceived cost of exit (Stern and
Kaufman, 1988; Ping, 1991; Pondy, 1967,1992). Exit cost variables were taken from the
literature as defined by Ping (1991) and altered to reflect the franchise environment. This
was accomplished by substituting the franchisor for the wholesaler and the franchisee for
the retailer.
3.6 SUMMARY
The central theme of franchising is an alliance between two firms for the
development of economies of scale for the enhancement of a common trade mark. In
chapter II we describe the theoretical underpinnings of conflict in that relationship. In
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chapter HI we use that theoretical framework to ask a research question and state three
propositions.
This research focuses on conflict in the franchisee-franchisor relationship with a
research question that asks what antecedents of conflict exist in the franchisee-franchisor
relationship from the perspective of the franchisee. We describe the development and
operationalisation of the key component of the research focus, the conflict construct
variable, as taken from the literature (Kaufman and Stern, 1988) and modified to reflect a
franchise interorganisational form. Having established a measure of conflict, we turn to
three propositions which explore the theoretical underpinnings of conflict in franchising.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The topic of franchisee-franchisor relations has been studied before. Our aim is to
focus directly on conflict, as related to goals, governance and trade mark value. Not only
are we interested in the antecedents of conflict but also to explain them in a series of
models. The research question and propositions are, therefore, exploratory in nature,
essentially asking what is the relationship among variables. By doing that we
simultaneously involve hypotheses concerning an expectation of a relationship among
variables (Spector, 1981). We fulfil our obligation to further research in the franchisee-
franchisor relationship by laying "...the foundations for perhaps more scientific work
aimed at testing hypothesis" (Bennett, 1988, p.139).
This chapter deals with the research and questionnaire design following the overall
research objective of exploring the franchisee-franchiser relationship. "Jesearch design is
the plan and structure of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research
questions" (Kerlinger, 1986, p279). The design has three basic functions: 1) to provide
answers to our research question in an objective manner, 2.) to support or reject each of
our three propositions, and 3.) to control variance by maximising the variance of the
variables, control extraneous systematic variance of "less powerful" variables, and
minimise the error or random variance including errors of measurement (Kerlinger, 1986).
Yin (1989) describes this simply as avoiding the situation in which the evidence does not
address the research question. In the previous chapter we discussed the research question,
propositions, and our choice and rationale for choosing them. Here we first discuss the
basic research designs evolving around two general groups: quantitative and qualitative.
Various methods of data collection are discussed before proceeding to development of the
variables, questionnaire and sampling framework.
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4.2 RESEARCH STRATEGIES
The nature of this research is non-experimental, defined by Kerlinger (1986) as:
"systematic empirical inquiry in which the scientist does not have direct control of
independent variables because their manifestations have already occurred or because they
are inherently not manipulative. Inferences about relations among variables are made,
without direct intervention, from concomitant variation of independent and dependent
variables" p348).
In non-experimental research, the dependent variable is observed, and one or
several independent variables are also observed, either before, after, or concomitant to the
observation of the dependent variable (Kerlinger, 1986).
Experimental studies are considered to be more powerful than nonexperimental
designs in uncovering causal relationships among variables and are more frequently
conclusive because they involve principles of control, randomisation, and comparison
(Spector, 1981). Spector (1981) notes, however, that although there is no assignment of
subjects in a nonexperimental study, many of the other principles of research design still
apply. Control over levels of certain variables can be exerted, without involving active
manipulation of conditions. Control can be exercised in the selection of certain cases to
include in the observational study. Cases can be chosen to meet certain specified criteria,
such as selecting organisations of a certain size, geographic region, or industry. Further
control can be achieved by selecting only certain values of control variables and observing
the variables of interest (Spector, 1981).
Within a nonexperimental research design a distinction is often made between two
basic approaches: the qualitative and quantitative research design. The distinction
between these two has actually been reduced in recent years because of sophisticated
computer software and statistical analysis. Yin (1989) argues that data reduction
techniques render the contrast between quantitative and qualitative evidence
indistinguishable among various research strategies. However, differences in quantitative
and qualitative research design are still important to discuss.
4.2.1 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN
Measurement plays an important role in a quantitative research design. This
includes methods such as survey research, longitudinal, and time series analysis and
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uncontrolled experimentation. However, some survey questions do rely on qualitative,
and not quantitative evidence (Yin, 1989). These methods allow the researcher to argue
that something is related to something else. Seldom do they allow a causal relationship to
be established.
One group designs are all considered nonexperimental since they do not involve
assignment of subjects to conditions, rather a single group of subjects is observed
(Spector, 1981). Among such studies are correlation designs, which are purely
observational since the research does not intervene in any way or expose the subjects to a
manipulation.	 ther measurements are taken on a group, and relationships are
determined among the measures.
Cross sectional design, in which all measurements are taken at one point in time, is
the simplest of the correlation designs (Spector, 1981). The design is especially attractive
in field studies where control over subjects is difficult to acquire. When the nature of the
research requires the establishment of relationships between two or more variables, the
cross sectional approach is useful.
Hawthorne effects and instrument reactivity are potential serious problems in the
correlation design (Spector, 1981). The major shortcoming of the cross sectional design
however is that it only establishes relationships. One way to improve the ability of the
cross sectional design to yield causal data is to take some measurement at a later point in
time, but with only a single measurement on each variable (Spector, 1981). Such designs
fall somewhere between cross sectional and longitudinal. The full longitudinal design is a
variation of the correlation study which involves two or more measurements of variables
in a study on the same group of subjects. This approach is more powerful than the cross-
sectional as it is possible to observe over time if certain values of a variable at one point
(e.g., conflict) are associated with certain values of another variable (e.g., a franchisor
provided service) at a different point. Although this could be applied to the present study,
time constraints prevent it. Additionally, Spector (1981) points out that since there is no
control over outside events in a longitudinal design and therefore many subsequent (to the
first measure) events may provide alternative explanations for the results, the support for
causality is weak.
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4.2.2 QUALITATWE RESEARCH DESIGN
Ethnography, case studies, in-depth interviews, and participant observation have
traditionally been described as qualitative research designs (reichardt and Cook, 1979).
"Closeness" to the subject, in our study the franchisee, and consequent understanding of
the operating conditions, is the major advantage of this type of research design. Hambrick
(1980) notes two major disadvantages of the qualitative research design. There is a lack
of generalisability of the results and a lack of measures which will therefore not allow
reliable comparison or replicability by other researchers. Thus the lack the utility when
attempting to reach the rigorous conclusions or determine the precise relationship between
variables.
4.2.3 DISCUSSION
Of particular concern in studies using one procedure for collecting data is common
method variance, which is the component of the correlation due to bias common to the
method of data collection (most commonly mail questionnaires or interviews). Subject
response tendencies and bias when responding to requests for self-reporting may account
for false relationships that are found, as subjects may report attitudes and behaviours in a
manner that is more consistent than they are in reality. This tendency towards consistency
may enhance correlation coefficients. Several modes of data collection, to assure non-
interaction of measures, have been frequently recommended (Spector, 1981; Jick, 1983;
rtmano, 1989).
A mix of qualitative and quantitative research in a single design is possible and
even recommended when seeking insights into how small businesses, such as franchisee
firms, interact with the environment.
Our research focuses on specific interaction of the franchisee with the franchisor
and seeks causality of variables in the relationship with conflict between the parities. The
most commonly used method of data collection with these objectives is a data base survey.
Mail surveys are the most extensive data base method (Hornaday and Churchill, 1987;
Pthwell, 1988).
With the advantages of survey research, wide scope and accuracy within sampling
error, there are inevitable disadvantages as survey information does not penetrate very
deeply below the surface. The scope of information sought is usually emphasised at the
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expense of depth. That is, there are trade-offs between the qualitative and quantitative
approaches, a trade off between breadth and depth (Pmano, 1989). "Data base surveys
attain generalisability and statistical significance but sacrifice the knowledge of interacting
forces within each observation." (Sandberg, 1986).
This research adopted a quantitative approach. It is our objective to produce
generalisable findings using standardised measures. Also, it is important to note that the
author spent thirteen years in a franchise system, first as a franchisor then as a franchisee.
This extensive "field work" provides contextual advantages in the design of the research
methodology. Because the extent of research in franchising is limited, quantitative
methods will allow further research through communication of comparability of findings
among researchers.
4.3 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION
Questionnaires can be used in three different ways for the collection of data;
telephone interviews, mail, and face to face interviews (Dillman, 1978). The major
advantages and disadvantages of each are discussed in the following.
4.3.1 PERSONAL INTERVIEW
Kerlinger (1986) argues for personal interview as the best principal method of
gathering data. This methodology can be used in order to enhance generalisability of
findings while retaining some of the desirable characteristics of case studies. They are
argued to be more likely to provide a representative sample than mail questionnaires
where non-response rate can be very high (Dillman, 1978). A structured personal
interview approach can further yield more reliable data (Smeltzer et al, 1988). The
researcher may probe for clearer, more comprehensive explanations in a face to face
interview than is possible in a mail questionnaire (Dillman, 1978). Also, the presence of
the interviewer may convince the respondent to answer questions which might otherwise
be left blank (Lehman, 1979).
Personal interviews are more costly, time consuming, and so require a smaller
sample size (Sudman, 1976). More important, however, is the problem of interviewer
influence and bias. In particular, Lehman (1979) states that since the interviewer is often
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required to interpret the response and assign it to a predesigned category, there is a
serious potential problem of errors in interpretation.
4.3.2 TELEPHONE SURVEYS
Kerlinger (1986) believes that telephone surveys have little to recommend beyond
speed and low cost. Non-response, a lack of cooperation, and reluctance to answer more
than simple, superficial questions are among the problems (Kerlinger, 1986). The result is
difficulty in obtaining detailed information (Kerlinger, 1986).
4.3.3 MAIL QUESTIONrAIRE
The major strength of the mail survey is its ability to survey widely dispersed
populations simultaneously at relatively low cost without the attendant problems of
interviewer bias or the possible distortion of time lag (Jobber, 1990). Kanuk and
Berenson (1975) also argue that mail surveys tend to be more valid than telephone or
personal interviews because they enable respondents to check information by verif'ing
their records or consulting with other people. Also, they permit leisurely and thoughtful
reply. Other advantages of the respondent completing the questionnaire without the
presence of the interviewer is that interviewer bias is eliminated, and the respondent is
more willing to answer certain questions when not face to face with an interviewer.
Pelative or promised anonymity encourages respondents to more freely divulge
information, especially relating to socially or personally embarrassing information
(Dillman, 1978).
Jobber (1990) warns that these benefits may be lost if the respondent answers in a
hurried, ill-considered manner. Further, there is no control over who answers the
questionnaire as it may be delegated to a subordinate or a group rather than the intended
individual (Jobber, 1990). Attendant problems include response and nonresponse bias
(Kanuk and Berenson, 1975).
Alpar and Spitzer (1989) reviewed over 50 studies involving mail questionnaires to
entrepreneurs and found response rates varied widely, from 3% to 80%. When the
questionnaire was not accompanied by a personal endorsement from someone who knew
the respondent, response rates ranged from 8% to 26%. Lack of time, interest, and
perceived gain from participating are frequently cited reasons for low response rates
(Plbinson and Pearce, 1986).
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4.3.3.1 DiscussioN
This study employs a mail questionnaire for data collection. Before
proceeding to implementation strategy, it is important to review the major sources of
sampling error.
There are two major sources of error in a survey (Sudman, 1976). The sampling
error, which depends on the sample size and design, is argued to be the lowest for a mail
survey since the sample size is usually larger than in other designs. Sampling error is
generally the smallest of the two components of error. Sample biases, which are a
fi.inction of how well the study design is executed, are smallest for face to face interviews
and largest for mail questionnaires. Factors found to correlate with greater response are
higher education, greater facility in writing, greater interest in the topic being studied,
loyalty to the study's sponsor, and being female (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975).
Phone and face to face methods avoid biases of mail procedure but are subject to
biases of their own. For some kinds of threatening information, the less personal mail
method appears to be superior to interviews (Sudman, 1976). As our study specifically
focuses on conflict in the relationship with the franchisor, there may be an implied
threatening environment. The franchisee may be less threatened by an impersonal method
of data collection such as the mail questionnaire.
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4.4 MAlL SURVEY STRATEGY
Empirical studies designed to improve validity and reliability of mail surveys can be
divided into two categories: those designed to increase response rate and those designed
to reduce biases caused by nonresponse or special interest response (Kanuk and Berenson,
1975). Some method for dealing with these disadvantages of mail surveys will be
discussed.
Dillman's (1978) Total Design Method (1DM) for maximising response rate pays
attention to all the factors which affect both the quantity and quantity of response. By
paying considerable attention to detail, the approach has been capable of consistently
producing high response rates (Cragg, 1990). Consequently, much of the implementation
strategies of this study rely on Dillman's (1978) recommendations.
4.4.1 TECHMQUES FOR INCREASING RESPONSE RATES
When sampling size is fairly small, a prior telephone call, providing an opportunity
to explain and raise interest in the study (Hodgkinson, 1990) and asking for cooperation,
is feasible and argued to accelerate the daily rate of return and increase the final response
rate (Jobber, 1990). This study, anticipating a mailing in excess of 2000 pieces, did not
make introductory calls.
Follow-up letters, usually one or two, is a technique which seem to be consistently
effective in increasing response rate (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975; Dillman, 1978; Cragg,
1990). However, too many reminders might harm the relationship between the research
and the organisation(s) (Cragg, 1990). This study mailed one post card reminder to
participants who had not responded within 10 days of the mailing.
The inclusion of a stamped return envelop is generally accepted practice in mail
surveys (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975; Dillman, 1978). The use of stamped addressed
envelopes rather than business reply envelopes is further argued to increase response
(Sudman, 1976; Jobber, 1990). However, Kanuk and Berenson (1975) found inconsistent
results both in the class of mailing and the type of postage used. Diliman (1978)
recommends first class post on all mailings. This study mailed all questionnaires via first
class post, using a stamped, addressed return envelope.
Dillman advises that both the envelope and the cover letter contain the name and
address of the intended recipient. While Cragg (1990) argues that self-adhesive labels are
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practical, Dillman (1978) recommends avoiding them. In this study, names and address of
the respondents were printed directly on the envelopes and cover letters, while self-
adhesive labels were used on the return envelopes.
Also included among concurrent techniques are such variables as degree of
anonymity promised or implied, the promise or inclusion of rewards, and the use of
deadline dates (Kanuck and Berenson, 1975). Offering anonymity, or at least
confidentiality in the cover letter has generally been assumed to encourage a high level of
voluntary and valid response. Kanuk and Berenson (1975), however, found little evidence
to support these assumptions although none of the studies they reviewed involved
franchisees. Some evidence supports the notion that deadline dates encourage earlier
reply but without increasing the response rate (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975). rewards,
including monetary inducements, are best used in consumer surveys (Alpar and Spitzar,
1989).
The cover letter used in this study promised confidentiality and a copy of
summarised results at the completion of the study. No rewards of any kind were offered
and it was clearly stated that the purpose of the survey was academic research.
4.4.2 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN
The advantages of high response rates could be offset by poor quality answers if
respondents omit questions, do not follow instructions, or simply give wrong answers
(Alpar and Spitzar, 1989). This section discusses the design of the questionnaire
(Appendix Al) with the two main objectives of increasing response rate and improving
response quality.
Alpar and Spitzar (1989) examined item response rate and response quality in a
survey of 438 new, technologically oriented entrepreneurs. They found areas of similarity
and differences between entrepreneurs and the general population. The probability of item
omission increased most when the question was non-personal. With this exception,
quality of entrepreneurs' responses to certain types of questions in a mail survey was found
to be much like the general population.
4.4.2.1 QUESTION ORDERING
The absence of an interviewer creates a need to determine the question order on
the basis of motivational considerations (Dillman, 1978). DilIman lists several principles
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for question ordering which are generally followed in this study. First, questions are to be
ordered along a descending gradient of importance; those which the respondent is likely to
see as useful come first. Second, questions that are similar in content were grouped
together, and within content areas were grouped by type of question. The third ordering
principle involves taking advantage of cognitive ties that respondents are likely to make
among groups of questions and thereby build a flow of continuity throughout the
questionnaire. The final principle is that the questions in any topic area that are most
likely to be objectionable to respondents, which in this study were proved to be financial
questions, should be positioned after the less objectionable questions.
Diliman suggests that demographic questions be placed at the end of the
questionnaire. This advice was not followed. The more recent study by Alpar and Spitzar
(1989) concluded that the probability of item omission in a survey of entrepreneurs
increased most when the questions were non-personal.
4.4.2.2 FORMULATING THE PAGES
The key to page formulation in a mail survey is producing an end result which is
aesthetically pleasing and motivating, preserves the structure of precisely worded
questions and keeps respondents from skipping individual items or whole sections
(Dillman, 1978). These principles have been generally adhered to in the questionnaire
design for this study. Psponse categories were arranged so that answers were registered
in a vertical line except for the financial questions (1 of 8 pages). Each category of
question was titled. Directions for how to answer questions followed the title and
preceded each section of questions at the top of the page. The same number is always
used for the same answer (e.g., No=1, Yes=2). Open-ended questions were limited, as
such questions may result in non-response (Jobber, 1990).
4.4.2.3 QUESTIONNAIRE LAYOUT
The questionnaire totalled 8 pages with no questions on the front or back covers
and with questions laid out spaciously. A4 white paper in the United Kingdom and 8.5 X
11 white paper in the United States was used to achieve the principal objective of
appearing visible and professional (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975).
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4.4.3 THE STRUCTURE OF flif QuEsTIoAmE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
RESEARCH QuEsTIoN AND PROPOSITIONS
The questionnaire (see Appendix A. 1) contains seven distinct sections:
Section I: THE FRANCHISEE FIRM lists nine questions relating to characteristics of
the franchisee and the franchisee firm.
Section 11: THE FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RELA11ONSHIP lists the four
relational goals taken from the literature (Achrol and Etzel, 1992).
Section ifi: FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES lists Achrol and Etzel's (1992)
sixteen franchisor provided services and two services added by this study. Franchisee
respondents are asked to score these services (1-5 Likert scale) in terms of both
importance and adequacy.
Section IV: THE FRANCHISEES VIEW OF THE CONTINUING
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRANCHISOR lists thirteen statements which are
taken from the literature (Stern and Kaufman, 1988) and reflect Parson's Organisational
Imperatives. The four variable which constitute the conflict construct are embedded in
this section.
Section V: INVESTMENT IN THE FRANCHISE consists of sixteen questions which
reflect perceived exit costs (Ping, 1990).
Section VI: FiNANCIAL iNFORMATION consists of seven questions which capture
financial information which the economics literature indicates may correlate to conflict
because of differences in the production functions.
Section VII: OPTIONAL COMMENTS space is provided to allows respondents to
voice an individualised opinion (Dillman, 1978) and to add richness to the understanding
of the franchisee-franchisor relationship.
4.5 PILOT STIJDY
A pilot study was conducted to test a questionnaire format that leads to a
quantifiable information with a high level of construct and content validity. Pretesting the
questionnaire is especially important for mail surveys since there are no interviewers to
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report defects and inadequacies (Dillman, 1978). A pilot study was conducted for this
purpose. Data analysed in this chapter regards the pilot.
Dillman (1978) suggests that the questionnaire be submitted to the scrutiny of
three types of people. The first groups are colleagues who understand the study's purpose
and are able to evaluate the questionnaire in terms of whether it will accomplish the study
objectives. The eight page questionnaire was designed over a period of six months. It
was reviewed by a number of Ph.D students and lecturers at Imperial College and faculty
members of Babson College in the United States. I received valuable feedback from
leading academics in the fields of economics, strategy, sociology, entrepreneurship, and
management.
The second group among Dillman's (1978) evaluators consists of potential "users"
of the data, such as policy makers. These people have substantial knowledge of the survey
topic. National Westminster Bank's head of franchise lending, a senior commercial lending
officer from a major US bank, two leading franchise attorneys (one from the UK and one
from the US), and a managing director of a UK franchisor firm, and a board director of a
US franchisor firm gave detailed, valuable, input.
The third group from which pretest information was sought were drawn from the
population to be surveyed, franchisees. These people should represent a cross section of
the potential respondents. Franchisees were chosen from both former colleagues in
franchising, from a random selection of London area franchisees and from the membership
of the American Franchisee Association. Thirteen franchisees were interviewed.
Interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes.
An office and home janitorial franchise agreed to supply a list of their franchisees
for participation in the pilot study. The firm is a wholly owned subsidiary of a US
company and was established in the UK in 1974. There 177 franchisees operating 304
territories (the name used by this company for the more commonly used term "outlet").
Questionnaires were sent with a cover letter and a self-addressed, stamped return
envelop. Cover letters were directed to the franchisee by name. All mailings were sent
first class. The franchisees were advised in the cover letter that if they participated in the
study and included their return address with the questionnaire, they would receive a copy
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of the study results. They were also advised that their individual responses would be kept
strictly confidential. All cover letters were signed by me using a black ballpoint pen.
Of the 177 questionnaires sent out, 52 were returned for a response rate of 29%.
All the respondent questionnaires were deliverable and useable. Of the 52 respondents, 36
(68%) included their name and address for a copy of the results.
Sudman (1976) argues that a pilot test of 20-50 cases usually is sufficient to
discover the major flaws in a questionnaire. Therefore, the pilot for this study cleared
Sudman's (1976) response ii. Only one major issue emerged from the pilot. Two
questions relating to trademark valuation were not answered by a significant number
(54%) of respondents. 13 respondents were reached by telephone to discuss the
unanswered questions. 12 of the 13 understood the questions but simply did not know the
answer. Therefore, a check-off labelled "unknown" was added for each of these two
questions. Less significantly, many of the telephone respondents mentioned that the
questionnaire used the term "outlets" when it was common in their system to use the term
"territories." The cultural differences in language between the United Kingdom and
United States were reviewed to assure neutral language and therefore an ability to
implement the main study in the United States. No other changes were made to the
questionnaire except changing the pound sterling to the dollar sign, where appropriate.
4.6 IMPLEMENTING THE MAIL SURVEY
The pilot study was conducted in the United Kingdom. Because of the availability
of dual mailing lists in the United States (from participating franchise systems and from the
governmentally mandated Uniform Franchise Offering Circular) it was decided to conduct
the main study in the United States.
Selection of franchise systems to participate in the study was done by speaking to
the American Franchisee Association (AFA) at their national conference. The AFA is an
organisational primarily consisting of franchise systems franchisee associations, such as the
Jiffly Lube Association of Franchisees and the Supercuts Franchisee Association. The
AFA membership represents about 15,000 franchisees. Six companies agreed to
participate. Two additional companies were referred by participants and agreed to be a
part of the study. Including the pilot study company, a total of nine franchise inter-
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organisational forms participated in this study. The procedure followed in the pilot study
was used in implementing the mail survey. Mailing lists were checked against United
States Federal Trade Commission required "Uniform Franchise Offering Circular" for
accuracy to improve list quality.
Questionnaires were sent out to 2912 franchisees by company in intervals of two
weeks. A post card reminder was sent out ten days following the initial mailing. The
number of undeliverable surveys was 96 of the 2,912 mailed, or, 3.3%.
4.6.1 QUEsTIONNAIRE RETURNS
Table 4.1 Data Collection Summary by Firm
Firm	 #1	 #2	 #3	 #4	 #5	 #6	 #7	 #8	 #9	 Total
Number	 177	 79	 94	 397	 153	 434	 123	 229	 1226	 2912
Mailed
Bad Address	 0	 0	 4	 3	 1	 49	 2	 35	 2	 96
net# mailed	 177	 79	 90	 394	 152	 385	 121	 194	 1224
	
2816
	
52	 39	 42	 85	 41	 64	 25	 28	 245
	 621
responses
response rate	 29% 49% 46% 22% 27% 17% 21% 14%	 20%	 22%
4.6.1.1 NON-RESPONSE BIAS
The potential problems inherent in a mail survey make the tabulation and analysis
of non-respondents a critical activity in order to avoid non response bias (Keats and
Bracker, 1988). Response can be examined by looking at differences between early and
late waves (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975). A Chi-square analysis was performed to see
whether there was a relationship between firms fitting sample criteria and early (1st
mailing) versus late respondents (those responding to the post card reminder and later
mailings). No such differences were found ( 2 .1572, D.f.=1, p=.T18). There was no
response bias within or among companies Similarities between early and late responders
can be interpreted as suggesting the absence of response bias, under the assumption that
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those firms that responded to the reminder would not have responded had the reminder
not been sent (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975; Covin and Covin 1990).
4.6.1.2 INDUSTRY EFFECT
The potential for an individual industry affecting the results is mitigated by the
representation of nine different industries in the study: #1=construction, #2=automotive
repair, #3=hearing aids, #4=business services, #5=fashion accessories, 6=electromcs,
#7=home security, #8=automotive service, #9=janitorial.
4.7 ASSESSMENT OF INSTRUMENT VALIDITY
Clearly, the value of our research in terms of both furthering research in
franchising and in furthering practitioner effectiveness, depends greatly on the
measurement of the criterion, specifically the dependent variable. That is, how do we
measure "conflict"? Carmines and Zeller (1979) state that "In short, those employing
criterion validation procedures should provide independent evidence of the extent to
which the measurement of the criterion is valid (p.19)."
4.7.1 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
Any instrument which attempts to quantif,' physical or mental traits must meet the
criteria of reliability and validity. Reliability is defined as the consistency or stability of a
measurement instrument, while validity refers to the degree to which the instrument
measures what it claims to. Reliability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
validity.
Reliability poses an objective of consistency, both external and internal. External
consistency refers to the instrument's ability to measure the same trait consistently upon
repeated measurements. Internal consistency refers to the ability of each subpart of the
measure to act consistently in its contribution to the measure.
The construct "conflict" has been operationally defined as the respondent's level of
agreement with four survey statements, each thought to reveal a facet or component of the
construct. A Likert scale of agreement with each item was constructed so as to order the
degree of a respondent's "conflict" from low to high. The central and (theoretically)
defining variable in the construct is the level of anger (Qlsangr), retained as a result of
past disputes. If all the items are in fact indicators of "conflict" then, taken together, their
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'measure' constitutes a scale. If related items are to be used as a scale to measure a
common entity, then each item must act consistently in its contribution to the measure.
This assumption must be tested. Reliability testing is used to assess the "internal
consistency" of such a scale.
Since a measure is reliable to the extent that it is free of random variation, some
form of inter-item correlation analysis is usually performed, the coefficient used as an
indicator of reliability. Reliability coefficients range in value from 0, when the measure is
completely unreliable, to 1.0, when it is perfectly reliable, indicating the consistency with
which each item contributes to the measure.
4.7.2 TEsTING RELIABILITY: CRONBACH'S ALPHA
One of the most commonly used reliability coefficients is Cronbach's alpha (a).
Alpha may be said to estimate the correlation between scores (item responses) on two
halves of a test for any randomly chosen halves. The computation of alpha for the conflict
construct is based on the average correlation of (standardized) items within a scale and
resulted in the following for pilot study data:
Reliability Coefficients, 4 items
Alpha.7946	 Standardized item alpha =.805 1
4.7.2.1 INTERPRETATION OF SPSS ALPHA RELIABILITY ou.rpuT.
An examination of the statistical output from SPSS Reliability Analysis aids in
characterizing the scale and judging its reliability.
Table 4.2 Alpha Item-total Statistics
Variable	 Scale mean
	 Scale Var	 Corrected item-	 Squared multiple	 Alpha if
if item deleted	 if item deleted	 total correlation	 correlation	 item deleted
QI5ANGR	 7.8824	 9.0705	 0.5735	 0.4630	 0.7612
Q15NOZE	 8.4076	 9.1287	 0.7986	 0.6454	 0.6635
QI5SAIvIE	 7.3137	 8.8092	 06622	 05079	 0.7141
QI5SAME2	 68037	 10.0608	 0.4391	 03914	 08266
Alpha.7946	 Standardized item alpha.8051
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For each item, the first column shows what the average score for the scale would
be if the item were excluded from the scale. The next column shows the scale variance if
the item were excluded. These values can be compared with those in the Statistics for
Scale table (APPENDIX B).
The Corrected Item-Total Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient
between the score on the item and the sum of scores on the remaining items in the scale.
These coefficients reveal that Q15ANGR has the strongest relationship with other scale
items and Q 15 SAME has the weakest relationship with other items on the scale.
The Squared Multiple Correlation column gives the resulting R2 from a regression
of the item on all other items in the scale. Accordingly, its interpretation is
straightforward. For example 44% of the variance in the responses to their level of
retained anger can be explained by the other items acting as independent variables.
Finally, The Alpha f Item Deleted column reveals the relative strength of each
item's contribution to scale reliability. In the pilot, the Alpha coefficient of 0.75 would
decrease to 0.63 ifQ15ANGR were deleted. As this is the greatest decrease among the
items, it reveals QI5ANGR to be the strongest contributor to scale reliability. Conversely,
the increase in Alpha to a value of 0.76 with the exclusion ofQ15SAME shows it to be
the weakest contributor. This is as we had expected.
The Standardized Item Alpha is the Alpha that would be obtained if all the item
variances were standardized. The small difference between this value and Alpha for
unstandardized variances suggests that the items have comparable variances. Hotelling's
T2 tests the hypothesis that all item means are equal (Rejected at p<O.001).
We concluded that Cronbach's alpha coefficient is sufficiently high to place
confidence in the reliability of our conflict scale (Nunnally, 1967).
4.7.3 TESTING THE VALIDITY OF THE PROPOSED SCALE (UsING PILOT STDY DATA)
Establishing the reliability of a measure does not address the fitness (validity) of
the measure for its intended purpose, only that whatever it measures, it does so
consistently. Validity refers to the degree to which the measure represents the trait of
interest In abstract terms it refers to the truth of the measurement. Many kinds of
validity are recognized. Terms used to describe them include internal, external, construct,
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face, concurrent, content, convergent, discriminant, and criterion related. Our task is to
assess the validity of the measure of the operationalised construct. Accordingly, since
there is no external standard by which we can validate our measure, we are constrained to
assess the measure in terms of itself That is, if related items are to be used to construct a
single scale, then we must test the assumption that each item is a measure of the same
entity. Factor analysis has been selected to test this assumption. That the entity being
measured is "conflict" remains an assumption.
Factor analysis refers to any of several methods designed to reduce a large number
of variables to a smaller number of variables, or "factors", by finding patterns among the
variations in the values of a number of variables. A cluster of highly intercorrelated
variables is a factor. One commonly used method of factor extraction (principal
component analysis) proceeds by forming a linear combination of variables which accounts
for the largest amount of variation in a sample, then a second combination which accounts
for the next largest amount of variation, but which is not correlated with the first, and so
on. The resulting variable groups, factors, are then "rotated" or mathematically adjusted
to maximize their "loading" on, or correlation with, their respective factors. In varimax
rotation the factors (and their component variables) remain uncorrelated (orthogonal).
A matrix of polychoric' correlation coefficients was generated by SPSS program
PRELIS. The matrix was then submitted to SPSS program FACTOR for analysis.
1 see discussion Appendix III.
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4.7.3.1 INTERPRETATION OF FACTOR oirn'u'r
Table 4.3 Factor Analysis of the Conflict Construct
Variable	 Loadings	 Factor	 Eigenvalue	 % Var
Retained anger	 0.83368	 1	 2.55208	 63 8%
Would not stay as franchisee 	 0.80246
Feelings unchanged by disputes 	 0 75326
Would act same as franchisor 	 0.6 1783
The Initial Statistics table (Appendix III) shows the results of Principal
Components Analysis factor extraction. The four factors are ordered by their Eigenvalues
which are the factor variances. Communality is the amount of (standardized) item
variance which must be accounted for. The total amount of variance for the items is 4.0,
of which the first factor accounts for 2.55. Therefore the percent of total variance
accounted for by the first factor is 2.55/4.0* 100 or 63.8% (Pct of Var column). The
second and subsequent factors contribute little additional information since each is no
better than a single variable with unit variance. This is the rationale for the selection of a
minimum Eigenvalue of 1.0 for inclusion in the analysis.
The Factor Matrix shows the loading of each variable on the (single) extracted
factor. Since factor analysis of the data has failed to separate the variables into more than
one factor, confidence in the "single entity" concept is supported. An item's loading value
is interpreted as the correlation coefficient between the item and the factor. As before, the
relative importance of each variable to the scale is reflected in the size of these correlations
and again it is clear that Q15ANGR predominates in the interpretation of the "conflict"
construct but all components contribute to the single factor. (For a discussion of the
choice of an appropriate correlation matrix see Appendix III).
4.7.4 SUMMARY OF THE INSTRUMENT VALIDITY
The conflict construct's validity was achieved in the literature (Achrol and Etzel,
1992). However, we chose to repeat the examination of the construct with our data.
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Highly similar results were achieved. To this point, analysis has revealed that "conflict"
measures a single entity. In effect, a scale of "conflict," characterized by respondent
anger, has been created by the item responses. The next goal is to place each case
(respondent) on the scale, ultimately to study the role of other variables in creating
conflict.
4.8 THE SAMPLE
There is nothing in the literature that describes the typical franchisee in terms of
demographic profile. Therefore, it is impossible to compare this data against the entire
franchisee population. However, we can test how well the sample population represents
the franchise companies who participated in the study, comparing demographic
information in our data set with that of the franchise companies. Discussion of the sample
profile is contained in Chapter 5.
4.8.1 GENIERALISABILITY OF THE DATA: HYPOTHESIS TESTING FOR TIlE MEAN OF A
POPULATION
In order to confidently generalize the findings of this study to the population from
which we have drawn our sample, we will measure the reliability of our point estimate of
the population mean by determining a confidence interval for this parameter.
The population means for selected descriptive variables, by company, are taken
from the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) of the franchisor, and Entrepreneur
Magazine (January 1994).
We will test the hypothesis that the sample has been drawn from a population with
the stated variable means. For example, the mean value for the year the license agreement
was signed for company I is 1987.9, while our sample mean is 1988.2. The test of the
hypothesis that the mean value for the population represented by our sample is 1987.9 is
stated as follows:
H0: I = 87.9 (null)
Ha p 87.9 (alternative)
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Table 4.4 Hypothesis Test Outcomes: Year License Agreement Signed
Company	 Population	 Sample	 I Z or t I	 Decision
Statistics	 Statistics
i = 1987.9	 1988.2	 IZI0.789	 Fail to Reject
n177	 s3.25	 H0
n =52
2	 1986.0	 = 1984.8	 Z1 1.780	 Fail toReject
n=79	 s=5.87	 H0
n=39
3	 p1986.9	 1987.6	 1Z11.560	 FailtoReject
n=94	 s3.88	 H.0
n =42
4	 1989.0	 x 1989.2	 1Z10.744	 FailtoReject
n=397	 s=2.79	 H0
n = 85
5	 i 1987.0	 x 1986.2	 1Zl 1.620	 Fail to Reject
n153	 s=3.69	 H0
n41
6	 .t=1982.5
n=434
7	 t=1984.4
n= 123
8
n229
= 1983.7
s6.28
= 64
x = 1983.9
s3.79
n = 25
= 1989.2
s= 1.88
n28
IZk 1.650	 FailtoReject
H0
It I = 0.736	 Fail to Reject
ltk2.l00	 Reject
9	 t 1987.0	 1987.4	 IZk 1.120	 Fail to Reject
n1226	 s6.26	 11€,
n245
89
Table 4.5 Hypothesis Test Outcomes: Number of Outlets
Company	 Population	 Sample	 I Z oct I	 Decision
Statistics	 Statistics
I	 il.lI	 w1.10	 IZI=0.276	 Failto
n=l77	 s0.31	 Reject}i,
n=39
2	 i 1.13	 = 1.18	 lZ1 1.12	 Fail to
n=79	 s0.39	 RejectH0
n =65
3	 ji=4.00	 =4.45	 ltl=0.878	 Failto
n94	 s=4.44	 Reject H0
n29
4	 t1.O	 1.0	 1Zl***	 Failto
n=397	 s=O.0O	 RejectH
n=43
5	 i1.5	 1.47	 IZHO.226	 Failto
n 153	 s0.99	 RejectH0
n89
6	 .i=1.15	 =1i1	 lZl0.753	 Failto
n = 434	 s = 0.46	 Reject I-Ia
n = 237
7
n= 123
8
n229
x5.7
s5.72
n41
= 1.5
s=0.95
n =26
Izl=o 683
ItI=0.O
Fail to
RejectH0
Fail to
Reject H0
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Company	 Population	 Sample	 I Z act I	 Decision
Statistics	 Statistics
9	 j.i1.5	 xl.4	 IZI=2.65	 Reject!-!0
n1226	 s0.66
n = 52
Table 4.6 Hypothesis Test Outcomes: Revenue
Company	 Population	 Sample	 I Z or t I	 Decision
Statistics	 Statistics
p.=2.20	 2.13	 1Z10.319	 Fail to Reject
n177	 s1.88	 110
n=52
2	 = 5.77	 = 5.83	 I Z I = 0.254	 Fail to Reject
n79	 s2.06	 H0
n=39
3	 j.i5.40	 5.26.6	 1Z10.506	 FailtoReject
n94	 s2.40	 H0
n42
4	 i2.1l	 2.02	 1Zl 1.15	 FailtoReject
n397	 s0.81	 H0
n = 85
5	 p.6.05	 6.33	 1Zl0.616	 FailtoReject
n153	 s=3.39	 H0
n41
6	 = 4.00	 x = 4.04	 I Z I = 0.173	 Fail to Reject
n434	 s2.0	 H0
n232
7	 = 7.0	 = 7.30	 I Z I = 0.526	 Fail to Reject
n123	 s3.18	 H0
n = 37
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Company	 Population	 Sample	 I Z or t I	 Decision
Statistics	 Statistics
8	 p=5.00	 x4.80	 ItI = 1.09	 FailtoReject
n = 229
9
n 1226
s= 1.03
n23
w=2.84	 IZI=0.982
s2.85
n52
Fail to Reject
H0
Twenty-five of the twenty-seven hypotheses are accepted. In seven of the nine
companies, the z-test and t-test of means for each sample and population from which it
was taken reveals that the samples have a likelihood of coming from a population having
the same distribution as the sample. That is, the sample of respondents reflects the
characteristics of the "average" franchisee of each franchisor. In two of the companies, a
comparison of two of three sample statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis and a
confidence level of .05. At a confidence level of.10, twenty-eight of the twenty-nine
means tests fail to reject the null hypothesis. Although this gives us less confidence in the
generalisability of the sample to the population than the previously discussed seven
companies, the two rejected hypotheses may be attributed to random occurrence. In any
case, the preponderance of evidence in all companies gives us confidence in the
generalisability of the findings.
The range of franchisee characteristics provides some justification for the belief
that the result can be generalisable to the entire sampled populations of franchisees.
Adding to the generalisablity of the study is that 15.15% of the respondents had previously
owned a different franchise, thus offering a broader perspective.
Having gained confidence that we have obtained a representative sample we look
to the issue of key respondent. The level of analysis in this study is the franchisee, who is
therefore the key respondent. It is essential that we are assured the mail survey
respondent is the owner of the franchise. As discussed in section 5.2.1, 99.2% of the
respondents can be clearly identified as the franchisee. There is a likelihood that some or
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all of the remaining .8% are also franchisees. Therefore, we proceed with the belief that
the sample is representative of the franchisees attitudes in the population studied.
4.9 STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS
4.9.1 CLUSTER ANALYSIS: FINDING A PATTERN AMONG ITEM RESPONSES
As we have developed a scale of conflict in franchising, it is necessary to locate
each franchisee respondent on that scale. Cluster analysis is used to place each case
relative to a centroid, or measurement center, calculated from all contributing conflict
construct variables. A new variable, which we label "conflict," is created with each
franchisee classified as a member of a cluster group.
4.9.2 FACTOR ANALYSIS
There are four tasks factor analysis can accomplish, 1) To identify the latent
tendencies not easily recognised in a larger set of variables, 2) Data reduction with the
minimum loss of information, 3) To identify the appropriate variables for regression,
discriminant analysis, and correlation, 4) Create a new set of variables to partially or
completely replace to original variables (I-lair, Anderson, Tatham and Grablowsky, 1979).
Our principal use of factor analysis is to identify latent tendencies and to identify
appropriate variables for CHAID analysis.
Factor rotations, where applicable, are achieved with varimax method.
4.9.3 CR1-SQUARE AUTOMATIC INTERACTION DETECTOR (CHAID) ANALYSIS
CHAID Analysis performs segmentation modelling and is useful in any situation in
which the goal is to divide a population into segments that differ with respect to a
designated criterion (Noruis, 1989). In this study that criterion is the dependent conflict
construct variable. CHAID divides a population into two or more distinct groups based
on categories of the "best" predictor of the dependent variable. It then splits each of these
groups into smaller subgroups based on other predictor variables. This splitting process
continues until no further statistically significant predictors can be found. The segments
that are derived by Cl-lAID analysis are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The segments
do not overlap and each case is contained in only one segment. These segmentation
results are displayed in the form of a tree diagram whose branches, or nodes, correspond
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to the groups. As these subgroups split further into additional subgroups, the tree adds
more nodes.
The dependent variable in CHAID analysis can be dichotomous or polytomous. A
dichotomous variable has two categories which distinguish between cases that have some
trait and cases that do not have that trait. In this study the dependent conflict variable is
polytomous, having a number of categories on the conflict scale as described by the cluster
analysis. If a dependent variable has a missing category it will not be used in the analysis.
In this study n=621 and only 613 cases are used in the CHAID analysis due to 8 with
missing values.
CHAID merges categories of a predictor variable that are not different in a
statistically significant manner. This merging procedure ensures that the cases in the same
segment are homogeneous with respect to the segmentation criterion (conflict construct).
Cases in different segments are heterogeneous with respect to the conflict construct.
Because the dependent variable in this study is nominal, and not ordinal, the
segmentation criterion is based on the probability distribution of the conflict construct.
Each predictor, or independent variable, is classified as "monotonic," "free," or
"floating." Categories of a monotonic predictor variable can be combined only if they are
adjacent to each other. Ordinal predictors, such as revenue, are treated as monotonic.
Float variables are treated as monotonic except that the final category, which, in this
study, represents missing values, is allowed to combine with any other category. Nominal
variables are treated as free, allowed to combine "freely," whether or not the categories
are adjacent.
At each segmentation stage in the CHAID analysis a new node is created based on
the predictor variable having the lowest probability value, orp value. This study uses a
significance level of .05 probability value or less. Thep value represents the probability
that the observed sample relationship between the independent predictor variable and the
dependent conflict construct variable would occur if the two variables were statistically
unrelated. For example, ap value of .01 means that the observed relationship between the
predictor and the dependent variable would occur only 1% of the time if the variables
were independent.
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CHAID analyses all variables input to the model and lists those which have ap-
value of .05 or less. The models are then built using one independent variable at a time as
the primary correlation with the dependent variable. Additional "level" of models can be
built by designating an independent variable which has been analysed as having a p-value
of.05 or less. For each level of model building all the variables with ap-value of.O5 or
less remain in the model to detect correlation among independent variables. The
correlations among independent variables are the additional nodes in the tree diagram
discussed above.
4.9.4 WiLcoxoN MATCILED PAIRS TEST
We extend Achrol and Etzel's (1990) analysis of franchisor contractually obligated
services to the franchisee by adding a 1-5 Likert scale of adequacy to the 1-5 Likert scale
of importance. To ascertain statistically significant differences between importance and
adequacy for each item we employ the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs test. Wilcoxon Matched
Pairs tests the hypothesis that two samples have the same distribution.
4.10 SUMMARY
Considerable space in this chapter was dedicated to the research design which
investigates conflict in franchising from the perspective of the franchisee, integrating
theory, research question, propositions, methodology, and statistical application. This
study's quantitative approach is supported by sophisticated SPSS software, specifically,
cluster analysis, factor analysis, the CHAID application and Wilcoxon matched pairs.
Because CHAID is a relatively new application this chapter deals with the
statistical underpinnings of Cl-LAID and its appropriate use in describing and modelling
franchisee-franchisor conflict. Further, the detailed development of the mail survey and
pilot study led to a substantial n, a reasonable response rate. Validation of the survey
instrument was achieved in the pilot study according to the requirements as related by
DilIman (1978).
Therefore, a strong theoretical foundation, a well-grounded methodology, a solid
pilot study, and a sophisticated statistical application, allow the main study to be launched
with considerable confidence.
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CHAPTER V
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to unfold the story of conflict in the franchisee-
franchisor relationship through data analysis and discussion. The data describes the
franchisee, franchisee firm, and the financial profile of the franchisee firm. Our aim is to
articulate the relevance of the data descriptions to the research question and propositions.
Further, the data is subjected to statistical applications which again validate the
operationalisation of conflict in our dependent variable and allows us to then answer the
research question and the three propositions.
Franchisee satisfaction is assessed through the analysis of the conflict construct, as
it is constituted in the main study, as a result of franchisee response to the four survey
statements which constitute the construct. The main study data relating to these four
statements is analysed at the individual variable level and then subjected to the same
correlation and factor analysis that was performed on the pilot data and is tested with
Kruskall-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. Further, the 621 cases in the study are
clustered on the conflict construct to establish likely levels of satisfaction.
Following the assessment of franchisee satisfaction, which answers the research
question, the three propositions are addressed in univariate analysis.
The rationale for the franchisee-franchisor alliance presumes the importance of
goals and goal congruency by the parties, which supports analysis of franchisee goals and
prompts Proposition A. The theoretical underpinnings of this thesis require an analysis of
the principal transactions between alliance partners (franchisee-franchisor) which support
the goals of the relationship partners. In this study, those transactions are identified as
franchisor provided services and analysed as a consequence of Proposition B. The final
proposition, C, addresses the culmination of the transactions between the parties, which
should, theoretically, be maintenance and enhancement of the trade mark value. These
three propositions regarding the perceived contract, franchisor provided services, and
trade mark valuation, are addressed by franchisee independent variables in the designated
perspectives which correlate among themselves and, ultimately, to franchisee satisfaction
(the dependent conflict variable construct) and modelled. The nature of the independent
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variables is theoretically supported as outlined in Chapter IV. Each model is supported by
ancillary statistical applications and analysis. A final model of the antecedents of franchise
conflict is presented utilising CHAID (SPSS Chi-square Automatic Interaction Detector)
analysis. These models are at the heart of the generalisability of the study.
5.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE FRANCHISEE AND FRANCHISEE FIRM
In this section franchisee responses to the questionnaire are analysed by individual
variable and/or by theoretically segmented sections of individual variables. Our aim is to
begin to understand the data in its most basic form to aid in answering the research
question, address the propositions, and bring clarity and reference to the conclusions and
recommendations.
5.2.1 THE FRANCHISEE
The nature of this study regards the perspective of the franchisee. Therefore, it is
essential that we are confident that the respondent is the franchisee. Eighty-six percent of
the respondents answered that they were "franchisee", "licensee", or "owner." Thirteen
percent answered in terms that indicated more than one person owned the franchise, such
as "co-owner" or "partner." The remaining eight tenths-of one percent, or five
respondents, referred to themselves in managerial terms, such as Director, President, or
Chief Executive Officer. These results, and the fact that we used specialised mailing lists
which were personally addressed to the franchisee, give us confidence that at least 99.2%
of the respondents are franchisees and that there is a likelihood all respondents are
franchisees.
Overall, the respondents to this survey operate a total of 936 outlets. While 77%
of the respondents own only one outlet, the range of ownership is as high as 30 outlets.
Clearly, this is important because there is the potential for varying perspective based on
size (Brickley and Dark, 1985). Also, the single outlet operator is typically the manager of
the outlet while the multiple outlet franchisee obviously cannot manage each of the
outlets, again setting the possibility of having a different perspective (Brickley and Dark,
1985).
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Table 5.1 Number of Outlets Owned
No. Outlets	 No. Cases	 Percent
1	 481	 77.6
2	 66	 10.6
3	 30	 4.8
4	 13	 2.1
>=5	 30	 4.8
total	 620	 100
It is interesting to note the backgrounds of the franchisee respondents. Thirty-two
percent had previous management experience prior to purchasing their franchise. Fifty-
nine percent had non-management, sales, and technical positions. Ten percent of the
respondents did not list a prior job.
5.2.2 THE FRANCHISEE FIRM
Table 5.2 Franchisee Firm Characteristics
Description	 Mean	 Std Dev	 Mm	 Max	 N
Number of Outlets per firm	 1.66	 2.23	 1.0	 30.0	 616
YearContract Signed	 1985.6	 5.53	 1960	 1993	 619
Number of new outlets planned 	 1.96	 2.77	 1.0	 30	 147
The average franchisee firm in our study signed their contract toward the middle of
1985. Inception of the sampled franchisee firms ranged from 1960 to 1993. This is
important because the length of time in a franchisee system has shown to impact levels of
litigation in franchising, one form of manifest conflict (Spinelli and Bygrave, 1992). This
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also validates the long term perspective offered by the results of this study, adding
justification to the inter-organisational definition. That is, the franchisees included in this
study are in a long term alliance for the purpose of enhancing the productive benefits.
Additionally, we have the opportunity to cross-check that the respondent is the franchisee,
accomplished by comparing the age of the license agreement with the amount of time the
respondent has been involved with franchising. The result is that the mean franchisee
respondent has 2.4 months more franchising experience than the mean life of the license
agreement. That 2.4 months is attributable to the 15% of the respondents who have
previously owned a franchise. Previous franchise experience is coded and included in the
data base of independent variables but proved not to correlate with conflict in any of the
models. Therefore, the perspective offered by franchisees in this study are primarily a
result of their current franchise relationship.
No study can capture all the internal and exogenous forces which might affect the
experiment (Yin, 1984). Moreover, with nine individual companies participating in the
study, the individual characteristics and anomalies particular to the individual franchise are
eligible to influence franchisee conflict cluster membership. Accordingly, the franchise
system related issues not captured in the independent variables in this study are contained
in the variable which designates the franchisee's specific franchise company affiliation.
Fifty-one percent of franchisees plan to buy existing outlets already in their
franchise system andlor build new outlets. Almost thirty-five percent of franchisee
respondents (n=2 15) plan to buy existing outlets. Twenty-four percent plan to develop
new outlets. This would intuitively indicate a positive perspective of the future by at least
half of the respondents. However, neo-classical economic theory would indicate the
possibility of other underlying motivations for growth, such as the amelioration of
cannibalised sales revenue from competing outlets within the same franchise system or
greater control of localised advertising expenditures (Mittelstaedt and Stassen, 1990).
As franchising is an inter-organisational form often used to expand a business
concept, franchisee attitudes toward growth are important. Clearly, some franchisees in
this study are growth oriented and some are not. Our sample therefore affords us the
ability to investigate the theoretical position posited by microeconomic theory that new
store development is a source of conflict in franchising.
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$106,000
32.16%
5.2.3 THE FRANCHISEE FIRM FINANCIAL PROFILE
Microeconomic theory regarding the production function of the franchisee firm
and the transaction-cost perspective regarding the "cost of running the business" (Arrow,
1969, p.9) requires a profile of the finance of the franchisee firm. The economic
perspective establishes the potential for structural conflict in the relationship based on cost
functions and profit maximising behaviour. Transaction-cost prescribes the governance
which most effectively ameliorates the conflictual behaviour resultant from self-interest
motivation.
Table 5.3 Mean Values of Franchisee Firm Financial Information
Variable	 Mean	 Minimum	 Maximum	 Std Dev	 N
Annual revenue	 $622,500	 $25,000	 $7,500,000	 $193,750	 604
8.48%
26.34%
Annual fixed expense
Variable cost per $ of
sales
Promotional expense
per $ of sales
Profit margin per $ of
sales
	
$5,000	 $750,000
	
5.00%	 68.00%
0 . 50%	 33.00%
0.50%	 3 9.00%
	
$27,000	 574
	
24.16%	 526
	
11.72%	 571
	
11.21%	 574
The combined sales of the franchisee firms participating in this study are
$386, 000, 0002
 with a significant percentage of the revenue by most allocated to
promotional expense. This would indicate some sense of the requirement to build trade
name value, or at least the overall importance of marketing. Of course, industry effects
may account for some of the variance. However, considering that there are nine
franchises in nine different industries represented in this study, industry effects also afford
2 Pounds Sterling are converted to US dollars at 1:1.55
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us a broad range of financial parameters, thus providing data unbiased by a preponderance
of a particular economic condition which might affect an individual franchise type.
Also, franchisee firms report a high profit margin. In a simple break-even analysis
it appears the firms are, on average, profitable.
Break-even Sales = Fixed Cost/Contribution Margin
For the average franchisee in this study:
Break-even Sales = $402,430 and average level of profit = $58,000
Of course, this data is for the "average" franchisee which may not exactly describe any of
the respondent firms. However, it does provide a bench mark of standard performance
against which satisfaction may or may not be affected. This is analysed in Chapter 6.
5.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF FRANCHISEE CONFLICT VARIABLES
The research question deals with conflict in the franchisee-franchisor relationship.
In this section we describe the four survey statements which are used to measure conflict.
Franchisees scored the statements on a 1-5 Likert scale of agreement.
Table 5.4 Conflict Variable Descriptives
	
Category	 Statistic
Conflict Statement	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 Mean	 N
Our organisation has retained
	 236	 106	 113	 89	 73	 2.44	 617
anger toward the franchisor
because of past disputes
If it was up to me we would not be 292
	 102	 83	 62	 81	 2.26	 620
a part of the franchise system any
longer
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107 615177 59	 2.76170102
61 619104 209	 3.5915788
	
Category	 Statistic
Conflict Statement	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 Mean	 N
Our organisation feels the same
way about the franchisor before
and after any dispute (reverse
coded for conflict construct)
If I were the franchisor I would act
as the franchisor does now
(reverse coded for conflict
construct)
While the mean scores indicate an attitude leaning to a positive perspective on
conflict in the relationship, there is a broad range of scoring. Certainly, this data
establishes a spectrum of conflict. There is little retained anger in 55% of the franchisees
(score1 or 2) and a majority, 65%, of franchisees would clearly choose to stay in the
franchise if they were given the option to exit (scorel or 2). There is a smaller but
significant number of franchisees who are angry and appear to be at the level of conflict
which manifests as a desire to terminate the relationship. However, we cannot ascertain,
at this level of analysis, if the angry respondents are the same franchisees as those who
wish to leave. Indeed, there remains a large number of franchisees who do not clearly fit
any obvious description of conflict in their attitude toward the franchisor. Greater clarity
can be gained by testing if these variables are measuring the same phenomenon and
provide a reliable scale on which to measure conflict.
5.3.1 CORRELATION AD RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT CONSTRUCT
The polychoric correlation matrix was used in both Reliability and Factor analysis
for the pilot study. A polychoric correlation matrix was also applied to the main study for
Reliability and Factor analysis, with similar and supportive results. Reliability as measured
by Cronbach's (standardised item) Alpha is .7458 (Table 5.5), Principal component
analysis, as in the pilot study, reveals one factor (Table 5.6).
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Table 5.5 Alpha Item-total Statistics
Variable	 Scale mean	 Scale Var	 Conected item-	 Squared multiple 	 Alpha if
if item deleted	 if item deleted	 total correlation	 correlation	 item deleted
Retained	 8.6085	 9.2545	 0.6465	 0.4399	 0.63 10
anger
Would not	 8.7961
stay as
franchisee
Feelings	 8.2936
unchanged by
disputes
9.3865
12.0374
0.5969
0.4034
04085	 0.6614
0.1734	 0.7611
Would act	 7.4633	 10.3687	 0.5410	 0.2946	 0.6938
same as
franchisor
Alpha= .7497	 Standardized item alpha= .7458
As in the pilot study, retained anger is the strongest, and feelings about the
franchisor being unchanged is the weakest contributor to scale reliability. The small
difference between the standardised and unstandardized alpha suggests that the variance
between the items is similar.
Table 5.6 Factor Analysis of the Conflict Construct
Variable	 Loadings	 Factor	 Eigenvalue	 % Var
Retained anger	 0.69502	 1	 2.28807	 57.2%
Would not stay as franchisee	 0.64394
Feelings unchanged by disputes 	 0.38171
Would act same as franchisor 	 0.56740
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The four survey statements form a single factor and therefore a construct on which
franchisee-franchisor conflict can be measured. With retained anger having the greatest
loading on the extracted factor, we feel justified in labelling the factor as a conflict
construct. This is especially true when considering that a desire to leave the franchise also
loads highly on the factor. When anger reaches some level of dissatisfaction, the
franchisee will choose to leave the relationship. Also, the theoretical position that conflict
can be positive is supported by the representation in the factor loadings by the statements
that feelings are unchanged by disputes and the franchisee would act as the franchisor
does.
We now have similar reliability and factor analysis results in our pilot and main
study which are comparable to the literature. Therefore, this study proceeds with
confidence that the conflict construct is a valid and reliable scaled measure of franchisee
satisfaction. This provides the foundation for addressing the research question in the
multivariate analysis chapter by placing the cases on the scale.
5.4 THE FRANCHISEES GOALS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
FRANCHISOR: CURRENT AND FUTURE
Proposition A is concerned with the extent of franchisee satisfaction and their
perception of the goals particular to their relationship with the franchisor.
The long term perspective of parties to an exchange relationship can be
operationalised by establishing a pattern of goals which reflect how the participant views
both the present and the future requirements of the relationship (Mcneil, 1975; Stern and
Kaufman, 1988; Achrol and Etzel, 1990). The statements of relative goals for the future
relationship with the franchisor are taken from the literature (Achrol and Etzel, 1990) The
statements which reflect the goals of franchisees for the on-going relationship with the
franchisor are taken from relational exchange literature and reflect the three models of
relational exchange (Stern and Kaufman, 1988).
5.4.1 ANALYSIS OF GOALS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Franchisees were asked to score their agreement (1-5 Likert scale) with the goal
statements listed in table 5.7, relative to each other.
104
Table 5.7 Relative Goals for the Future Relationship With the Franchisor*
Categoiy	 Statistics
Goal Statement	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 Mean	 N
A More Cooperative 	 42	 40	 144	 161	 233	 3.81	 620
Relationship
Improving Communication	 27
	
33	 100	 197	 263	 4.00
	
620
and Information Sharing
Improving Coordinated
	
18
	
34	 153	 202	 213	 3.91
	
620
Quality Assurance
Strengthening Mutual 	 26	 32	 118	 216	 227	 3.94	 619
Commitment
* I =riot important, 5most important
Because all the goal statements are a positive aflirmation of a productive alliance,
the mean scoring of the 1-5 Likert scale of franchisee goals for the future of the
relationship reveals a narrow range which is well above the neutral '3'. More than 60%
score greater than 3 on each of the four scales. Franchisees see the entire range of
relational goals as important. Between 16% and 25% are indifferent and a significant
minority of between 8% and 13% view these goals as unimportant. Even though they
were asked to score these goals on a relative basis, the mean scores indicate little
prioritisation. Therefore, it would seem that all relational goals are important to most
franchisees. If a goal is important then achievement or lack of achievement of that goal
should affect satisfaction (Schul, 1987). This suggests that attainment of goals would
correlate to the conflict construct. Cooperation has the greatest spread of scoring and all
goals score the entire range of the scale. This provides a broad basis for conflict
correlation analysis in Chapter 6. Also, we ask if this is just one construct?
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Table 5.8 Factor Analysis of Goals Variables for the Future JeIationship with the
Franchisor (one factor extracted)
Variable Description	 Loadings	 Factor	 Eigenvalue	 Pct Var
A more cooperative relationship 	 0.74	 1.00	 2.34051	 58.5
Improving commuiucationsfmfo	 0.81
Improving coordinated quality assurance 	 0.80
Strengthening quality assurance 	 0.68
With all variables loading, and therefore contributing, one factor emerges from
Factor Analysis, representing almost 59% of the total variance in the factor (Table 5.8).
More cooperation, improving communication, improving coordinated quality assurance
and strengthening quality assurance all have significant explanatory influence. The
literature is rich in establishing the importance of cooperation in organisations and
contains numerous references to coordination as a companion concept. It is less
encompassing in reviewing cooperation in inter-organisational forms. Yet, in this study of
franchisee perspectives, there is a clear acknowledgement of the need for a cooperative
relationship with the franchisor. Our inference is that more perceived cooperation will
diminish conflict in the relationship.
5.4.2 GOALS FOR THE CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRANCHISOR
Kaufman and Stern (1988) established a series of statements which they used to
measure the extent of relational exchange between manufacturer and wholesaler. These
goals may be distinct from the future goal described above because they reflect an attitude
about the current status of the relationship versus a desirable status of the relationship for
the future. These statements are developed to encompass the three traits as described by
Mcneil's (1975) relational exchange perspective. We analyse the variables individually
and in the groups which reflect the relational exchange trait they are developed to reflect.
5.4.3 RELATIONAL EXCHANGE THEORY DRIVEN GOALS
In assessing the franchisees' goals for the continuing relationship with the
franchisor we first examine if the data supports the theoretical position that franchising is a
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relational exchange. Kaufman and Stern (1988) specifically reference franchising as an
example of the prototypical relational exchange, establishing the statements as an
appropriate operationalisation of franchise goals.
We first examine the raw scores of the relational exchange measures on the 1-5
Likert scale of agreement, divided in the three models headed Solidarity, Mutuality, and
Role Integrity.
Table 5.9 Franchisee's Goals for the Continuing Relationship*
Vanable Description	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5	 Mean	 Std	 N
Dcv
Solidarity Variables
The relationship is best described	 91	 111	 180	 121	 117	 3.10	 1.31	 620
as 'arms length'
The relationship goes beyond	 78	 99	 144	 181	 116	 3.26	 1.28	 618
simply buying and selling
The franchisor is just another
	 166	 166	 111	 95	 82	 2.61	 1.37	 620
supplier
Mutuality Variables
License Agreement terms are
	 67	 83	 112	 156	 202	 3.55	 1.34	 619
precise and understood
Franchiseemonitors the
	 119	 155	 210	 93	 39	 2.64	 1.14	 616
franchisor
The franchisor monitors sales to 	 118	 83	 114	 111	 177	 3.24	 1.49	 603
ensure proper royalty payments
Role Integrity Variables
The relationship is well 	 52	 78	 149	 196	 146	 3.49	 1.22	 620
coordinated and will continue
The relationship is complex	 148	 121	 137	 139	 71	 2.78	 1.34	 616
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Variable Description	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 Mean	 Std	 N
Dcv
The relationship is complicated
	 159	 138	 155	 105	 63	 2.64	 1.30	 620
by diverse expectations
* 1 not important, 5—most important
These results cannot be analysed simply by ascending order of the mean scores
on the 1-5 Likert scale of agreement. For example, a low score on franchise exit is an
indication of a relational exchange, while a high score for agreement with the actions of
the franchisor is also an example of an exchange relationship.
There is great consistency in the distribution of the scoring. Franchisees score the
solidarity variables 38% clear disagreement, 23% neutral, and 38% clear agreement. The
mutuality variables are scored in a similar pattern, 37% clear disagreement, 24%
neutrality, and 39% clear agreement. The role integrity variables again follow the
established pattern with 37%, 24% and 39%.
A close examination of the results reveals attitudinal trends displaying a range,
which lends support to the conflict construct. The franchisees understand that the
relationship goes beyond basic market transactions, see the relationship as well
coordinated, and generally agree with the way the franchisor acts. All of these statements
exempli1,' the exchange relationship which has a likelihood of continuing. However, there
is a relative neutrality on the issues of complexity of the relationship and arms length
dealing, indicating a sense of caution and a desire for some distance by the respondents
and a moderation of the exchange relationship. Kaufman and Stern (1988) would argue
that agreeing with and understanding the precision of the license agreement also implies
less of a relational exchange because detailed contractual adherence inhibits long term
perspective. The theoretical implication is that the generalised relationship is characterised
as toward the relational exchange end of the transactional spectrum but certainly not at the
polar extreme. This contradicts the literature's classification of franchising as a pure
relational exchange.
This result is more accurately indicated by transaction-cost analysis, which has a
clear delineation of governance based on transactional and relational focus. Transaction-
cost analysis places the franchise relationship in the hybrid category on the governance
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grid, with "moderate" levels of interactive requirements between the franchisee and
franchisor (Williamson, 1985). In fact, the relationship is at the center of the three-section
transaction-cost spectrum.
Both theoretical perspectives are based in a spectrum of exchange attitudes. The
scores for each goal variable cover the entire scale, again providing a complete range of
variable scores for analysis with the conflict construct.
The relational exchange spectrum is constructed by analysing component models
as portrayed by the specific variables used in the implementation of this study. Kaufinan
and Stern (1988) did not report subjecting the data to factor analysis. We do so to gain
insight into the latency of the construct. That is, do the variables actually measure one
goal or more than one, and if more than one factor emerges, do we gain additional insight
into the motivations of the franchisee to continue the relationship or not.
Table 5.10 Factor Analysis of Solidarity Variables
Variable Description	 Loadings	 Factor	 Eigenvalues Cum. Pct
Var
The relationship is best 	 0.86	 1	 1.5	 51.4
described as 'arms length'
The franchisor is just another 	 0.87
supplier
The relationship goes beyond	 0.97532	 2	 1	 84.4
simply buying and selling
In cases where a small number of variables are used in factor analysis, the
Eigenvalue cutoff of 1.0 can be relaxed (Hair et al, 1979). Therefore, we have reduced
the eigenvalue cutoff to .99. Factor Analysis yields two factors from the three variables.
This suggests that in the perspective of the relational exchange spectrum, franchising may
not be an example of the extreme case in point. There is more than just the one
"solidarity" goal. In the context of the review of scoring frequencies, franchisees are
neutral on the arms length nature of the relationship, agree that the relationship goes
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beyond simply buying and selling, and disagree that the franchisor is just another supplier.
The mean score of the "arms length" nature of the relationship is neutral and therefore
reflective of a neutral sense of solidarity with the franchisor while the mean scores for the
remaining two variables are mildly supportive of relational exchange.
The first factor accounts for only 5 1.4% of the variance among the variables. The
variable labelled "simply buying and selling," constitutes the second factor. This might be
explained by the fact that nine distinct franchisors are represented in the perspectives of
the franchisee respondents. "Beyond simply buying and selling" might be defined in very
different ways by the different franchise affiliations. Whereas, the three variables are
theoretically designed to represent a single factor called solidarity, "the norm that holds
exchange relationships together" (Mcneil, 1980: 52), our study finds there are two
dimensions to solidarity.
The issue of franchisee solidarity with the franchisor is unresolved. Given the
nature of the conflict construct, these results are not surprising. We are encouraged to
enter the three original variables separately into the CHAID analysis
Table 5.11 Factor Analysis of Mutuality Variables
Variable Description	 Loadings	 Factor	 Eigenvalues	 Cum Pct Var
License Agreement terms are precise
	 0.73	 1	 1.21667	 39.5
and understood
The franchisor monitors sales to
	 0.78
ensure proper royalty paents
Franchisee monitors the franchisor
	 0.98995	 2	 0.96734	 71.7
Again, the first factor explains only a relatively small amount of the variance
among the influencing variables. This gives us less confidence that the factor is
informative or as rich in detail as are the individual variables. Franchisees cautiously
perceive themselves in a relational exchange. The franchisor monitoring sales is a contra-
indication of relational exchange, as is any rigid adherence to the license agreement. This
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is an important finding because it gives us insight into the ambivalence that is indicated by
franchisees as measured by the conflict construct. We would expect that a respondent
who agrees with these statements to have greater conflict with the franchisor. Clearly,
there are two dimensions of mutuality in the franchise relationship (from the view of the
franchisee). While the first factor reflects the franchisor's mutuality, the second factor
reflects franchisee mutuality. Mutuality focuses on the fair distribution of the productive
benefits of the relationship. If franchisees see themselves in a relational exchange but
question the franchisor's perspective, there is support for the microeconomic theory of
structural conflict and the relational exchange perspective which would indicate there is
fertile ground for latent conflict (Kaufman, 1987; Thomas, 1992).
Table 5.12 Factor Analysis of Role Integrity Variables
Variable	 Loadings Factor Eigenvalues	 Cum Pet Var
The relationship is well coordinated and will 	 -0.71	 1	 2	 66 7
continue
The relationship is complex	 0.82
The relationship is complicated by diverse 	 0.85
expectations
Each variable of this relational exchange model is clearly measuring a single factor.
This is supportive of the theoretical underpinning provided by relational exchange theory.
In this factor, loadings are high in ll variables. Therefore, they all help explain the
franchisee's perspective on role integrity. However, coordination is negative loaded in the
factor. Complexity and diverse expectation move in the opposite direction to
coordination.
Role Integrity expresses the hope that the parties to the license agreement will
behave in a manner in which supports their promises. Two of the three variables do not
support the role integrity characteristic of relational exchange when examined in univariate
form, again supporting the potential for conflict in the relationship. Also, factor analysis
indicates that complexity and diverse expectation are seen as negatively influencing
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coordination in the relationship. Simply stated, franchisees do not see the relationship as
diverse and complex and therefore expect it to be coordinated.
5.5 FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES
Proposition B addresses the specific transactions between the franchisee and
franchisor which support the maintenance and enhancement of the trademark, franchisor
provided services, and links franchisee satisfaction to the importance and adequacy of
these services.
Achrol and Etzel (1990) developed a list of franchisor provided services. In their
study the franchisees scored the importance of each service. In this study, the respondents
have scored each of the eighteen franchisor services for h importance of the service and
the adequacy of the franchisor in the delivery of that service. The objective is to
understand the relative difference between importance and adequacy as well as overall
rankings of the contractually obligated services. We submit that the franchisor provided
services are the points of transactional interaction between the franchisee and franchisor
and thus act as the informal governance of the relationship. By assessing if there is a
difference between importance and adequacy of franchisor provided services we can
present an argument that the theoretical informal governance of the relationship is
practically executed. This gives us insight into the transactional boundaries within which
the relationship continues relatively harmoniously. In multivariate CHAD analysis we will
then investigate how transactional boundaries, the informal governance of the relationship,
affect conflict. Cl-LAID provides us with the ability to recognise non-linear segmentations
of variables which correlate with the dependent variable. This is more useful then
regression modelling in distinguishing divergent patterns of response to conflict.
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Table 5.13 Service Variables: Importance vs. Adequacy
Importance	 Adequacy
Service Variable 	 Mean	 SD	 N	 Mean	 SD	 N
resolving disagreements fairly 	 4.47	 0.78	 613	 3.02	 1.30	 612
effective national advertising	 4.46	 0.91	 613	 3.10	 1.45	 614
promoting newproducts& services	 4.36	 0.85	 611	 3.10	 1.23	 613
developingnewproducts& services	 4.33	 0.83	 613	 3.11	 1.20	 613
clearly defined operating procedures 	 4.11	 0.91	 613	 3.38	 1.16	 616
market information& analysis 	 4.07	 0.96	 610	 2.39	 1.17	 610
programs & procedures for training 	 4.07	 1.03	 613	 2.94	 1.12	 612
employees
access to franchisor management 	 3.99	 0.93	 612	 3.35	 1.26	 612
acting asa supplierofproducts	 3.90	 1.25	 608	 3.36	 1.19	 606
traininginmanagernentskills 	 3.90	 1.14	 614	 2.58	 1.14	 611
organizing local advertising cooperatives
	 3.77	 1.18	 612	 2.40	 1.23	 615
support in new store development	 3.76	 1.27	 591	 2.90	 1.20	 587
advice on management problems 	 3.76	 1.08	 609	 2.80	 1.15	 610
financial assistance and credit
	 3.74	 1.28	 614	 2.53	 1.18	 607
training in accounting& bookkeeping
	 3.53	 1.31	 612	 2.48	 1.22	 609
advice on financial management
	 3.52	 1.21	 608	 2.30	 1.11	 605
provision of standardized equipment
	 3.49	 1 05	 603	 3.31	 1.07	 602
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Importance	 Adequacy
Service Variable	 Mean	 SD	 N	 Mean	 SD	 N
advice on inventoiy control 	 3.45	 1.28	 609	 2.75	 1.19	 609
The mean score of all importance variables are higher than the mean score of any
of the corresponding adequacy variables. Personal experience and anecdotal information
would suggest that these results are not surprising. Franchisees tend to want more for less
(Spinelli and Birley, 1994). However, on the 1-5 scale of adequacy, ten of the eighteen
services were scored below the neutral 'three' score. Also, only four of the eighteen
franchisor services are scored clearly above the neutral '3' score. These services are
operating procedures, supply of products or services, access to franchisor management,
and provision of equipment. There appears to be linkage between these variables and the
business format. However, the remaining fourteen services are neutral or not adequately
delivered. This would indicate some dissatisfaction, encouraging us to pursue our
investigation of services as antecedents of conflict in the relationship. Multivariate CHAID
analysis will allow us to understand if perceived inadequacy in the delivery of services
manifests as franchisee dissatisfaction as scored on our conflict scale.
Marketing services play an important role in the development of the trade mark
(Stern and El-Ansary, 1988). Franchisees appear to recognise the requirements of
franchise marketing economies and the role of the franchisor in leading that process. Four
of the six franchisor provided services scored as most important are marketing functions
More important than the overall score of a service on either importance or
adequacy is the difference between the importance and adequacy on each of the individual
services. Table 5.14 lists the results from tests for rank differences between each
corresponding pair of service variables.
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Table 5.14 Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test: Importance and Adequacy of Each Franchisor
Provided Service
Service Importance vs. Adequacy
	 Z-Scoce	 p value
Prgms/procedures for employee training.
	 -14.327	 0.0000
Training in accounting/record keeping.
	 -12.1107	 0.0000
Training in management skills.
	
-15.05	 0.0000
Financial assistance and credit.
	
-13.9505	 0.0000
Advice on financial management.
	
-14.3985	 0.0000
Developing new products and services.
	 - 16.2039	 0.0000
Promoting new products and services.
	
-15.8613	 0.0000
Effective national advertising.
	
-15.6 153
	 0.0000
Market information & analysis.
	
-17.44 15
	 0.0000
Organizing local coops for advertising.
	
-15.3907	 0.0000
Access to franchisor management.
	
-10.1276	 0.0000
Provision of standardized equipment.
	
-3.2 1%
	 0.00 13
Acting as a supplier of products.
	
-8.7 152	 0.0000
Advice on management problems.
	
-13.0323	 0.0000
Advice on inventoiy control.
	
-9.5042	 0.0000
Clearly defined operating procedures.
	
-11.1764	 0.0000
Resolving disagreements quickly/fairly.
	
-16.5904	 0.0000
Support in new store development.	
-11.1774	 0.0000
A p-value of .05 or less infers that the underlying population means for the
importance and adequacy variable pairs are different, therefore establishing statistically
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significant evidence that franchisees see the importance of franchisor provided services as
different than adequacy of those services. Clearly, the importance of every franchisor
provided service is greater than the adequacy of delivery of that service.
The z-score is a transformation of the importance and adequacy score into a
standard normal deviate. The larger the z-score the greater the disparity between
importance and adequacy. Franchisees categorically expect better delivery of services
than they are receiving. Ordering the matched pair analysis of each service allows for a
delineation of the magnitude of disparity between importance and adequacy and therefore
a description of the resource allocation priority.
Table 5.15 Franchisor Provided Services Ordered by Z-Score
Services Matched Pair	 Z-Score
Importance/Adequacy Marketing Analysis & Information
	 -17.4415
Importance/Adequacy Fairness in Handling Problems
Importance /Adequacy Developing New Products & Services
Importance /Adequacy of Promotions
Importance /Adequacy of Effective National Advertising
Importance /Adequacy Local Advertising Cooperatives
Importance /Adequacy Management Training
Importance /Adequacy Financial Management
Importance/Adequacy of Employee Training
Importance/Adequacy of Provision of Credit
Importance /Adequacy Management Problem Solving
Importance/Adequacy of Accounting Practices
Importance /Adequacy of New Store Development
Importance/Adequacy of Operating Procedures
-16.5904
-16.2039
-15.8613
-15 .6 153
-15.3907
-15.0500
-14.3985
-14.3270
-13 .9505
-13.0323
-12.1107
-11.1774
-11.1764
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Services Matched Pair	 Z-Score
Importance /Adequacy of Access to Franchisor Management
	 -10.1276
Importance/Adequacy of Inventory Control
	 -9.5042
Importance/Adequacy of Supply of Products and Services 	 -8.7152
Importance/Adequacy Provision of Standard Equipment
	 -3.2196
Five of the top six matched pairs, as ranked by the size of the z-score, are the
marketing functions. Clearly, franchisees have a strong marketing focus and desire for
better performance from the franchisor. Theoretically, marketing should be an important
transactional focus in the relationship as it builds sales revenue and establishes value in the
trade mark through communicating with the end user (Justis, 1986). The method and
accuracy of the marketing communication have a dramatic impact on the effectiveness of
trade mark enhancement. Franchisees understand the importance of the marketing
function as it is related by their overall scoring of importance; but, they are also clearly not
satisfied with the delivery of these services in relationship to their importance. We submit
that to alleviate the gap between importance and adequacy in the marketing functions will
require the greatest amount of resources, as exhibited by the z scores. This is especially
important in light of the results of our analysis of the franchisees goals which tell us that
cooperation and coordination are primary relational objectives.
The marketing functions in a franchise are typically separated into three levels of
execution (Justis and Judd, 1986). The national advertising effort, if applicable, is
coordinated and executed by the franchisor. The regional advertising programs are
coordinated between the franchisor and franchisee and executed by the franchisee. The
local advertising effort is typically coordinated and executed by the franchisee. The results
of this study indicate that franchisees place a high priority in the marketing activities and
believe coordination between the franchisee and franchisor are intimately linked.
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5.6 FRANCHISEE PERCE WED EXIT COSTS
Proposition C relates perceived exit costs to trade mark valuation and conflict in
the franchisee-franchisor relationship. Ultimately, the alliance and resulting productivity of
the franchisees and the franchisor should become embodied in the trade name (Mcneil,
1983). This brand capital would be lost to the franchisee upon exit from the franchise
relationship. The extent of the loss is the value of the brand capital. Therefore, we ask
the question; what are the perceived exit costs? It is posited that the extent of perceived
exit costs will correlate to conflict in the franchisee-franchisor relationship. The list of exit
costs is taken from the literature (Ping, 1990). Below is table 5.16 of the mean values on
the 1-5 scale of agreement regarding franchisee perceived exit costs.
Table 5.16 Perceived Exit Costs*
Variable Description	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 Mean	 Std	 N
Dev
Exiting will increase training cost
	 231	 142	 82	 85	 76	 2.40	 1.42	 616
Exiting costly finding alternative suppliers
	 225 122	 77	 104	 90	 2.53	 1.48	 618
Exiting costly in store conversion 	 176 120 108	 96	 105	 2.73	 1.46	 605
Exitwillrequireoperatingchanges	 151	 117	 77	 131	 140	 2.99	 1.52	 616
Exit will increase marketing budget
	 156 107	 90	 107	 153	 2.99	 1.52	 613
Exit will be costly in legal expense
Company investment is unique to the
relationship
Overall costs of exit would be high
Company has invested time and energy into
the relationship
Exiting costly in lost customer goodwill
146	 83	 106	 127	 154	 3.10	 1.51	 616
64	 83	 212	 156	 93	 3.22	 1.18	 608
89	 95	 119	 146	 169	 3.34	 140	 618
42	 93	 173	 198	 110	 3.39	 1.14	 616
73	 74	 108	 161	 201	 3.36	 1.36	 617
I have personally invested in the relationship	 13	 42	 %	 207 259	 4.06	 1.02	 617
*l=Disagree,
 5Agree
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The expectation is that all exit costs will be scored above the neutral if the
franchise is providing value in specified area of concern and that the more specific a cost is
to the enhancement of the trade mark, the higher the exit cost. However, franchisees'
mean scores regarding exit range from 2.4 (clearly not costly) to 4.06 (clearly costly).
Franchisees score their personal investment in the relationship as the highest of all
perceived exit cost with over 73% scoring 4 or 5 and only 8% viewing personal
investment as low. There is also a clear understanding that exiting the relationship will
negatively impact customer goodwill (59% score 4 or 5) and that the overall cost of exit
will be high (51% scored 4 or 5. These exit costs are very specific to the existing
franchise relationship and cannot be transferred to another relationship.
There is a counter-intuitive overall neutrality regarding the increase in marketing
costs upon exit, even with the recognition of the potential loss of customer goodwill.
However, there is an almost perfect inverted bell curve for the scoring of an increased
marketing budget upon exit, representing equality in difference of perspective on the issue
and a smaller but significant degree of neutrality. Also, surprisingly, there is little
indication that business format franchisees see much value, as expressed by perceived exit
costs, in the operating system (2.99), training programs (2.4), and store conversion (2.73).
The franchisees might see these operating realities as transferable. In essence, they have
been paid for and are now transportable. The same is true for finding alternative sources
of supply with a mean score of 2.53 and 56% of franchisees scoring 1 or 2. The more
personal and more subjective costs score higher than the direct costs of doing business.
The overall assessment of the costs of exiting the relationship is surprisingly low at
a mean value of 3.34. While franchisees perceive a value in the relationship, it is
somewhat tentative. This is an important issue. If franchisees view the costs of exit as
relatively low, they are less constrained and therefore more free to exit. Also, the
literature is clear that when the costs of remaining in the relationship exceed the value, the
parties are more likely to move to manifest conflict.
5.6.1 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF EXIT COST VARIABLES
Although these variables are taken from a study by Ping (1990), he did not subject
them to factor analysis in the same fashion as performed here. Ping (1990) combined
variables in a different manner and therefore results are not comparable. However, it is
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edifying to perform factor analysis because the results reveal latent variables which can be
related to theory. Varimax rotation was used.
Table 5.17 Factor Analysis of Perceived Exit Variables (4 factors extracted)
Factor	 Variables	 Loadings	 Factor	 Eigenvalues Cum Pct Var
Name
Expense	 Exit will be costly in
	 0.88	 1	 2.87	 26.10
legal expense
Overall costs of exit
	 0.84
would be high
Exit will increase
	 0.52
marketing budget
Business	 Exiting costly fmding
	 0.72	 2	 1.62	 40 80
Format	 alternative suppliers
Exiting costly in lost 	 0.50
customer goodwill
Exiting will increase	 0.66
training cost
Exit will require	 0.78
operating changes
Psychic	 Ihave personally	 0.74	 3	 1.47	 54.10
invested in the
relationship
Company has invested
	 0.87
time and energy into the
relationship
Company investment is
	 0.70
unique to the relationship
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Factor	 Variables	 Loadings	 Factor	 Eigenvalues Cum Pct Var
Name
Asset	 Exiting costly in store	 0.89	 1.00	 63.20
conversion
Four factors emerge for exit costs. The first factor has been labelled the
"Expense" factor, so named to reflect what appears to be the direct expenses associated
with exit, the largest of which is legal expense. This indicates a belief that the license
agreement is of a binding nature. Interestingly, an increased marketing budget is included
in this factor. Marketing has been a function performed primarily by the franchisor, based
on an advertising fee paid by the franchisees. Therefore, franchisees see marketing as an
expense and not as an investment.
The second factor is labelled "Business Format" because the variables deal with the
specific elements of delivering goods and services to the customer that make up the format
of the operating system. Not inconsequentially, the variable with the largest factor loading
is "exit will require operating changes."
The third factor is labelled the "Psychic" factor, borrowing the term from Ping and
Dwyer's (1988) work on the personal psychological expenses involved in exiting an
exchange relationship.
The fourth factor deals with only one variable, cost of store conversion upon exit,
and is labelled the "asset" factor because it deals with the role of converting physical assets
upon exit.
In relating the perceived exit cost factors to transaction-cost analysis we make
judgements as to the nature of each factors asset specificity. The Expense factors are not
specific assets as they are related to the specific action of exit and not a result of exit.
Greater agreement with high expense factor exit costs should therefore produce greater
anger. The Business Format factor consists of assets which are to a moderate extent
specific to the relationship (for example, knowledge of the operations procedures cannot
be expunged from the franchisee's mind even if the operating manual is returned to the
franchisor, but the franchisee's ability to exactly duplicate operating procedures is
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questionable). Therefore, moderate levels of anger should be produced by high business
format exit costs. The Psychic factor is clearly specific to the relationship, as the
psychological response of the franchisee is to a specific franchisor. High costs in the
psychic factor should not produce high levels of conflict. The Asset factor is again
moderately asset specific in that signage, and possibly colours and proprietary equipment
in a store might have to be changed. But it is unlikely that the physical structure would be
dramatically changed, and certainly the location would not be moved. Moderate levels of
conflict should arise from high asset factor exit costs.
5.6.2 PERCEWED BALANCE SHEET AND MARKET VALUES OF THE TRADE MARK
301 of the 621 respondents, or 48%, stated that they did not know the balance
sheet value of their trade mark. More importantly, 315 respondents, or 51%, stated they
did not know the market value of the trade mark. Additionally, 113 franchisees simply did
not answer the question about the balance sheet (no affirmative value listed and the
"unknown" box not ticked). Likewise, 116 franchisees did not answer the question
regarding market value. A majority of franchisees do not quantitatively link their
business activity and alliance with the franchisor to the value of the trade mark.
Table 5.18 Balance Sheet and Market Valuations
Variable Label
	
Mean ($)
	
Std Dev($)	 Min($)	 Max(S)	 N
Balance Sheet
	 110,795	 168,633	 -12000	 1250000	 207
Market	 177,795	 294,002	 -10000	 2000000	 190
The large standard deviations in both balance sheet and market valuations of the
trademark are due to both industry effect and individual franchisee firm size in terms of
number of outlets owned. However, market value is higher than balance sheet value, thus
suggesting that amortisation of the cost of the franchise yields a positive return to the
franchisee. That is, presumably the mean franchisee believes the franchisee firm can be
sold at a value exceeding the amortised cost of the trade mark (the cost of the franchise
fee and the present discounted value of the royalties), yielding a gain on the transaction.
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Although this is a positive indication of financial return, it is still troublesome that only
31% of the franchisees offered any opinion about trade mark value.
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CHAPTER Yl
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
6.1 THE RESEARCH QUESTION AN]) DELINEATION OF FRANCHISEE
SATISFACTION
In Chapter III we ask the research question:
To what extent does the potential for conflict in the franchisee-franchisor relationship
manfest as dissatisfaction?
The first goal of the study was to assess the level of conflict in franchising. Our
earlier review of the literature clearly establishes the potential for conflict. But, there is no
empirically supported measurement of this conflict in the literature. Therefore, we used
satisfaction as a surrogate for conflict. Measuring satisfaction, that is, developing a scale
on which to place cases, becomes paramount to the development of a model which
describes and predicts the antecedents of conflict in franchising. The first step in the
measurement process was to perform principle component analysis on the main study data
used to construct the conflict variable. This was accomplished in section 5.2.2.1
6.1.1 CLUSTERING OF T CASES ON THE CoNFLICT CONSTRUCT VARIABLE
Since we are confident that each item in the conflict construct contributes reliable
and valid information to the scale, we can search for patterns of responses among
respondents. A commonly used technique for this purpose is cluster analysis. This
analysis forms groups of similar objects, which, in this study, are homogeneous cases (See
Chapter ifi: Methodology).
The QUICK CLUSTETh procedure, to which the data was subjected, produces
only one solution for the number of clusters requested by the user (Noruis, 1988b). A
major issue with all clustering technique is how to select the number of clusters.
Determination of the appropriate number of clusters is a key arbitrary and subjective
decision, for which no standard, objective guidelines exist. Increasing the number of
clusters will tend to reduce the average within-cluster distance (Green et al, 1967; Frank
and Green, 1968). Hair et al (1987) suggest that several solutions should be computed for
different numbers of clusters and the alternative solutions based upon apriori criteria,
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practical judgement, common sense, or theoretical foundations (p.306). Lehman (1979)
argues that there is generally no way to get reliable cluster size of less than 30-50 from
survey data, hence approximately n/50 to n130 clusters is the maximum. For this research
the maximum is therefore 12 to 20 clusters. Hambrick (1984) argues that:
"The aim is to pick a cluster solution that enlightens, that somehow squares with
what could be expected theoretically, but that yields new insights and reveals
relationships in a way not yet taken for granted (p.37-38)."
Theory would argue for a five-cluster solution to the clustering of cases on the
conflict construct. That is, because conflict tends to operationalise through five stages;
latent, perceived, felt, manifest, and aftermath, franchisees should theoretically be grouped
by these five categories. However, the five and four cluster solutions (see Appendix VII)
provide smaller separations than the three cluster solutions. This may have occurred
because the stages of conflict are not necessarily distinct transitional segments, but form a
less discrete spectrum of frequently vacillating relational reactions to behaviour (Thomas,
1992; Pondy and Huff, 1985). Also, our measure of satisfaction may not be fine enough
to reveal the subtle differences at the cusps of the stages of conflict or that these fine
distinctions are not practically relevant to the franchisee.
Clearly, the clusters of franchisees revealed by the three cluster solution (Appendix
VII) are distinct separations, represent a fairly even distribution of cases across clusters,
and are large enough as a percentage of the sample to be generalisable.
6.1.1.1 INTERPRETATION OF mE SPSS QUICK CLUSTER OUTPUT
The Final Cluster Centres (table 6.1) shows the centres selected for maximum
Euclidean distance between them. Eight iterations were completed. These are the centre
changes as centre replacement and recalculation proceeds. The centres in the Final Cluster
Centres are those to which all cases are assigned. An examination of the final cluster
centres revealed that the cluster assignments could be recoded to ease interpretation. That
is, to be placed in scale order from low to high, reflecting low, medium, and high conflict
on the relative scale.
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Table 6.1 Final Cluster Centres.
Cluster	 QI5ANGR Q15NOZE QI5SAME Q15SAME2
	 N
1	 1.4179'	 1.3284'	 2.1393'	 2.0697'	 201
2	 2.2716	 1.6078	 2.8664	 4.2716	 232
3	 3.8167"	 4.1333"	 3.3167	 4.4111	 180
mean	 2.4400	 2.2577	 2.7602	 3.5905
std. dcv.	 1.4200	 1.4571	 1.2003	 1.3408
The labelling of each cluster involved assessing the cluster mean for each variable
from the original data set and making a comparison to the respective global mean for that
variable (Birley and Westhead, 1992a). Interpretation and evaluation of the clusters was
done by first recognising the clear pattern. All the variables in cluster 1 are below the
global mean, all are above the global mean in cluster 3, and all variables in cluster 2 are
around the global mean.
Next, we identified retained anger as the key diagnostic variable because it is the
highest loading component in the conflict factor. The mean of that variable differs by ½
and I standard deviation from the global mean, calculated from the raw, untransformed
data (*under,
 * *over) Cluster 'I' is just under one standard deviation from the global
mean of the anger variable. Cluster '2' is less than 1/2 standard deviation from the global
mean, and cluster '3' is just under one standard deviation above the global mean. In terms
of the factor defining anger variable, cluster '1' is below the mean, cluster '2' about equal
to the global mean, and cluster '3' clearly above the global mean. Table 6.2 is a further
illustration of the cluster defining method, using the factor defining variable "organisation
is angry about past disputes."
6.1.1.2 LABELLING THE THREE CLUSTER SOLUTION
Ultimately, the labelling of the three cluster solution is a subjective exercise which
is supported by experience, intuition, and statistical application (Birley and Westhead,
1 992a). Cluster 1 consistently scores as very satisfied on all three variables, cluster 3
scores consistently dissatisfied and cluster 3 is inconsistent in its scoring.
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Cluster 1 is labelled the satisfied cluster. The mean values of the "satisfied" cluster
range from 1.42 to 2.14; indicating satisfaction on all levels, is between 1/2 and I standard
deviation from the global mean.
Cluster 2 is labelled the ambivalent cluster. In the "ambivalent" cluster the, mean
scores range from 1.61, clearly satisfied, to 4.27, clearly dissatisfied, is less than 1/2
standard deviation from the global mean of the anger variable.
Cluster 3 is labelled the angry cluster. It is named so because the mean values of
the answers to the four questions in the conflict construct (1less conflict to 5=most
conflict) range from 3.32 to 4.41. All of these mean scores are above the neutral "3"
score on the scale, the mean value of the angry cluster is almost one standard deviation
above the global mean.
The overall significance of the cluster solution obtained was tested by means of the
Kruskall-Wallis H-test, which is a useftil alternative to analysis of variance (Westhead,
1992) since it is a non-parametric test and therefore does not rely on possibly unrealistic
assumptions about the distribution of the variable. The Kruskall-Wallis H statistic was
calculated with respect to the original raw data since the principal component analysis had
accounted for only 57.2% of the variance of the data. The H test combines and ranks all
cases from the clusters. Average ranks are assigned in the case of ties. For each group,
the ranks are summed, and the Kruskall-Wallis H statistic computed from these sums
(Noruis, 1988a). Below, each variable is tested in order of its contribution to the conflict
construct.
Table 6.2 Organisation Angry about past Disputes: Ranks by Cluster
Mean Rank	 Cases	 Cluster	 Chi-Square	 D.F.	 Significance
179.63	 201	 1	 268.6184	 2	 .0000
294.35	 232	 2
465.54	 180	 3
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The cluster groups have clear separation of mean ranks and a significance of .0000,
statistically significant probability that the clusters represent different populations.
Table 6.3 I Would Not Be Part of the Franchise: Ranks by Cluster
Mean Rank	 Cases	 Cluster	 Chi-Square	 D.F.	 Significance
194.02	 201	 1	 393.0182	 2	 .0000
246.52	 232	 2
511.11	 180	 3
While the Kruskall-Wallis H test again shows statistically significant differences
between the cluster groups, the mean ranks of the '1' and '2' cluster groups are separated
by 52 while the ambivalence and '3' clusters are separated by 265. This would indicate
closer alignment of '2' and '1' clusters then '2' and '3' clusters. It appears that while
franchisees in cluster 2 are ambivalent about their relationship with the franchisor, they are
not inclined to exit the relationship.
Table 6.4 Feelings Toward Franchisor Unchanged by Dispute: Ranks by Cluster
Mean Rank	 Cases	 Cluster	 Chi-Square	 D.F.	 Significance
216.32	 201	 1	 936574	 2	 .0000
326.90	 232	 2
382.62	 180	 3
With a significance of .0000 the groups are clearly separated. However, the
reverse of the previous alignment is evident, as the '2' cluster group is separated from the
'3' cluster by 55 and the '1' cluster by 110. The literature indicates that exchange relations
build over time (Mcneil, 1975). Attitudes about the franchisor appear to build in a manner
which aligns cluster 2 closer to cluster 3, the most angry.
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Table 6.5 I Would Act as the Franchisor Does: Ranks by Cluster
Mean Rank	 Cases	 Cluster	 Chi-Square	 D.F.	 Significance
11752	 201	 1	 93.6574	 2	 .0000
384.96	 232	 2
418.09	 180	 3
The fourth and final variable in the conflict construct reflects statistically significant
different cluster groups and again displays a closer alignment of cluster 2 with the more
angry cluster.
These results confirm the earlier conclusion of considerable and significant
between-group variability in terms of the cluster groups of cases on the conflict construct
variable. Further, the Kruska!1-WaIlis analysis gives additional insight and justification for
the labelling, as the '1' and '3' clusters are clearly at the extremes of the mean ranks and
the '2' cluster, while in the middle of the clusters, shifts from closer to cluster '1', then,
closer to cluster '3'.
Each case (franchisee respondent) has been assigned a value in the new variable
"Conflict." This value will be used to indicate the perceived conflict in the Franchisor-
Franchisee relationship. The levels of conflict are identified as "satisfied" (value 1),
"ambivalent" (value 2), and "angry" (value 3).
The final clusters, as labelled by this study are:
1: Satisfied ( n=201) 32.37%
2: Ambivalent (n=232) 37.36%
3: Angry (n=180) 29.0%
The results of this study show that the potential for conflict in the franchisee-
franchisor relationship manifests as a three level stratification of franchisee satisfaction.
This answers the research question. Further, conflict results in 29% of the franchisees
being clearly dissatisfied and, in this study, labelled as "angry." Of equal importance is
that the results indicate over 37% of franchisees are ambivalent. The conflict literature
suggests that these franchisees may be at the boundary of latent and manifest conflict
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(Pondy, 1992). Relational exchange theory would point to a dynamic assessment of the
franchisor by the franchisees. The results of that assessment as positive or negative are
still in doubt, or, at least shifting over time for the ambivalent franchisee (Blau, 1964).
Assessment of the global means and the Kruskall-Wallis support the theoretical, and for
the future of the relationship, potentially hazardous positioning of the ambivalent cluster
members.
6.2 PROPOSITION A: THE PERCE WED CONTRACT
Proposition A
There is a relationship between the extent offranchisee satisfaction and their
perception of the goals particular to their relationship with the franchisor.
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION
This study approaches franchisee goal attainment in two distinct sections of the
survey instrument. The first section is titled "Franchisee Goals for the Relationship with
the Franchisor." The second section is titled to "Franchisee View of the On-Going
Relationship with the Franchisor." These sections are taken from the literature and assess
both the current status of goal alignment and the effect of that assessment on the
perceived goal for the future. In Chapter 5 the goals of the franchisee for the relationship
were subjected to principal component analysis, resulting in some validation of the
theoretical goal positions and some distinct challenges. That is, not every relational
exchange model forms one factor. Regardless, it is not in the scope or interest of this
thesis to scale goals but, rather, to propose that, in a theoretically supported manner, goals
correlate to conflict in franchising. Therefore, we designed the CHAID analysis of the
franchisee perspectives of goals to include the individual goal variables.
For all of the CHAD analysis the 621 respondents were divided into two separate
and distinct files. The study file consists of 556 cases (the CHAID models reflect 548 as 8
cases have missing data for the conflict construct) and the test file consists of 65 cases.
The CHAD models are built with the data from the 548 study file cases. Chi-square
goodness of fit is then used to test the predictive power of the model. This is
accomplished by using the percentage of franchisees in each node of the independent
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variable in the model to predict the cluster group membership of the 65 cases in the test
file.
6.3 CHAID MODELS OF FRANCHISEE GOALS
6.3.1 GOALS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
There are four independent variables which describe the franchisee's goals for the
future of the relationship and are used for input to the CHAID model:
1. A more cooperative relationship
2. Improving communication and information sharing
3. Improving coordinated quality assurance
4. Strengthening mutual commitment
(See Figure 6.1)
The first stage of the CHAID analysis is a calculation of the probability value of
the independent variables with respect to their correlation with the dependent conflict
variable. The variables are then listed from lowest to highest p-value. Table 6.6 shows
the four independent variables input into the CHAID analysis.
Table 6.6 Future Goals CHAID Model Predictors
Variable	 p-value	 Variable Label
QiOcoop	 6.60eO9*	 A more cooperative relationship
Ql3comit	 4.30e-02	 Strengthening mutual commitment
Qllcomm	 l.00e+O0	 Improvmg communications/info sharing
Ql2qual	 l.00e-fOO	 Improving coordinated quality assurance
'Sig. at .05
Only two of the four independent variables, cooperation and commitment, have
been determined by the CHAID analysis to correlate with the dependent conflict variable.
Both of these variables are modelled, with cooperation, as the independent variable with
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the lowest p-value, described as the first level model and commitment, having the second
lowest p-value, described as the second level model. All four variables are input in all
levels of models for calculation of potential independent variable correlations. As we will
see from the model, improving quality assurance and improving communication are
perceived by franchisees as influencing the cooperation and commitment goals but do not
describe the principal goals for the relationship.
6.3.1.1 GOALS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP AS AN ANTECEDENT OF
CoNFLICT: A NOTE ON READING THE CHAII) MODEL AN]) THE FIRsT LEVEL
MODEL
(see page 136, figure 6.1 for a tree diagram of the discussion below)
Because CHAID is not an often used statistical application, it may be helpftil to
review how the tree diagrams are read. For this purpose we describe the first "goals"
model in dialogue form, followed by a detailed review of each node of the tree. In
subsequent models the trees are displayed followed by a discussion of the key results.
Each tree begins at the top with the dependent conflict variable. This variable was
developed by clustering the cases on the conflict construct and saved in our data file
(section 6.1.1.). This node is titled conflict and has the percentage membership of the
three clusters listed in the box, with 1 representing the satisfied cluster membership, 2 is
the ambivalent cluster, and 3 the angry cluster: 1: 32.48%; 2: 38.50%; 3: 29.01%. These
percentages are the conflict cluster membership of 556 case (n=548 with 8 missing cases)
after 65 cases were split from the 621 cases in the data file to create a file to test the
predictive value of the models developed.
Below the dependent variable box is a description of the first independent variable
(as determined by the lowest p-value) which correlates with conflict cluster group
membership. In the case of the goals model, "A More Cooperative Relationship"is the
independent variable with the lowest p-value and therefore depicted in the aforementioned
fashion. This represents the first level of the model because "a more cooperative
relationship" has the lowest p-value of the four goals entered into the analysis. Below the
statement are boxes, or nodes, which represent the scoring of the independent variable "a
more cooperative relationship" by franchisees (1-5 Likert scale of importance). There are
four nodes because cooperation=2 and cooperation3 are not statistically different in their
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correlation with conflict. The n of each node sums to the n of the dependent variable,
548. Jcading from the left to the right, the first node, which is titled '1', represents the
franchisees who scored cooperafion1, clearly unimportant, (n=38). For those 38
franchisees, 36.84% belong to the satisfied cluster, 23.68% belong to the ambivalent
cluster, and 29.01% belong to the angry cluster. This describes the 38 franchisees and
also allows us to predict that for any group of franchisees who answer cooperation=l, the
percentage membership in each cluster group will be statistically the same as that reported
above. In the node directly to the right of the cooperation=l node is the node titled '23',
which represents the franchisees who scored cooperation=2 or 3, unimportant or neutral,
(n= 163). Of those 163 franchisees, 50.31% are in the satisfied cluster group, 31.90% are
ambivalent, and 17.79% are angry.
The node directly to the right of the cooperation=2 or 3 node is titled '4' and
represents the franchisees who scored cooperation=4 (n= 144). Of those 144 franchisees
29.17% are satisfied, 48.6 1% are ambivalent, and 22.22% angry, again both describing the
144 franchisees represented in the node and predicting the cluster group membership for
any franchisee who scores cooperation=4. Directly to the right of cooperation=4 is the
node titled '5', representing the franchisees who scored cooperation=5, very important
(n=203), and who are 19.70% in the satisfied cluster, 39.41% in the ambivalent cluster,
and 40.89% in the angry cluster. This node is proposed to have predictive value.
Interpreting the lowest scoring of importance regarding cooperation as a goal for
the future of the franchisee-franchisor relationship yields very strong views in both
extremes of conflict with a significant minority remaining ambivalent. Clearly, not
important and neutral scoring of the importance of cooperation are not statistically
different in their correlation with conflict; therefore, CHAID joins the scoring. With a
change in scoring from I to 2 or 3 there is a significant shift in cluster group membership
to the satisfied cluster. As scoring of cooperation achieves importance as a future goal
less satisfaction is predicted, somewhat more anger is predicted, and significantly more
ambivalence manifests. When cooperation becomes an extremely important goal for the
future of the relationship anger becomes the predominant cluster and satisfaction is
reduced to its lowest level in the cooperation Cl-LAID model.
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6.3.1.1.1 CORRELATION AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN THE CHAID MODEL
OF FRANCHISEE GOALS
The cooperation=5 node is further segmented. Additional analysis of the first level
predictor CHAID model allows a perspective on what independent variables influence the
franchisee regarding the nature of the variable cooperation=5.
Branching from the cooperation5 node is the independent variable "improving
coordinated quality assurance" (quality), which is segmented into two nodes. This means
the 203 franchisees who considered cooperation very important were influenced in their
scoring of cooperation in a statistically significant manner by their attitude toward the
"quality" independent variable. Of the 203 franchisees who scored cooperation=5, 109
also scored "improving coordinated quality assurance" 1,2,3 or 4. As shown in the node
titled '1-4', 14.68% are satisfied, 34.86% are ambivalent, and 50.46% are angry. In the
node titled '5', the remaining 94 of the 203 franchisees who scored cooperation=5 also
scored coordinated=5. They are 25.53% satisfied, 44.68% ambivalent, and 29.79%
angry. It is clear that franchisees have a high standard for cooperation which is influenced
by an equally high standard for coordinated quality assurance. Even at the highest scoring
of cooperation and quality, franchisee anger is at approximately the same level as the
current status of the sample. There is a marginal, but important, improvement in the
relationship when the franchisees score the franchisor commitment=1-4. However, when
franchisees view strengthening mutual commitment as an important goal for the future of
the relationship, they are overwhelmingly angry.
As long as a correlation exists Cl-LAID will continue to add nodes. Directly below
the node quality=1-4 node is the statement "Strengthening Mutual Commitment"
(Commitment). The 109 franchisees who scored cooperation=5 and qualily=1-4, also
scored commitment either 1-4, as represented in the node titled '1-4', n65, or,
commitmenl=5, as represented by the node titled '5', n=44, reinforcing the established
conflict pattern.
The results indicate that franchisees see cooperation as their current goal more
than for the future of the relationship. If cooperation is seen to be clearly important to the
future of the relationship with the franchisor (score=4 or 5) there is greater angry cluster
membership. It appears that franchisees believe that cooperation should exist in the
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relationship, hence the lowering of conflict when the scoring is '2' or '3' versus '1'. But, if
there is a need to increase cooperation, respondents are clearly angry. Therefore,
cooperation is a prerequisite for minimisation of conflict between franchisee and
franchisor.
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6.3.1.1.2 Cm-SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST OF THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF
COOPERATION AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CONFLICT
By separating out a test sample of 65 cases and building the CHA.TD models on the
remaining 548 cases, we are able to use the 65 cases to test the predictive value of the
model. That is, we use the percentages of cluster group membership in each node of the
first correlation model to predict the cluster group membership of the test sample.
Table 6.7 Goodness of Fit Test Results: Cooperation
Node	 Chi-square	 DF	 Significance
Cooperation= I
	
1.0500	 2
	
0.59 16
Cooperation=2,3
	
0.5602	 2
	
0.7557
Cooperation=4
	
2.5159	 2
	
0.2842
Cooperation=5	 1.3586	 2	 0.5070
*=si g .
 at .05
The null hypothesis that the distribution of the population in the test data is not
different from the main study data is rejected at a significance level of .05 or higher.
Clearly, all scoring of cooperation contains powerful predictive qualities.
6.3.1.2 SECOND LEVEL MODEL: GOALS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP AS
AN ANTECEDENT OF CONFLICT (See Figure 6.2)
For the next model we refer to table 6.6, which lists commitment as the variable
with the second lowest p-value and therefore the predictor of conflict displayed in the
second level model.
In the first level model (cooperation), differences in franchisee scoring resulted in
significant changes in conflict cluster group percentages. There is a far less impact of an
increased mutual commitment on conflict cluster membership than in the "cooperation"
model, although the pattern of the highest scoring of the goal (in this model,
commitment), results in the greatest the angry cluster membership (3 5.6%). Also, in a
complex correlation among independent variables where franchisees scored
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commitment=1-3, communications3, and cooperation1-3; angry group membership is
reduced to its lowest level in the model at 9.84% and satisfaction rises to 59.02%. Again,
cooperation is an integral component of franchisee satisfaction. To achieve commitment,
franchisees require communications. In turn, communications is seen as a cooperative
process. We note that each variable scoring of importance in this string of correlations is
at the neutral '3' or below. Clearly, it is the franchisee's view that the process should be in
place throughout the relationship and therefore not an issue of importance for the future.
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6.3.1.2.1 CHI-SQUARE GooDNESS OF FIT TEST OF THE PREDICTWE POWER OF
COMMITMENT AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CoNFLICT
Table 6.8 Goodness of Fit Test Results: Commitment
Node	 Chi-square	 DF	 Significance
Commitinentl,2,3	 0.2162	 2	 0.8974
Commitment-4	 0.9372	 2	 0.6259
Commitment=5	 0.7188	 2	 0.6981
We cannot reject the null hypothesis for any of the three predictor variable nodes.
Therefore, all have predictive value.
6.3.2 CHAID MODEL OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE GOALS
Taken from the literature, role integrity, solidarity, and mutuality variables are used
to create CFIAID models of the relational goals of franchisees. Relational exchange gives
a view of the on-going relationship from the perspective of the franchisee.
6.3.2.1 SOLIDARITY MODEL OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE AS AN ANTECEDENT OF
CoNFLICT
The three goal variables used in the solidarity model of relational exchange:
1. The relationship is arms length
2. Franchisor is just a supplier
3. Relationship goes beyond supply
Here, only two of the three variables correlate with conflict (see table 6.9).
Table 6.9 Solidarity Cl-lAID Model Predictors
Predictor Vanable 	 p-value	 Variable Descnption
QI Sarms	 I .20e-39	 The relationship is "Arms Length"
Qlsjust	 6 60e-29t	The franchisor is just a supplier
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Predictor Variable	 p-value	 Variable Description
QI 5bynd	 I OOe+OO	 Many areas beyond buy/sell product
Sig at .05
(See Figure 6.3 for a tree diagram of the discussion below)
Perception of an arms length relationship and the perspective that the franchise
relationship must go beyond a supply relationship has the greatest predictive and
descriptive power in the solidarity relational exchange model. When franchisees score
clear disagreement with the notion of an arms length relationship there are no influencing
independent variables and very little anger. However, we see a clear pattern of responses
reflecting the franchisees belief that if the relationship is described as arms length,
influenced by, and focused primarily on, supply, conflict builds. This finding is
theoretically supported (Mcneil, 1975) and a particularly important for franchisor
practitioners. Manufacturers who see franchising as simply, or principally, a channel of
distribution may find a considerable level of conflict with franchisees. Although there is
little other empirical evidence existing in the literature which addresses this issue, there is
considerable anecdotal evidence supporting this finding (Tannenbaum, March 1994), as
well as strong theoretical support. Relationships that are arms length or unidimensional
are less likely to be of a long term nature (Mcneil, 1985).
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6.3.2.1.1 Cm-sQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST OF THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF
"ARMS LENGTH" AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CONFLICT
Table 6.10 Goodness of Fit Test Results: "Arms Length"
Node	 Chi-square	 DF	 Significance
"Arms Length" =1	 1.8608	 2	 0.3944
"Arms Length"=2	 1.5706	 2	 0.456
"Arms Length"=3	 2.0202	 2	 0.3642
"Arms Length"4	 0.1383	 2	 0.9332
"Arms Length"=S	 1.3192	 2	 05171
All segments of the predictor variable have predictive value.
6.3.2.2 MUTUALITY MODEL OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE AS AN ANTECEDENT OF
CONFLICT
Three independent variables are used in the CHAID analysis to identify the
predictors of conflict in the internal control model of goals.
1. Precise understanding of the license agreement
2. Franchisee monitors franchisor activities
3. Franchisor monitors sales to ensure royalty
All three variables correlate with conflict (See Figure 6.4 for a tree diagram of the first
predictor).
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Table 6.11 Mutuality CHAID Model Predictors
Predictor Variable	 p-value	 Variable Description
Q 151_a	 1 .60e- 17	 Precise understanding of the license agreement
Ql5monit	 3 .30e- 16	 Franchisee monitors franchisor activities
Ql5pymts	 1 .40e-04	 Franchisor monitors sales to ensure royalty
*sig.
 at .05
A precise understanding of the license agreement combined with an on-going
process of monitoring the relationship is a clear predictor of conflict in the franchise
relationship. This is an important finding from both a theoretical and practical perspective.
Transaction-cost analysis would indicate that the franchise contract (license agreement)
requires an adjustment mechanism that centres on the transactions between the parties
which support the trade mark. These findings indicate that the franchisees recognise that
understanding the license agreement is an important start to the relationship but
monitoring is required to maintain the relationship. Franchisees who have a high need for
precision in the contractual relationship and a need to monitor the activities of the
franchisor exhibit attributes which indicate latent conflict that are potentially destructive to
the long term prospects of the relationship. A relational exchange judges the monitoring
of the details of the relationship secondary to the multitude of issues not directly related to
any particular transaction (Stern and Kaufinan, 1988). Precision in and monitoring of
individual transactions subverts long term relational exchange because the transaction
becomes more important than the total relationship (Muris, 1991).
144
U	 -
cI
U
e.o	 I000	 I 0N '0 N
N N -
01.,
U
000
000000 N
2'0 40
- CM m
000000
o o 0
o v o-
40
- N
145
-
• °ç xo-
_000	 -
0.
0.
00
•0S	 I0	 0	 I 0N N
N C N
—Nm
0
.0U
0
000000	 I
000 I
©0.I
m
0
—Nm
N 000V
0?m_C r
m —mv 0
- CM r
000
NNNNVIN 0
- N m '00
ON00
0
- N m
000
m
0
- CM m
000
0 00
N 00
rirn—r00
0
- N
Ce.
00 0 0000Nr
lo 0
	ri
0
- N
o v• • -
_O'.00N00N - 0
- N m
6.3.2.2.1 Cm-SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST OF THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF
LICENSE AGREEMENT AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CONFLICT
Table 6.12 Goodness of Fit Test Results: License Agreement
Node	 Chi-square	 DF	 Significance
License Agreement=1,2 	 0.5895	 2	 0.7447
License Agreement=3	 0 4362	 2	 0.804
License Agreement4	 2.703 2	 2	 0 2588
License Agreement=5	 16.3689	 2	 0 0003k
*sig. at .05
Three of the four nodes have statistically significant predictive value. We expect
that the low significance of the License Agreement=5 node is a statistical anomaly, and
because the overall pattern of predictive significance is good, we are not concerned.
6.3.2.3 ROLE INTEGRITY MODEL OF RELATIONAL GOALS AN ANTECEDENT OF
CONFLICT
There are three independent variables used for the role integrity model as
established by theory and set forth below:
1. Coordination
2. Expectations
3. Diverse Complexity
All three variables correlate with conflict (see table 6.13). Scoring of the variables is a 1-5
Likert scale of agreement in all three relational exchange goal models. We exhibit and
describe only the first level model because of space restrictions and because the
coordination model gives a clear view of franchisees perspective on role integrity.
Additional models were calculated and do not provide further insights.
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Table 6.13 Role Integrity CHAID Model Predictors
Variable	 p-value	 Variable Label
Ql5coor	 3.5Q0e-5l	 Well coordinated & will continue
Qi Scmplx	 2.000e-1 9*	 Created a complex web of expectations
Ql5expct	 5.900el5*	 Complicated by diverse expectations
*Sig at 0.05
(See Figure 6.5 for tree diagram of the discussion below)
Franchisees do not equivocate in their attitude toward the need for coordination.
Without a clearly coordinated relationship, the franchisees exhibit little satisfaction. A
lack of coordination (scoring=1,2) results in 72% angry cluster membership. Interestingly,
when the franchisees score the relationship as being complicated by diverse
expectation5=4 or 5 in the segmentation of the coordination=1,2 node, satisfaction cluster
membership is 0.00%. Neutrality in scoring coordination moves a majority of franchisees
to ambivalence from anger but does little to change satisfied cluster membership. That is,
the percentage of cases in the cluster changes. We do not know if the specific franchisees
change cluster membership or not, but we do know that the total percentage of franchisees
in each cluster changes with respect to scoring changes.
The further segmentation of the neutrality node marginally affects population
cluster membership. Only at the highest scoring of coordination do a majority of the
respondents join the satisfied cluster.
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6.3.2.3.1 Cm-SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST OF THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF
CO0RrnI4ATI0N AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CoNFLICT
Table 6.14 Goodness of Fit Test results: Coordination
Node	 Chi-square	 DF	 Significance
Coordination= 1,2	 0.0421	 2	 0.9792
Coordination=3	 0.0418	 2	 0.9793
Coordination=4	 0.6448	 2	 0.9244
Coordination=5	 2.0395	 2	 0.3607
Three of the four predictor nodes are significant at above 90% and all four nodes
exceed the threshold .05.
6.3.3 AN INCLUSIVE CHAD MODEL OF FRANCHISEE GOALS AS AN ANTECEDENT
OF CoNFLIcT
This model includes all of the independent variables used in the preceding
relational exchange models which reflect franchisee perspectives of goals for the
relationship in an attempt to discover the principal goal of the franchisee regarding the
relationship with the franchisor (See Figure 6.6).
Clearly, franchisees want a well coordinated, arms length relationship which is
uncomplicated by diverse expectations.
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6.3.4 SUMMARY OF GOALS AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CoNFLIcT
The preeminent goal of franchisees is cooperation with the franchisor. In both
levels of CHAID modelling, cooperation is either the principal predictor, or an
independent variable influencer of the principal predictor. However, it is equally clear that
cooperation is a prerequisite of establishing the relationship and a requirement of on-going
franchisee satisfaction and not a goal to be achieved in the fi.iture. Given cooperation,
franchisees require coordination with the franchisor to maintain satisfaction. When
complexity in the relationship is perceived, then coordination is inhibited and conflict
manifests in a high percentage of angry cluster group membership. This result is a contra-
indication of a relational exchange as described by Mcneil (1975).
Coordination is centred on an understanding and monitoring of the license
agreement and the responsibilities of the parties therein. Therefore, we next examine
Proposition B, franchisor provided services, which are the contractual obligations of the
franchisor to fulfill the license agreement in the business format franchise.
6.4 PROPOSITION B: FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES AS A SOURCE
OF CONFLICT IN THE FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHIP
Proposition B
Franchisee satisfaction with the services provided by the franchisor is the
principal measure of contractual performance. Contractual performance is an
antecedent of conflict in the franchisee-franchisor relationship.
6.4.1 INTRODUCTION
Having established an empirical measure of conflict in the franchisee-franchisor
relationship, and the relational goal of cooperation, which is empirically supported, and
further modelled by coordination, this study now examines how coordination is achieved
in franchising. Proposition B contends that franchisor provided services are the principal
means by which the contract, the franchise license agreement, is fulfilled by the franchisor.
These transaction specific actions are modelled using Chi-square Automatic Interaction
Detector and, therefore, depict correlation between the dependent conflict variable and the
franchisor provided services variables and yield both descriptive and predictive results.
Correlations among independent franchisor provided services variables are also depicted.
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This is particularly important in speaking to the practitioner community as a guide to the
coordination of franchise relations through management of the resources applied to
franchisor provided services.
Transaction-cost economics has recently been criticized for isolating transactions
between parties to a governance structure which are actually completed within the context
of multiple transactions (Gulati, 1995). CHAID, allowing for correlation among
independent variables, contextualises the analysis, segments the population, and illustrates
the potential for franchisee movement among cluster groups with transactional focus.
Also, this model is developed with an understanding that it follows the empirically
supported goals of cooperation and coordination and is subsequent and integral to the
goal model. Therefore, this concern is relieved.
6.4.2 CHAID MODEL OF FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES AS ANTECEDENTS OF
CONFLIC1' IN THE FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHIP
Eighteen franchisor provided services, scored for both importance and adequacy
were used for this CHAID analysis for a total of thirty-six independent variables.
Only five of the eighteen independent franchisor provided services importance
variables correlate with the dependent conflict variable (see table 6.15). All eighteen
independent adequacy variables concerning franchisor provided services correlate with the
dependent conflict variable. Additionally, all franchisor provided services adequacy
variables have a lower p-value than any of the five importance variables. Franchisees'
conflict cluster group membership is defined to a much greater extent by execution by the
franchisor of the contractually required services than by the importance of the services.
There are clear and distinct parameters of service delivery adequacy with intuitively sound
and quantifiable results which correlate to conflict cluster group membership. Given that,
Proposition B is supported by the data.
Table 6.15 Franchisor Provided Services Predictor Variables3
Variable	 p-value	 Variable Label
Adfair	 1 30e-30	 Adequacy of disagreement resolution
1-5 Likert scale of adequacy/importance
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Variable	 p-value	 Variable Label
Adprob	 3 40e-29	 Adequacy of advice for solving management problems
Adzorm	 1 .7Oe-25	 Adequacy of access to management
Adnewd	 2.40e-2 I •	 Adequacy of support in new store development
Adops	 2.90e-18	 Adequacy of operating procedures
Adfmzna	 7.70e-18'	 Adequacy of advice on fmancial management
Admgmt	 3. lOe-1 5*	 Adequacy of management training
Adsuply	 9.70e-15	 Adequacy as a supplier of products
Adprom	 4.3Oe-14	 Adequacy of new product/service promotion
Adtrain	 7.9Oe14*	 Adequacy of employee training programs
Admkinf	 8.6OeI4*	 Adequacy of market information and analysis
Adnwpr	 8.9Oel4*	 Adequacy of new product & service development
Adacct	 2.8Oe13*	 Adequacy of training in accounting
Adcrdt	 2.30-Il *	 Adequacy of financial assistance and credit
Adnaf	 3.20e-1 1 *	 Adequacy of national advertising
Adinv	 4.40e-10	 Adequacy of advice on inventory control
Adequip	 1 .40e-08	 Adequacy of equipment provision
Adlclad	 6.80e-06	 Adequacy of organizing local coops for advertising
Ql4crdt	 2.40eO4*	 Importance of financial assistance and credit
QI 4ops	 6.40e-03 *	 Importance of clearly defined operating procedures
Ql4zorm	 7.20-03	 Importance of access to franchisor management
Ql4lclad	 8.6OeO3*	 Importance of organizing local coops for advertising
Ql4inv	 3.40O2*	 Importance of advice on inventory control
• Sig. at.05
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Again, all adequacy variables correlate to conflict at a higher level of statistical
significance than do y importance variables. Franchisees first (as measured by this
variable having the lowest p-value) judge the franchisor on their perception of adequacy of
disagreement resolution, referred to hereafter as 'fairness', then the franchisor' s ability to
help solve management problems. The third predictive variable is franchisee access to
franchisor management. All variables are intuitively sound. As perceived fairness,
management problem solving, and access to franchisor management increases, so does
satisfaction.
Adequacy of support in new store development and adequacy of operating
procedures are the next two predictors with the lowest p-value and follow the same
intuitively consistent pattern of increased adequacy yielding less conflict in the
relationship.
That franchisees want more adequately delivered services is not surprising.
Franchisees generally want more services for diminishing expense. We are somewhat
surprised that ll services are rated as inadequate in relationship to importance. However,
the specific patterns of population segmentation and influences of independent variables
are more important to understanding what degree conflict manifests as a result of
inadequacy. These correlation and segmentation are described below in five models. The
number of models is arbitrary but, we believe, adequate.
6.4.3 THE FIRST LEVEL CHAD) MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES (See Figure 6.7)
The variable which describes the adequacy of franchisor resolution of
disagreements is a "gatekeeper" to those services which drive conflict cluster membership.
That is, all five adequacy offairness scores correlate to cluster membership. There is no
scoring by franchisees of franchisor fairness which precludes satisfied cluster membership.
Even the lowest scoring of fairness can result in some satisfaction, especially if the
correlation among independent variables is managed. For example, adequacy of
fairness=1, clearly inadequate resolution of disagreements, logically yields a high degree
of anger (64.36% angry cluster membership). Adequacy offairness=2 describes and
predicts 10% satisfied, 50% ambivalent, and 40% angry cluster group membership.
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However, adequacy offairness=2, still clearly unfair, is further segmented by the variable
adequacy of new products and services. Adequacy of new products and services= 1-3
exacerbates anger, but adequacy of new products and servic.s-4, 5 reduces anger to just
10%. Even if the franchisee perceives the franchisor as patently unfair in settling
disagreements, but, the franchisor achieves at least an adequate score in developing new
products and services, most of the franchisees will be satisfied or ambivalent. This pattern
continues at each adequacy offairness node.
Adequacy oJfairness=3, a neutral scoring of fairness, further reduces anger to
25.33% from adequacy offaimess-2: 40.00% anger. The dual sub group for this node is
adequacy of access to managementl-4 and adequacy of access to management—S.
Adequacy of access to management=5 dramatically reduces the angry cluster membership
and shifts a majority of the franchisees into the satisfied cluster membership. The
adequacy of access tofranchisor management=1-4 node is further influenced by the
adequacy of new products and services. Adequacy of new products and services=4, 5 only
slightly reduces anger in the adequacy of access to management--l-4 node. The
franchisees appear to recognize that the value of new stores is reduced if access to
management of the franchisor is not adequate.
Adequacy offairness=4, clearly fair in handling disagreements yields the intuitive
result of only 13.71% angry cluster membership. However, there is still a large
percentage of franchisees in the ambivalent cluster, 3 7.10%. There is further segmentation
of adequacy offairness-4 by adequacy of training= 1,2,3 and adequacy of training=4,5.
Fairness scoring above the neutral score requires clearly adequate performance in the sub
groups. Adequacy of training=4,5 produces 69.23% satisfaction among franchisees who
also score adequacy offairness=4. This level of franchisee satisfaction is only matched by
those franchisees who score adequacy offairness=5. Clearly, excellence is rewarded by
franchisees in their cluster group membership.
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6.4.3.1 GOODNESS OF FIT: TESTING THE FIRST LEVEL PREDICTOR,ADEQUACYOF
FAIRJVESS, IN THE CHAID MODEL
Table 6.16 Goodness of Fit of the CHAID Model Fourth Level Variable: Adequacy of
Fairness
Variable Categoty	 Chi-square	 D.F.	 p-value
Adequacy offairness=l	 1.0883	 2	 0.9568
Adequacy of fairness=2	 1.1252	 2	 0.5697
Adequacy of fairness3	 0.1323	 2	 0.9360
Adequacy of fairness=4	 0.0042	 2	 0.9979
Adequacy of faimess=5	 0.6624	 2	 0.7181
This table represents the predictive value of the CHAID model when adequacy of
fairness is the independent predictor variable. A p-value of .05 or more indicates a
statistically significant probability that the test sample cases have the same distribution as
the cases used to develop the model. Therefore, the cluster group membership described
by the model in 6.3.3 predicted the cluster group membership in the test sample cases at a
statistically significant level. This validates Model 6.3.3 as having significant predictive
value in assessing conflict in franchising.
6.4.4 SECOND LEVEL CHAD) MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES (See Figure 6.8)
The second level CHAID model predictor is similar in structure to the first level
model (6.3.3) in that adequacy of advice for problem solving is also segmented into five
distinct nodes and each node is then segmented into two sub groups, except the neutral
score is segmented again to a third sub group.
The cluster membership percentages described and predicted by adequacy of
advice for solving management problems virtually mirrors the first level predictor tree
diagram at the adequacy of advice for problem solving 1, adequacy of advice for
problem solving-2, and adequacy of advice for problem solving=3 nodes. These nodes
are also influenced by marketing functions, albeit different functions than adequacy of
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fairness. Clearly, marketing is at the forefront of franchisee thinking and influences
relational issues with the franchisor and these marketing ftinction influences are dramatic.
Adequacy ofproblem solving=1 is influenced by the adequacy of national
advertising. If adequacy of national advertising=1, an overwhelming 88% of franchisees
are angry. Being scored adequacy of national advertising=2 as a sub group of adequacy
of advice for problem solving=1 shifts 47% of the franchisees from angry to the
ambivalent and satisfied cluster groups.
Clearly adequate scores (4,5) yield significantly positive results in franchisee
cluster membership with 60% and 74% satisfied membership and, 12% and 2% angry
cluster membership. Adequacy of advice for problem solving=4 correlates with the
importance of training in accounting in a difficult to interpret correlation. Both here and
in the adequacy ofpromolion=4 node there is a negative correlation with importance of a
franchisor provided service and the level of franchisee satisfaction. When the importance
of credit and financial assistance is higher (adequacy of credzt=4) then satisfaction is
reduced by 34%. If credit and financial assistance are important, it may be because the
franchisee needs financial assistance and credit. The need may reflect a tenuous financial
perspective by the franchisee. In fact more franchisees who score the importance of credit
and financial assistance as a five have the lowest two categories of profit margin than any
other profit category (table 6.17).
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Table 6.17 Correlation of franchisees scoring importance of credit and financial assistance
as '5' with profit, N618
profit	 % respondents
0-2%	 41.79
3-5%
	
42.42
5+%
	
13.41
6.4.4.1 GOODNESS OF FIT: TESTING TIlE SEc0NI) LEVEL PREDICTORADEQUACYOF
AD VICE FOR PROBLEM SOL VING IN THE CHAID MODEL
Table 6.18 Goodness of Fit Test for the Cl-LAID Model Second Level Variable:
Adequacy of Advice for Problem Solving
Variable Categoiy
	 Chi-square	 D.F.	 p-value
Adequacy of advice for problem solving= 1
	 1.0179	 2	 0.6011
Adequacy of advice for problem solving2 	 3.8968	 2	 0. 1425
Adequacy of advice for problem solving=3 	 5.4016	 2	 0.0550
Adequacy of advice for problem solving-4 	 7.4330	 2	 0.0243*
Adequacy of advice for problem solving=5
	 0.7297	 2	 0.6943
sig at .05
Four of the five predictor nodes have significant predictive value.
6.4.5 THIRD LEVEL CHALD MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES (See Figure 6.9)
There is very little equivocation on the part of franchisees in their view of access to
franchisor management. Anger and ambivalence predominate with only marginal change
at scoring adequacy of access to management=l-4. Adequacy of access to
managemenr=5 dramatically reverses that phenomenon yielding 64% satisfaction cluster
group membership. It appears that franchisees demand the highest level of access to
franchisor management. It is a pre-requisite to franchisee satisfaction.
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6.4.5.1 Cm-SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST OF PREDICTWE POWER OF ADEQUACY
OFACCESS To M4NA GEMENTAS ,4NANTECEDENT OF CONFLICT
Table 6.19 Goodness of Fit Test Results: Adequacy of Access to Management
Vanable Categoiy	 Chi-square	 D.F.	 p-value
Adequacy of access to management 1
	
3.5169	 2
	
0.1723
Adequacy of access to management2
	
2.6775	 2
	
0.2622
Adequacy of access to management=3,4
	
0.7063	 2
	
0 7025
Adequacy of access to management=5
	
0.1739	 2
	
0.9 167
All four of the segments have statistically significant predictive value.
6.4.6 FOURTH LEVEL CHAH) MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
FRANCIIISOR PROVIDED SERVICES (See Figure 6.10)
The fourth level franchisor service predictor of franchisee conflict is adequacy of
store development support, the adequacy of franchisor support for the development of
new outlets. The four initial nodes of importance of store development support follows a
classic pattern of conflict reduction with increased scoring of the dependent variable.
However, there is a core of angry franchisees even at the importance of store development
support=4 (11.65% angry) and importance of store development supporI-5 (12.73%
angry). This might be emanating from franchisees who are adversely affected by the
extent of new store development, vis a vis territorial encroachment and subsequent sales
cannibalization. This effect is predicted by neo-classical economic theory (Mittlestaedt
and Stassen, 1990). It would also explain the slightly increased level of conflict when
adequacy of store development support scoring increases from 4 to 5. Increased
efficiency in new store development quickens the pace of territorial shrinkage for the
franchisee who does not grow.
Conflict cluster membership can be greatly affected by correlating independent
variables. Adequacy of store development support=1,2 has an angry cluster membership
of 43.88%. However, if the franchisee scores the franchisor provision of national
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advertising as adequacy of national adveriising=5, the angry cluster shrinks to 17.65%.
Again, with an in depth understanding of franchising, this phenomenon is intuitively sound.
The marketing economies which, in part, motivate the use of franchising as a growth
mechanism, should aid the individual store sales growth curve. Effective national
advertising is the most encompassing form of marketing. Therefore, deficiencies in new
store development are apparently offset, to some degree, by effective national advertising,
which, in turn, promotes franchisee revenue.
When neutrality of opinion regarding importance of store development support
manifests then fairness drives cluster group membership.
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6.4.6.1 GOODNESS OF FIT: TESTING TIlE FouRTh LEVEL PREDICTORADEQUACYOF
Sroi DE VELOPMENTSUPPORT IN THE CHAD MODEL
Table 6.20 Goodness of Fit Test for the CHAID Model Third Level Variable: Adequacy
of Store Development Support
Variable Categoty	 Chi-square	 D.F.	 p-value
Adequacy of store development supportl .2 	 1.5005	 2	 0.4722
Adequacy of store development support=3 	 0.9122	 2	 0.6338
Adequacy of store development support-4 	 0.3067	 2	 0.8578
Adequacy of store development support=5 	 1.9829	 2	 0.3710
Again, all four segments predict conflict cluster membership at a statistically
significant level.
6.4.7 FIFTH LEVEL CHAD MODEL PREDICTOR WITh TREE DIAGRAM:
FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES (See Figure 6.11)
The adequacy of operating systems from the franchisor is discretely segmented
into five scoring nodes. The adequacy of operation=2, adequacy of operation=3, and
adequacy of operation=4 all correlate with the adequacy offairness independent variable.
However, even when the franchisor is scored adequacy of operation=4, there is 22%
angry cluster membership and only 42% in the satisfied cluster. The adequacy offairness
influence is helpfiul, but, adequacy offairness=3-5 increases satisfied membership to only
53% and 36% of the franchisees remain ambivalent and 11% angry. On one extreme, at
adequacy of operalion=1, there is correlation with the independent variable adequacy of
supply. Adequacy of supply scoring of 3-5 affects cluster membership by reducing the
angry cluster from 51% to 35%. At the other extreme, adequacy of operation=5, the
independent variable correlation is with adequacy of store development support. When
adequacy of store development support is scored 4 or 5 there is a shift of cluster
membership from the ambivalent cluster (24% to 10%) to the satisfied cluster (62% to
79%).
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Franchisees clearly expect superior operating systems. It is difficult to move a
majority of the franchisees from anger and ambivalence unless a superior operating system
is delivered. There is important differentiation by franchisees at each scoring of adequacy
of operation. Important incremental gains in franchisee satisfaction can be gained by a
franchisor who is scored at anything below adequacy of operations=5.
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6.4.7.1 GooDr*Ess OF FIT: TESTING THE FIFTH LEvEL PREDICTOR ADEQUACY OF
OPERATIONS IN fl11 dAil) MODEL
Table 6.21 Goodness of Fit Test for the CFIAID Model Second Level Variable:
Adequacy of Operation
Variable Node
	
Chi-square	 D.F.	 Significance
Adequacy ofoperation=1,2	 4.9276	 2	 0.0851
Adequacy of operation=3	 3.6997	 2	 0.1573
Adequacy of operation4
	
1.8473	 2	 0.3971
Adequacy of operation=5 	 1.6906	 2	 0.4294
Again, all four segments of ADEQUACY OF OPErATIONS are statistically
significant predictors of conflict cluster membership.
6.5 SUMMARY OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF FRANCHISOR
PROVIDED SERVICES
relational issues continue to emerge from the analysis. resolving disagreements
fairly is clearly the first predictor of franchisee conflict cluster group membership. The
third predictor is access to franchisor management, which is relationship oriented.
However, many of the franchisee perspectives are influenced by marketing variables. It
seems that franchisees are more tolerant of the relationship when they view the marketing
functions as adequately provided.
The existence of a "spectrum" of franchisee perspectives and influences on
attitudes is apparent from the highly discrete predictor segments. This is theoretically
supported by transaction-cost and relational exchange. However, in the multivariate
analysis CHAID modelling of the franchisor provided services we begin to measure the
spectrum and provide guidance to the practitioner for movement along the spectrum.
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6.6 PROPOSITION C: ThE RELA11ONSHIIP BETWEEN EXIT COSTS,
TRADE MARK VALUE, AND CONFLICT
Proposition C
Perceived costs associated with leaving the franchise relationship reflect the
perceived value of the trade mark, and correlates with conflict in the franchisee-
franchisor relationship.
6.6.1 INTRODUCTION
The asset that has been established as the focus of the relationship between the
franchisee and franchisor is the trade mark. Transaction-cost analysis has directed this
study to the transactions which support the trade mark. In Proposition B the franchisor
provided services were examined because they are the actions specifically undertaken to
support the trade mark. Given that the trade mark is the compelling reason for the alliance
between franchisee and franchisor, this study proposes that the value of the trade mark,
built and supported as a result of the transactions included in franchisor provided services,
is internalized by the franchisee firm and will be reflected by the costs associated with
leaving the relationship. That is, the franchisee has worked with the franchisor to build
value in the trade mark and would forfeit that value if the relationship was exited.
Therefore, the franchisee's perception of trade mark value can be examined in a number of
ways. First, the market places a value on the trade mark by what it will pay for a franchise
versus a similar "stand alone" business. Alternatively, the franchisee places a technical
value on the trade mark in the form of intangible asset value on the balance sheet. Ping
(1991) found that exiting and switching costs are another way to estimate the value of a
channel relationship. Therefore, we examined trade mark value in three ways; estimated
market and balance sheet value and the scoring of exit costs.
6.6.2 CHAID ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED MARKET AND BALANCE SHEET VALUES OF
THE TRADE MARK
Although only one third of the respondents (n=190) offered a perspective of the
market value of the trade mark, this study proposes that trade mark value is linked to
perception of exit costs. Therefore, we subject the data to CHAID analysis to investigate
the correlation between market value of the trade mark and exit costs. All exit cost
independent variables were used in the Cl-LAID analysis. Scoring of market value of the
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component vanable Label
exiting costly in finding alternative suppliers
exiting will increase training cost
trade mark was used as the dependent variable. Likewise, 182 franchisees offered a
balance sheet value of the trade mark and a CHAID analysis of the balance sheet value as
the dependent variable and all exit costs as the independent variable was run.
Surprisingly, there were n exit cost predictor variables which correlate to market
or balance sheet valuation of the trade mark. It is clear that franchisees do not directly
link exit cost with trade mark value. It may be that expense factor components are
sufficiently prohibitive to preclude exit as a realistic alternative to the franchise
arrangement. Also, the scoring of legal expense as clearly high may indicate a recognition
of the contractually binding nature of the agreement. The first part of Proposition C is
not supported. We now look to exit costs as a predictor of conflict cluster membership.
6.6.3 Exrr COST AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CorkvLIcr
The accumulation of knowledge which is necessarily internal to the franchise
system constitutes the bundle of resources which are firm specific (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Partners in an interorganisational form like franchising continually reconsider the strategic
accumulation and implementation of these resources and thus create a dynamic assessment
of the value of the relationship (Dierickx and Cool, 1988). Zajac and Olsen (1993)
emphasize that the value of transaction-cost analysis as a theoretical tool is enhanced when
a view to long term value, as well as cost, of the transactions which form the alliance.
6.6.3.1 Exur COSTS PREDICTORS OF CONFLICT IN FRANCHISING
Eight of the eleven exit cost variables correlate to conflict in franchising (table
6.18).
Table 6.22 Exit Costs Which Correlate to Conflict Cluster Membership
Factor	 p-value
business format
	 l.40e-08'
business format
	 I .40e-08
business format
	 4.00e-06 exiting will require operating procedures changes
asset
	 2.20e-04	 exiting costly in store conversion
expense	 4.40e-04'	 exiting will increase the marketing budget
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Factor	 p-value	 component variable Label
business format	 3.70e-03	 exiting costly in lost goodwill
psychic	 770e03*	 company investment unique to the relationship
expense	 3.20e-02	 exiting costly in legal expense
psychic	 0.069	 company invested time and effort in the relationship
expense	 0.270	 exiting costs would probably be high
psychic	 1.000	 franchisee invested personally in the relationship
• Sig. at .05
Components of the business format factor dominate the exit cost variables that
correlate with conflict. The top three exit cost predictors are all business format factor
components and all four business format factor components are represented in the
predictor list. Conversely, only two expense factor components and one of the three
psychic factor components are exit cost predictors of conflict. We would expect that the
transactions undertaken to support the alliance engender the highest level of conflict in a
commercial relationship (Pondy, 1992). The business format components, exit costs are
clearly the focus of the franchise relationship. CHAID analysis will allow us to review the
nature and manifestation of the exit cost related conflict.
6.6.3.2 CHAID ANALYSIS OF Exrr COSTS AS ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT IN
FRANCHISING
The three independent variable predictors with the lowest p-value are modelled,
followed by a discussion of the findings.
6.6.3.2.1 CHALD ANALYSIS WITH TREE DIAGRAM: EXITING COSTLYIN FINDING NEW
SUPPLIERS (See Figure 6.12)
The higher the perceived cost of finding alternative suppliers upon exit, the higher
the satisfied cluster group membership. This phenomenon is consistent across the four
alternative supplier nodes of scoring which predict cluster membership. When franchisees
perceive value in the franchise supply system, there is a reticence to exit. There is
additional correlation between the independent variable exiting costly in store conversion
171
(perceived cost of store conversion upon exiting the relationship) at the exiting costly in
finding new suppliers=l node. Exiting costly in store conversion is segmented into three
additional nodes. When the perceived costs of store conversion are high, franchisees
strongly tend to the angry cluster, the reverse of the reaction to high alternative supplier
costs. When finding alternative suppliers is scored 3 or 4, the node is further segmented in
correlation with the cost of training employees. Low exit costs associated with training
correlates to a mostly ambivalent franchisee attitude. Neutral and high scoring of training
costs associated with exit significantly reduces the angry cluster (from 27% to 10%)
following the pattern established by the cost of finding alternative suppliers.
This model illustrates the mixed signals that can be associated with exit costs. The
principal independent variable predictor and two of the three independent variables which
correlate with the principal predictor increase satisfaction when exit costs are perceived as
high. However, one of the independent variables reflects an opposite reaction. The
sometimes alternating correlations between exit cost and conflict cluster group
membership occurs in each of the exit cost models.
The store from which the franchisee operates is an asset developed which is
specific to the relationship, but, the asset is not necessarily specific to the franchise
relationship. That is, the store is seen as a transferable asset. However, building design,
layout, and signage are all a part of that which constitutes the trade mark, yet there does
not appear to be recognition of this fact.
Supplier relations are not a specific asset to the franchise relationship.
Transaction-cost economics theorizes that the franchise, or any hybrid organizational
form, is focused on the transactions which bind the relationship and builds the assets which
are most specific to the relationship. The results in the first CHAID model of exit cost as
an antecedent of conflict regarding the perceived cost of finding alternative suppliers upon
exiting the franchise relationship would indicate that the perceived cost of exit regarding a
specific asset correlates negatively with conflict. Exit costs associated with a non-specific
asset correlates positively with conflict.
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6.6.3.2.1.1 CR1-SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST OF THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF
ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIER AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CoNFLICT
Table 6.23 Goodness of Fit Test JsuIts: Alternative Suppliers
Node	 Chi-square	 DF	 Significance
Alternative Suppliers=1
	 2.7987	 2	 0.2468
Alternative Suppliers=2,3 	 5.6162	 2	 0.0603
Alternative Suppliers-4,5	 0.863	 2	 0.7877
*s1g. at .05
6.6.3.2.2 PERCEIVED Exrr COST CHAID ANALYSIS WITH TREE DIAGRAM: EXITING
WILL INCREASE TRAINING COST (See Figure 6.13)
Training follows the predictive pattern that was established by the first CHAID
exit cost model. The independent variable, Exiling will increase training cost, is
segmented into three nodes and as scoring of the variable increases, so does the angry
cluster group membership.
Training costs upon exit are greatly influenced by the respondent's particular
franchise system membership. Therefore, the second level segmentation gives us less
insight, but, does caution franchisors to attentively design training programmes specific to
the needs of the business format they are offering.
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6.6.3.2.2.1 CR1-SQUARE GooDNESS OF FIT TEST OF THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF
ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIER AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CONFLICT
Table 6.24 Goodness of Fit Test Results: Training Cost
Node	 Chi-square	 DF	 Significance
Training Cost=1	 0.2152	 2	 0898
Training Cost=23	 0.9668	 2	 0.7077
Training Cost=4	 1.007	 2	 0.6045
*S i g .
 at .05
6.6.3.2.3 CHAID ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED EXIT COST WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
EXITING WILL REQUIRE OPERATING PROCEDURE CHANGES (See Figure 6.14)
There is a pattern of higher satisfaction with at least neutral agreement with
operational changes being required upon exiting the franchise relationship. This is
consistent with the theoretical linkage between asset specificity and a recognition of the
costs associated with losing an asset unique to the relationship. However, the recognition
of operating system specificity appears to be limited, with only a small increase in
satisfaction with an increase in scoring of agreement with operational changes.
Consistent with the recognition of the unique nature of the operating procedures is
a further segmentation of the nodes by company affiliation. This segmentation follows the
same pattern of greater satisfaction with higher scoring of agreement with operating
procedure changes upon exit, with dramatic differences in cluster membership by
company.
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6.6.3.2.3.1 Cm-SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST OF THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF
OPERA TING PROCEDURES CHANGES AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CONFLICT
Table 6.25 Goodness of Fit Test Results: Operating Procedures Changes
Node	 Chi-square	 DF	 Significance
Operating Procedure Changes= 1,2	 2.4 162	 2	 0.2988
Operating Procedure Changes3 	 3.6059	 2	 0.1648
*=Sig.
 at .05
6.6.4 SUM1vLARY OF EXIT COSTS AS AN ANTECEDENT OF CONFLICT IN FRANCHISING
Theory is supported as franchisees place greater value on those assets which are
specific to the relationship and therefore less easily transferred to another exchange
relationship. However, the most specific asset in the relationship, the trade mark, is only
obliquely recognised as non-transferable and therefore a cost upon exit.
6.7 GENERAL MODEL OF THE ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT
6.7.1 INTRODUCTION
The intent of this study is to examine the issues in the franchisee-franchisor alliance
which affect conflict in the relationship. Theory has been used as a tool to direct the
development of the research question and propositions and focus the investigation vis a
vis collecting data regarding specific independent variables. The CHAID models reveal
correlation between and among independent variables and the dependent variable and
segments the population based on these correlations. This provides perspectives on
conflict which allow us to address the propositions. It is also the stated objective of this
thesis to bridge academic work to practitioner utilisation. Comprehensive models of
conflict in the relationship support and prioritise the propositions and provides a grand
view. This allows the practitioner to more efficiently allocate management resources and
the researcher with an agenda for future research which reflects these priorities.
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SPSS Cl-lAID indicates that forty-six of the seventy-six independent variables
input to the model have descriptive and predictive correlation probability with the
dependent conflict variable at a .05 level or better (Appendix IX). It is interesting and
informative to note the "types" and quantity of variables included in the list of predictor
variables:
1)18 of 18 franchisor provided services adequacy variables
2) 8 of 9 relational goal variables
3) 8 of 11 perceived exit cost variables
4) 4 of 7 financial variables
5) 2 of 4 future goal variables
6) 2 of 9 demographic variables
7) 4 of 18 franchisor provided services importance variables
This list provides a sweeping view of the overall nature of franchisees attitudes
toward the relationship with the franchisor, the business format franchise, and their
satisfaction. Adequacy of franchisor provided services, within a complex relational
exchange, is the predominant theme. There is an indirect understanding of the trade mark
value as represented by perceived exit costs. Finance plays only a supporting role in the
relationship.
Each independent variable predictor of conflict can be modeled and will illustrate
the interaction among independent variables. Space limitation in this dissertation prohibits
exhibiting all forty-seven models Additionally, the practical requirement of describing and
predicting franchisee cluster membership can be achieved with far fewer models.
Therefore, the following CHAID models depict the 5 principal independent variables
(those with the lowest p-value) which are the descriptive and predictive antecedents of
conflict in franchising from the perspective of the franchisee survey population. Each
predictor is displayed in a separate tree diagram which includes the sub-groupings. These
sub-groupings are indicative of correlation among independent variables. Four of the five
predictors are contained in previously developed models. However, because all variables
are used, the general model of conflict varies somewhat. Each model is described in
detail.
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Table 6.26 First Five Predictors of Conflict in Franchising
Predictor	 Variable type	 p-value
well coordinated and will continue
relationship best described as "arms length"
adequacy of disagreements settlement
franchise system affiliation
adequacy of management problems advice
Goal
Goal
Service
Characteristic
Service
1.6Oe5l*
6.50e-40
1 .3Oe-30
7.0Oe30*
4.20e-28
=Sig. at .05
6.7.2 THE FIRST LEVEL CIIAII) MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
ANTECEDENTS OF CONFUCT (See Figure 6.15)
Coordination, representing the statement "the relationship with the franchisor is
well coordinated and will continue," is the independent variable which has the lowest
probability value (p-value=1.6e-51) of the seventy-six independent variables in the survey.
That is, the coordination independent variable should have the "best" descriptive and
highest predictive value of the dependent conflict variable of all the independent variables.
The coordination variable is segmented into four sub-groups based on the 1-5 likert scale.
The first sub-group is coordination, scores 1 and 2 (n1 13).
From these results we see that the franchisees believe that coordinating the
activities of the system are essential to their satisfaction with their relationship with the
franchisor. Almost 73% of franchisees are dissatisfied ("angry") if the relationship is
clearly not well coordinated. Over 22% are ambivalent about the relationship if they feel
at distinct lack of coordination. Also, in this node we see "structural" satisfaction that the
6.1 9% satisfied cluster membership may represent. The opposite structural group, in the
angry cluster, may be present in the coordination5 node.
The node located directly to the right of the coordination 12 node is the subgroup
node coordination score=3 (n=127).
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A neutral perspective of coordination with the franchisor moves a large block of
franchisees from angry to ambivalent but still leaves more than a third of the segment in
the angry cluster and does little to increase the satisfied cluster membership. Franchisees
are clearly	 neutral in their perspective of coordination as a requirement in the
relationship with the franchisor.
The node located directly to the right of the coordination 3 node is the
coordination 4 node which represents the subgroup coordination who scored 4 on the 1-5
scale (n=177).
Franchisees have to have a clear perspective of coordination with the franchisor to
become satisfied with the relationship. Although almost half of the respondents remain in
the ambivalent conflict cluster group when they answer 4 on the 1-5 scale, it is in this
segment that we see the first shift toward a more satisfied group of franchisees. Although
the single largest cluster membership is still in the ambivalent group, the satisfied clustered
increases 30% (to almost 3 8%).
The node located directly to the right of the coordination 4 node is the
coordination 5 node
The highest rating of coordination yields an overwhelming level of satisfaction by
the franchisees. Almost 72% of the franchisees are satisfied and only 6% are angry. In
this segment there is an indication of the previously noted structural or chronic
dissatisfaction that may be very difficult to eliminate. Thus, this model establishes a
realistic goal of franchisee satisfaction that the franchise system might attain
6.7.3 CORRELATION AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN THE MODEL OF THE
ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT
Further analysis of the first level predictor Cl-LAID models allows a perspective on
what independent variables affect the perspective of the franchisee regarding the nature of
a "coordinated" relationship. The most striking of these relationships occur at the nodes
below coordination=3 and coordination=5.
Branching from coordination=3 is the independent variable which is a dummy
variable representing the nine franchise systems who participated in the study. Although
all nine companies had virtually the same percentage membership in the satisfied cluster in
the franchise system sub-group, the ambivalent and angry cluster membership are
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dramatically different and almost exactly opposite. Membership in a particular franchise
system becomes important in assessing conflict in the relationship only when the attitude
of the franchisee toward coordination is neutral. Branching from Coordination=5 is the
independent variable representing the adequacy of access to the franchisor management.
Significant access to franchisor management creates an overwhelmingly satisfied group of
franchisees (90%). This question does not ask for agreement with franchisor management
action which result from access. This implies that franchisees attain greater satisfaction
with the relationship when involved in the decision making process. There is nothing to
indicate that the outcome of those decisions affects conflict.
It is important to note that the perspective of the franchisee appears to transition
from the satisfied through the ambivalent clusters, not directly shifting back and forth from
satisfied to angry. Although we do not propose the individual franchisee necessarily
transitions through the conflict clusters, the data suggest that the percentage of franchisees
in each cluster shifts transitionally. This suggests incremental steps in gaining the
satisfaction of the franchisee.
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6.7.3.1 GooDNEss OF FIT: TESTIIiG THE FIRST LEVEL PREDICTOR COORDINATIONIN
THE CHAID MODEL
As previously noted, a randomly selected test file of 65 cases was held out of the
data base to be used to test the predictive value of the model which was built using the
556 remaining cases. Chi-Square Goodness of Fit was used for testing the model. For
each variable node in the CHAD tree the expected percentages displayed in the model
were used to predict the cluster membership of the test file. The conflict cluster
membership of the test file cases has been previously established in the cluster analysis in
section 5.1.3.
Table 6.27 Goodness of Fit Test for the CHAD Model First Level Variable:
Coordination
Variable Node	 Chi-Square	 D.F.	 p-value
Coordination=l,2 	 0.0421	 2	 0.9792
Coordination=3	 0.0418	 2	 0.9793
Coordination4	 0.6442	 2	 0.7244
Coordination=5	 2.0395	 2	 0.3607
The "significance" statistic (p-value) indicates the probability that the expected and
observed percentage of cases for each category are the same. That is; we establish a
model we expect to have both descriptive and predictive power. This model indicates that
for each of the coordination answers listed above and in the model, specific percentages of
franchisees will fall into each of the three conflict cluster groups. The expected cluster
membership percentages are then used to predict the cluster membership of the cases in
the test file. A significance level of 0.05 or more indicates that the expected and observed
cases have a probability of being the same. Clearly, each node of the first level predictor,
coordination, has significant predictive value.
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6.7.4 THE SECOND LEVEL CHAII) MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT (See Figure 6.16)
The second level predictor is "arms length," which asks for the degree of
agreement (1-5 Likert scale) with the statement "my relationship with the franchisor is
arms length."
The second level independent variable is again a highly discrete predictor of
franchisee-franchisor conflict. Each of the I (disagree) to 5 (agree) answers on the scale
are segmented into descriptive/predictive sub-groups. The interpretation of the sub-
groups follows the pattern established and explained in the first level predictor
coordination. The franchisees are clearly more satisfied with the relationship if they
n see it as "arms length." However, it is important to note that strong disagreement
with the arms length notion of the relationship (1 on the 1-5 scale) is required to obtain a
majority of the franchisees (79%) in the satisfied cluster membership. As soon as there is
y doubt by the franchisee that the relationship is
	 arms length (2 on the 1-5 scale)
ambivalence becomes manifest and anger rises somewhat (from 2.47% to 9.38%). This
phenomenon becomes exacerbated in the 3, 4, and 5 segments. There is little doubt in the
minds of franchisees that the franchisee-franchisor relationship should not be arms length.
This would indicate that the coordination previously required (as depicted in the first level
model) goes beyond formal boundaries. Axlerod (1984) describes an "organic"
cooperation that represents informal and spontaneous cooperation born out of an
understanding or belief that the relationship will be maintained for a long time. Organic
cooperation goes beyond the formal, contractual relationship.
The "arms length"=1 node, (n81, 1:79.01%, 2:18.52%, 3:2.47%) is further
segmented into two sub-groups which correlate to the independent variable cooperation,
which asks for level of importance regarding the statement, "At this point in time,
developing a more cooperative relationship with the franchisor is relatively..." (1, not
important to 5, very important, Likert scale). This further segmentation places each of the
81 franchisee respondents from the "arms length"=l sub-group into cooperation=1-3, or
cooperation=4 segments.
These results indicate that franchisee perception of an arms length agreement
correlates with their attitudes about the on-going relationship with the franchisor in terms
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of the relational goal of cooperation. Franchisees logically believe that if cooperation in
the relationship is currently in place then they have less of an arms length deal. However,
the franchisees appear to allow great latitude in their perspective of cooperation. There is
no statistically significant difference in the correlation with conflict in the franchisee-
franchisor relationship between clearly seeing the relationship as not needing more
cooperation and neutrality in perspective on the issue.
The shifting of conflict cluster group membership is between satisfied and
ambivalent, with relatively little effect on the angry cluster. Although the majority of the
franchisees remain satisfied with the relationship, the franchisor has lost unequivocal
support vis a vis satisfaction, as group membership in the ambivalent cluster increased to a
third of the sub-group.
The "arms length"=2 node, (n=96, 1: 46.88%, 2: 43.75%, 3: 9.38%) is further
segmented into two sub-groups which correlate to the independent variable promotional
expense, which asks for level of expenditure on promotion based on percentage of sales
(1=0-1%, 2=2-4%, 3=5-7% and so on).
Spending more on promotional expense inversely correlates with franchisee
satisfaction. The economics literature discussed in the literature review chapter would
support the notion that higher promotional expense, often a result of franchisor marketing
programs (Mittlestaedt and Stassen, 1990), would result in conflict. The promotion
expense sub-groups are a small but clear indication of that phenomenon.
The "arms lenglh"=3 node, (n=160, 1:25.00%, 2:55.00%, 3:20.00%) is further
segmented into two sub-groups which correlate to the independent variable coordination.
This further segmentation places each of the 160 franchisee respondents from the "anns
length"=3 node into either coordinalion-4, or coordination=5.
This sub-group indicates again that the franchisees are clear in their desire to
coordinate activity with the franchisor. Less of an arms length relationship and neutrality
on coordination result in and ambivalence and anger and very little satisfaction. This is
consistent with the findings in the first level predictor model.
The fourth "arms length" node is segmented by company, or franchise affiliation.
The nine companies are divided into two groups. The largest segment has six companies
with a large ambivalent cluster and even minority clusters of angry and satisfied
186
franchisees. There is a higher propensity of conflict if the market value of the trade mark
is not known. This is the only appearance of a trade mark related variable and, although
theoretically sound, the result is rather minor when transaction-cost points to a much
greater role.
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6.7.4.1 GOODNESS OF FIT: TESTING THE SECOND LEVEL PREDICTOR "ARMS LENGTH"
IN THE CHAII) MODEL
Table 6.28 Goodness of Fit Test for the CHAID Model Second Level Variable:"Arms
Length"
Variable Categoiy	 Chi-square	 D.F.	 p-value
"Arms length"= I	 1.9051	 2	 0.3858
"Aims Iength"=2	 1.5706	 2	 0.4560
"Arms length"=3	 2.0202	 2	 0.3642
"Arms Iength"4	 0.1383	 2	 0.9332
"Arms Iength"=5	 1.3192	 2	 0.5171
Although the significance of the goodness of fit analysis is less than that for the
first level predictor, all five variable segments are statistically significant (p>.O5) predictors
of franchisee cluster membership.
6.7.5 THE THIRD LEVEL CIIAII) MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT (See Figure 6.17)
The third level independent variable predictor of franchisee conflict cluster
membership is adequacy offairness, the variable which scores (1 -.5 Likert scale of
adequacy) the statement, contained in the Franchisor Provided Services section of the
questionnaire, "rcsolving disagreements and complaints quickly, eagerly and fairly."
Therefore, the franchisee respondents are commenting on the adequacy of the franchisor
in resolving disagreements brought by the franchisee. It is intuitively logical that fairness
and conflict would correlate (Ouchi, 1972). However, this intuitive relationship has not
been measured in franchising before this study.
The respondents who scored adequacy offaimes=1, clearly inadequate fairness,
are clearly dissatisfied franchisees (5.68% satisfied, 29.55% ambivalent, 64.77% angry). It
is surprising that jy 65% of the franchisees are angry when they score the franchisor as
clearly unfair. This adds further support for a structural group of satisfied franchisees.
Importantly, if the franchisor achieves only adequacy offaimess=2, a majority of the
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franchisees move from the angry to primarily the ambivalent conflict cluster. If the
franchisor can achieve a neutral (adequacy offairness=3) score for fairness, only 26.03%
of franchisees are angry. The movement of franchisees toward greater satisfaction
continues through to adequacy offairness-5. However, even at a high degree of fairness,
8.14% of franchisees remain in the angry cluster, possibly representative of the structurally
angry franchisee.
The sub groups of the adequacy offairness predictor variable are primarily
relational variables. If a franchisee believes the relationship is clearly arms length then the
franchisee sees fairness as clearly inadequate. However, "clearly arms length" is defined
by the franchisee response of "arms length"=5. There is no statistically significance
difference among "arms length"=l ,2,3 or 4 in the way those scores correlate to the
franchisee response adequacy offairness=1.
Adequacy offairness=3 represents the neutral franchisee perspective on fairness.
The resulting conflict cluster membership is intuitive and symmetrical. About half of the
franchisees are ambivalent and one quarter satisfied and one quarter angry. Neutrality of
fairness scoring correlates to the franchisor is just another supplier. Disagreement with
that statement the franchisor is just another supplier=1,2, and therefore a belief that the
relationship goes beyond product and service transactions, dramatically shifts franchisees
from anger and ambivalence to satisfaction. The franchisee scoring of the franchisor is
just another supplier correlates with the adequacy of advice from the franchisor regarding
inventory, adequacy of inventory management. An interesting and important point is that
correlation among independent variables in the sub group headed by adequacy of
fairness=3 (neutrality) segment vertically down the tree diagram into two distinct sub
groups. These two groups are scoring 1 and 2 versus 3, 4, and 5. Gaining a neutral or
better perspective from franchisees on supplier issues dramatically affects the anger group,
reducing it by 26% to 39%.
Adequacy offairness-4 indicates the first segment in which satisfaction has the
largest cluster group membership. However, 37.1% of franchisees are still ambivalent.
Angry franchisees are reduced to 13.7 1%. Again, it is coordination that correlates with
satisfaction in the sub groups of the adequacy offairness-4 predictor variable. Clear
190
coordination (coordination-4, 5) predicts over 50% satisfaction cluster membership.
Likewise, coordination is linked to a relationship which is not arms length.
Adequacy offairness5 yields two-thirds satisfaction among franchisees. The sub
groups correlate to the franchisees perception that the relationship goes beyond that of
supply. However, if there is any doubt that the franchisor is more than just another
supplier franchisee ambivalence manifests.
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6.7.5.1 GooDNEss OF FIT: TESTING THE THIRD LEVEL PREDICTOR ADEQUACYOF
FAIRNEss IN THE CHAH) MODEL
Table 6.29 Goodness of Fit Test for the CHAID Model Third Level Variable: Adequacy
of Fairness
Variable Categozy
	 Chi-Square	 D.F.	 p-value
Adequacy offairness=l 	 0.0882	 2	 0.9569
Adequacy of faimess=2	 1.5000	 2	 0.4724
Adequacy of fairness=3	 0.1323	 2	 0.9360
Adequacy of faimess4	 0.0301	 2	 0.9851
Adequacy of fairness=5
	 0.6036	 2	 0.7395
The Goodness of Fit test indicates that all five adequacy offairness segments have
statistically significant predictive value.
6.7.6 THE FOURTh LEVEL CHAI1) MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
ANTECEDENTS OF CoNflICT (See Figure 6.18)
Franchise system, the categorical variable which designates franchise system
affiliation of the respondent. Coordination is the independent variable which correlates
with company affiliation in five of the nine companies in the study at this level of analysis.
Agreement that the relationship is arms length correlated with two company affiliations.
Agreement that the relationship creates a complex web of expectations correlates with the
remaining two companies.
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6.7.6.1 GOODNESS OF FIT: TESTING THE FOURTH LEVEL PREDICTOR FRANCHISE
SYSTEM IN THE CHAJ]) MODEL
Table 6.30 Goodness of Fit Test for the CHAD Model Fourth Level Variable: Franchise
System
Variable Node	 Chi-Square	 D.F.	 p-value
Franchise system=1,9 	 1.2535	 2	 0.5343
Franchise system=2,4 	 6.6577	 2	 0.0358
Franchise system=3,6,7 	 1.6 126	 2	 0.4465
Franchise system=5,8	 0.4206	 2	 0.8103
Franchise systems two and four are not statistically significant predictors of
conflict cluster membership. There are few nodes in all of the CHAD modelling that did
not support the predictive value of the independent variable. Therefore, we remain
confident in the descriptive and predictive value of the models.
6.7.7 THE FIFTH LEVEL CHAII) MODEL PREDICTOR WITH TREE DIAGRAM:
ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT (See Figure 6.19)
The fifth level independent variable predictor is adequacy of management problem
solving advice, is consistent with previously developed CHAID modelling using this
variable. Patently poor advice is influenced by the franchisor's performance in delivering
national advertising. Developing new products and services influences the adequacy of
management problem solving advice=2 node and promotion of products and services
influences the adequacy of management problem solving advice =3 node. All influencing
independent variables are marketing oriented.
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6.7.7.1 GooDNEss OF FIT: TESTING THE FIFTH LEVEL PREDICTOR ADEQUACY OF
PROBLEM SOL VING IN THE CHAII) MODEL
Table 6.31 Goodness of Fit Test for the CHAJD Model Fifth Level Variable: Adequacy
of Problem Solving
Variable Node	 Chi-Square	 D.F.	 p-value
Adequacy of problem solvingl 	 1.0753	 2	 0.5841
Adequacy of problem solvmg2	 3.8968	 2	 0. 1425
Adequacy of problem solving=3	 10.3241	 2	 0.0057
Adequacy of problem solving4 	 7.4333	 2	 0.0243 *
Adequacy of problem so1ving'5
	 0.7297	 2	 0.6943
=Sig. at .05
Only three of the five nodes have statistically significant predictive power as
opposed to the more specific franchisor provided services models which contain the
problem solving variable. Franchisees may judge the franchisor's problem solving ability
in the context of their daily activities, as represented by the franchisor provided services
adequacy variables. This is a very task oriented perspective and underscores the value of
the franchisor provided services model.
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6.8 SUMMARY OF THE MULT1VARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Conflict exists in all commercial organisations at some level (Thomas, 1992). The
clear and rational separation of the three cluster solution in establishing the conflict
construct scale is a striking depiction of the theoretical potential for conflict in franchising.
Equally striking is the almost even distribution of the cases in the three clusters.
Theoretical underpinnings have led us to significant correlation of variables to the
conflict construct. These correlations point to the pivotal role of the ambivalent cluster
group as cases move along the conflict scale. There appears to be a small core of both
structural satisfaction and anger and significant movement from the ambivalent group into
anger and satisfaction.
The research question is answered by this delineation of the status of conflict
in the franchisee samples studied with a strong case for the generalisability to the
populations of the franchise systems.
The franchisee's belief that cooperation is the underpinning of the relationship
makes the delicate balance between coordination and an arms length relationship an
important and intricate franchisor management function if high satisfied cluster
membership is to be achieved. Coordination, however, is achieved by promulgating a
system which is not complex and has clearly understandable expectations. These
expectations can be delivered, at least initially, in the license agreement. Franchisees
understand the importance of this contract. There are expectations of monitoring of the
relationship by both the franchisee and the franchisor. Parenthetically, this is an interesting
adjunct to the mutuality component of Mcneil's relational exchange theory. Mutuality is
clearly at least a two party phenomenon which may be best studied by using two
constructs. Proposition A, which relates franchisee goals to conflict in franchising, is
supported.
The monitoring activity is captured in the analysis of the franchisor provided
services. Adequacy within the boundaries of the CHAID model produce a very high level
of satisfaction. Franchisees appear to be flexible in their acceptance of performance by the
franchisor but not without boundaries. Proposition B, which relates franchisor
provided services to conflict in franchising, is supported.
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That the trade mark cannot be directly linked to exit costs nor directly quantified in
valuation is surprising. This symbol of the relationship's asset accumulation is clearly not
directly addressed as a part of the alliance between the franchisor and franchisee. It is not
the coalescing agent that theory would suggest. Although not linked to trade mark
valuation, exit costs do provide an interesting perspective on conflict. It appears that
assets which are more easily transferred out of the relationship are viewed as less of an
exit cost than those assets which are relationship specific. Also, the greater the value of
the transferable asset the higher the level of conflict. The opposite is true for relationship
specific assets. Proposition C, which links exit costs to trade mark value and conflict
is only partially supported.
Table 6.32 below is a summary of the 19 models and the independent variables
contained in the models. The numbers opposite the variable labels indicate the whether
the variable is a principal predictor (#1) or an independent influencing variable by depth
(a's 2,3,4).
Forty variables are included in the table. Coordination is the principal predictor
three times. Attitude towards an arms length relationship appears eight times, once as a
principal predictor and seven times as an influencing predictor.
Table 6.32 Predictor Depth Level for CHAID Models
FIGURE	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 1	 I
0	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9
MODEL	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 a	 a	 a	 a	 a	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 S	 C	 a
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 d	 d	 d	 d	 d	 1	 2	 2	 1	 1	 d	 o	 d
o	 3	 5	 5	 5	 5	 f	 p	 z	 n	 o	 7	 5	 6	 5	 5	 f	 m	 p
C	 C	 C	 a	 I	 c	 a	 r	 0	 e	 p	 a	 I	 0	 C	 a	 a	 p	 r
o	 o	 0	 r	 -	 0	 I	 0	 F	 W	 I	 I	 r	 p	 0	 F	 i	 fl	 0
o	 m	 o	 in	 a	 o	 r	 b	 in	 d	 I	 a	 s	 o	 m	 r	 o	 b
p	 I	 r	 a	 r	 $	 I	 r	 I
I	 U	 fl
cct	 2	 3
adcrdt	 3	 3
.du	 1	 2	 2	 2	 3	 1
199
FIcAJRE	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 $	 9	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
	
0	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 S	 9
MODEL	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 a	 a	 a	 a	 a	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 a	 c	 a
i	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 d	 d	 d	 d	 d	 1	 2	 2	 1	 1	 d	 o	 d
o	 3	 5	 5	 5	 5	 f	 p	 z	 0	 7	 5	 6	 5	 5	 f	 in	 p
c	 C	 c	 a	 I	 c	 a	 r	 0	 C	 p	 a	 I	 0	 C	 a	 a	 p	 r
o	 o	 0	 r	 -	 0	 1	 o	 r	 w	 I	 I	 r	 p	 o	 f	 I	 fl	 0
o in o in a	 o	 r	 b m d	 I	 a	 a	 o in	 r	 o	 b
p	 I	 r	 i	 f	 S	 I	 r	 a
t	 U	 U
d6nn	 3	 4
admv	 2	 3
edlclad	 3
odmkmf	 4	 2	 4
3
dnaf	 2	 2	 2	 2
adnewd	 3	 1	 2
adnwF	 3	 2
adops	 2	 3	 1
sdprob	 1	 2	 2	 1
adp	 2	 3
adsuply	 2
3
sdtrsm	 2	 3
adzorm	 1	 2
qlOcoop	 1	 2	 2	 2
qllcom	 2
ql2qual	 2	 3
ql3conit	 3	 1
ql4acct	 3	 2
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FIGURE	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 I	 9	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
0	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 I	 9
MODEL	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 a	 a	 a	 a	 a	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 a	 c	 a
1	 i	 i	 1	 1	 1	 d	 d	 d	 d	 d	 1	 2	 2	 1	 1	 d	 o	 d
o	 3	 5	 5	 5	 5	 f	 p	 z	 n	 0	 7	 5	 6	 5	 5	 1	 m	 p
C	 C	 c	 a	 I	 c	 a	 r	 0	 C	 p	 a	 I	 0	 C	 a	 a	 p	 r
o	 o	 o	 r	 -	 o	 I	 o	 r	 w	 I	 I	 r	 p	 o	 r	 j	 n	 0
o	 m	 o	 m	 a	 o	 r	 b	 m	 d	 t	 a	 s	 o	 m	 r	 o	 b
p	 I	 r	 a	 r	 ,	 a
I	 U	 fl
q14.tI	 3
q14U.in	 3
ql5expt	 2	 2	 2
q15.rn	 I	 2	 3	 1	 2	 2
3	 3
ql5cmpl	 2
ql5coor	 1	 1	 1	 2	 2
ql5juat	 2	 2
q151_m	 I
ql5moni	 3
ql5pymt	 2
ql6cnvit	 2	 3
qIlaltiu	 1	 3
q21pciI	 3
q24mktb	 2	 4
4
q25trmn	 2	 1
q26ops	 I
conlpflo	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 1
q3IFo	 2
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FT.JRE	 I	 2	 3	 4	 6	 7	 I	 9	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
0	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 I	 9
MODEL	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 a	 a	 a	 a	 a	 q	 q	 q	 q	 q	 a	 c	 a
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 d	 d	 d	 d	 d	 1	 2	 2	 1	 1	 d	 o	 d
o	 3	 5	 5	 5	 5	 1	 p	 z	 n	 0	 7	 5	 6	 5	 5	 f	 m	 p
c	 C	 C	 a	 I	 c	 a	 r	 0	 0	 p	 a	 I	 0	 C	 a	 a	 p	 r
o	 o	 0	 r	 -	 0	 i	 0	 t	 W	 S	 I	 r	 p	 o	 r	 I	 a	 o
o	 m	 o	 m	 a	 o	 r	 b	 m	 d	 I	 a	 a	 o	 m	 r	 o	 b
p	 i	 r	 S	 I	 I	 I	 r	 a
I	 U	 U
q32mktu	 3
Within the seventy-six independent variables used in this study there are four major
areas of variables which seem to impact the models to the greatest extent. First are the
franchisor provided services adequacy variables. It is striking how prominent they are in
predicting conflict and how few franchisor provided services importance variables impact
conflict. Franchisees appear to focus their attention more on delivery of the system than
on ordering the priorities of the system. Second, are the goals for the future of the
relationship. Cooperation is the most important goal and an important influencing goal in
the general model of conflict. The third area of concentration is in the goals for the on-
going relationship, and in particular, the role of coordination as a principal predictor of
conflict. However, the franchisor is also expected to deal at arms length with the
franchisee. There is a delicate balance between coordination and arms length dealing that
franchisees expect from the franchisor. The fourth area of concentrated effect on conflict
is the exit cost. Interestingly, the expense factor components are not prominent and the
business format components are. The transaction specific costs of doing business are the
costs which affect conflict.
In only one of nineteen models is franchise affiliation (company) the principal
independent variable predictor of conflict. However, it is an influencing variable in both
the perceived exit cost models and in the general models of conflict. Therefore, the
predictor should be the focus of the relationship with detail of the process executed with
specific company issues in mind. For example, in model 6.13 the principal independent
variable predictor of conflict is the increase in training costs upon exit. For five of the nine
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companies the percentage of franchisee in each cluster is influenced by the cost of store
conversion upon exit. While our model is clear that training costs are a predictor of
conflict for all franchisees in the populations from which the sample was drawn, "fine
tuning" this issue may require company specific knowledge.
Considering the density of the data, maneuvering throught the CHAID models can
be a tedious task. However, it's greatest contribution may be in the overall perspective
gained by reviewing the detail, rather than the detail itself The patterns of response are
astonishingly consistent within both theoretical and intuitve parameters, providing
guideance to the researcher for teasing out intricacies in future work while sending strong
messages to the practitioner regarding the tone and direction for managing the
relationship.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This study has attempted to expand the understanding of franchising as well as
delineate and empirically support the antecedents of conflict in the franchisee-franchisor
relationship from the perspective of the franchisee. The literature review has been focus in
an attempt to focus on the definition of franchising, specifically to categorize the
organizational form and to rationalise the governance structure. The methodology is
designed to segment the franchisee population and reveal the intricacies of the correlations
with conflict which could affect decision making and consequently help form the
governance of the relationship.
The theoretical foundations of the study, specifically Transaction-cost Economics
and Pelational Exchange Theory, guide the study, and, when linked with the methodology,
are extended by the applications. The intricacies of franchisee motivations are studied in a
manner which focuses on the individual transaction but accepts the reality of correlation
among transactions. Thus, the transactional boundaries of the relationship are viewed as a
series of models which offer varied perspectives on conflict rather than individual and
possibly unrelated events.
Conclusions and recommendations are presented in several sections which
generally follow the chapter headings of the dissertation. This is done because there is a
wide range of literatures this study impacts.
7.2 MEASURING CONFLICT AND SEGMENTATION OF THE
FRANCHISEE POPULATION
We have spent considerable time in the development and explanation of
operationalising and scaling conflict through measuring satisfaction. Other researchers
have developed similar operationalisations but usually as linked to "job satisfaction" and
not a reflection of the relationship with the franchisor. However, it is useful to review
their work and explain both the extensions of and variances from the literature this study
contributes.
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Walker's (1971) mail survey of 319 franchisees was the first to examine franchisee
satisfaction, defined as a franchisee's general feeling toward his entire work situation.
Plative scaling (1-6 Likert scale of agreement) of satisfaction was operationalised as the
average of the response to two questions: 1.) indicate your overall feelings about your
present position; and 2.) describe your level of satisfaction as a franchisee.
The main findings of the study included the following: 1.) a majority of the
franchisees reported satisfaction of between 58.5% and 85%, depending on the specific
work environment; 2.) the most common sources of satisfaction were, being one's own
boss, and high income; 3.) the most common sources of dissatisfaction were poor financial
return, lack of franchisor support, and prospects oversold by the franchisor; 4.) the most
beneficial element of franchising was having trade name recognition or trade mark image;
5.) the most undesirable elements of franchising were the absence of continuing support
and excessive royalties.
Goodman's (1980) study surveyed non-food franchisees and examined franchisee-
franchisor conflicts of interest. Fifty-three percent of the sample did not perceive
significant conflicts of interest with their franchisor but forty-two percent were undecided.
Goodman's study reveals that 62% of franchisees reported being clearly satisfied with their
franchise and 15% dissatisfied. No report was made as to the status of the remaining
23%. Principal sources of dissatisfaction were lack of contractual fairness, low levels of
franchisor services, and inadequate income.
Also in 1980, Schul studied franchised real estate brokerage services and showed
that various dimensions of franchisee satisfaction were negatively affected with respondent
identified issues of conflict with the franchisor, specifically in the areas of franchisor
provided services, and fee structure. Additionally, he found that franchisee performance
(measured as annual pre-tax profit) was negatively affected by reported levels of conflict
with the franchisor.
Christenholz (1989) explored franchisee satisfaction in a picture framing franchise.
He attempted to relate franchisee satisfaction with economic success. He found no
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correlation. However, adequacy of controls in the license agreement did correlate to both
franchisee satisfaction and economic success.
Mayo, Robicheaux, and Ferrell (1989) conducted exploratory research, measuring
franchisee satisfaction with an eight-item scale that included earnings, growth, support and
personal relations items. The findings show a positive relationship between satisfaction
and 1.) fairness of the license agreement 2.) overall satisfaction with the franchise
relationship, 3.) experience relative to expectations and 4.) future development plans of
the franchisee. Variables most likely to produce disagreement with the franchisor were
advertising fees, product availability, territorial restrictions, and product restrictions.
The most recent study was conducted by the Gallup organisation in the U.S.
(Gallup, 1992). This was the largest study of its kind, with 994 franchisees interviewed
via telephone and sponsored by the franchisor organisation, the International Franchise
Association (IFA). The results suggest that: 1.) ninety-four percent of respondents
consider their franchise to be either very (47%) or somewhat (47%) successful; 2.) More
than 70% of the respondent's franchise experience either met or exceeded their
expectations with regard to their personal satisfaction (76%), and overall satisfaction
(73%). Franchisor support was reported as the variable least likely to have met franchisee
expectations (63%). When asked if they were satisfied with the franchisor, 79% of
respondents answered affirmatively. However, 25% of the respondents answered that
they would not invest in the franchise again.
Our study at times validates and sometimes refutes the results of these works, but
more importantly, is the first to focus principally on the relationship with the franchisor as
a source of conflict. Also, some methodological and theoretical weaknesses may affect
validity and generalisability of these studies which we believe have been, at least to some
degree, alleviated in this study. Satisfaction constructs were discussed only briefly and
validity and reliability data for the measures sometimes unreported (Gallup, 1992;
Goodman, 1980). Small sample sizes or only one franchise were used in some studies, or
no proof of samples representing the franchise population were offered (Christenholz,
1989; Schul, 1980; Hunt and Nevin, 1974; Mayo et a!, 1989). Importantly, segmentation
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of the population was achieved using the mean scoring of questions with no analysis of
statistical significance (Walker, 1971). Having described these deficiencies, the studies do
provide some grounded support for our results.
Walker's (1971) study is the first to attempt to measure franchisee satisfaction and
to point to franchisor provided services as a pivotal issue in the franchisee-franchisor
relationship as a source of conflict. Further he attempts to segment the population
generally as satisfied or not satisfied. Goodman's (1980) study was the first to reveal a
large percentage of franchisees as "undecided." We cluster cases on our conflict construct
and more specifically label the "ambivalent" group of franchisees. Schul (1980) also found
conflict to correlate with franchisor provided services, however, made no specific
delineation of those services. He also found a correlation between satisfaction and
financial return, which our data does not support. Christenholtz (1989) also found no
correlation between economic success and franchisee satisfaction. He made a tangential
finding regarding the license agreement and satisfaction, but no specific reference to
franchisor provided services. Mayo, Robicheaux and Ferrell's (1989) findings introduce
personal relations variables in scaling satisfaction and consequently fairness as a variable
involved in conflict, although the scale itself is heavily weighted in favour of financial and
economic variables, which we find to have less impact on conflict. Even with the Gallup
(1992) study's methodological weaknesses (the vested interest support of the WA and
potential interviewer bias), the 25% of respondents who would not again invest in the
franchise is similar to our angry cluster of franchisees who would not be a part of the
franchise if it were up to them.
Our contribution to the literature includes a sound methodology in the
development of the conflict construct (use of the appropriate correlation matrix and
presenting both pilot and main study data on validity and reliability) and in presenting a
theoretically and statistically sound clustering of the cases on the construct. Additionally,
we extend the measure to segmentation of the population using the appropriate statistical
application (SPSS CHAID), allowing us to develop predictive as well as descriptive
models of conflict in the franchisee-franchisor relationship. These models provide a useful
207
platform for further academic research and a pathway to greater inter-organisational
efficiency for the practitioner.
Validating and assessing a measure of conflict in franchising is an advancement of
the literature. By measuring conflict, a base line is established from which antecedents are
measured. Also, future research can attempt to duplicate, refine and expand the
experiment. The conflict construct forms a spectrum of franchisee satisfaction,
ambivalence and anger. The difference between satisfaction, ambivalence and anger, as
measured by distance from the global mean, is striking. The ability to manage the
relationship better and move franchisees from the angry to ambivalent and ambivalent to
satisfied clusters is evident in the data. The conflict literature explains that destructive
conflict occurs and the commercial relationship breached when a party to the relationship
sees the costs of continuing the relationship exceeding the benefits. The satisfied cluster
group member sees the action of the franchisor and agrees with those action. The
ambivalent and angry cluster members see franchisor action and disagree. Also, the result
of the action by the franchisor in the angry cluster is retained anger and a desire to exit the
relationship. The ambivalent cluster member has less retained anger and desires to remain
in the franchise relationship. Theory explains that a commercial relationship builds anger
or trust over a series of transactions between the participants. The conflict cluster
groupings appear to form a spectrum. Theoretically, the franchisee places himself
somewhere on the spectrum immediately upon entering the relationship and moves along
the spectrum as transactions with the franchisor occur. The franchisee perceives these
transactions as positive or negative, which moves the franchisee toward greater
satisfaction or greater anger. There is a highly sensitive response by franchisees to the
actions of the franchisor, which effects the franchisee's position on the spectrum. The
danger in franchising is that the ambivalent cluster group members move toward the angry
cluster over time. The reverse, of course, is the opportunity to motivate satisfied cluster
group membership among the ambivalent franchisees and to move the angry franchisees
into at least ambivalence, where they tend to want to stay in the relationship.
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The percentage of franchisees in each cluster is important. The three clusters are
almost equally divided. With almost a third of the franchisees angry, the reported high
level of litigation in franchising (Wall Street Journal, 1994) is understandable.
Quantification of the problem, the percentage of franchisees who are angry, establishes a
general scope of the tasks required to ameliorate the conflict. Therefore, having
established the nature and extent of the problem, the models of the antecedents of conflict
focuses the analysis on the detail of the problem.
The practical nature of using these models to influence cluster group membership
is also evident. The next section begins with a discussion of the major findings from the
Cl-LAID modelling and then discusses the practical implications.
7.3 EXPANSION OF THE EMERGING FRANCHISE LITERATURE
Using divergent literatures franchising is established as an inter organizational form
by this study. Our empirical work clearly illustrates that franchisees see the relationship
cooperative in nature and coordinated as a requirement in a dynamic set of transactional
boundaries. Also clear is that franchising is a relational exchange but not at the extreme of
the spectrum. Plational exchange goals describe a cautious franchisee partner. We
believe this supports the definition of franchising as an inter-organisational form. This is
an important step in the continuing evolution and development of a franchise literature.
Previously, franchising has been viewed, and studied, by many scholars as a hierarchy.
The hierarchial perspective is promulgated by both the Agency theorists and a formal
legalistic approach. The various Cl-LAID models developed in this study exhibit an
interdependent set of processes. It is clear that interdependent processes of this nature are
required of the inter-organizational form (Muris, 1981). In our view the franchise
literature under- emphasizes the interdependencies which this study emphatically models
as essential in franchising. Also, the hierarchial perspective tends to underestimate the role
of the franchisee in the management of the system. Hierarchy is its own court of last
appeal and therefore a hierarchial perspective of franchising requires the franchisee to
undertake decision making processes which presume an inferior strategic position. Strict
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legal interpretations of the relationship grant the franchisor pre-emptive contractual rights
which lever franchising into a hierarchy. If the franchisor has the absolute contractual
right to terminate a franchisee then the franchisor is the court of last appeal and thus
franchising is a hierarchy. Grossly diverse legal environments within the United States and
around the world and legal precedent clearly evolving toward greater equity in the
relationship deny the validity of the strict legal perspective.
Choice of organizational form is imperative to optimise outcome (Hambrick,
1989). Logically then, it is imperative to properly define the organizational form for
franchising. This allows for a research agenda with focused perspectives, specifically in
governance and the consequent influence strategies. For the practitioner, a better
understanding of the organizational form enhances the rational model of strategic decision
making. The consequence will be enhanced inter-organizational performance.
7.4 FRANCHISEE GOALS AND CONFLICT IN THE FRANCHISEE-
FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHiP
The literature is replete with studies on cooperation. This study clearly reveals
that cooperation is essential to gaining franchisee satisfaction. Also, there is a path to
cooperation which is outlined by the franchisee. This path illustrates the detailed route of
problem solving (reducing conflict in the relationship) that the franchisees require of the
franchisor. Specifically, coordination of activities designed to build the trade mark leads
to a feeling of cooperation which then maintains satisfaction. The reduction in conflict is
exhibited by definable movements of franchisees from the angry cluster to the ambivalent
and satisfied cluster groups. Otherwise stated, coordination, cooperation, and
commitment are linear correlations and positively correlate with satisfaction.
Smith, Carroll, and Ashford (1995) use an interesting historical anecdote about 20
Greek cities in 448 B.C. who allied to defeat the larger and more powerftil Persian empire.
The focus of the battle would be on the ocean. The Greek cities use of smaller ships and
ramming techniques required a high degree of training to create speed and synchronization
of movements. The Greeks attributed their ultimate success to the initial cooperation
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among the cities and eventual coordination among the ships' crews. Additionally, this
initial concept of cooperation and coordination became a template for the flowering of
Greek culture with its vast contributions to civilization. It is in this tradition that the
findings of this study are an important guide for franchise management and development.
Understanding and following the path to coordination and cooperation will establish a
highly satisfied franchisee body. Allocation of resources to functions which support and
enhance cooperation and coordination will reduce anger and yield greater productivity.
A closer review of the literature reveals a progressive examination of cooperation
in management. Barnard (1939) viewed the business organization as a system of
cooperative efforts and coordinated activities. Mayo's (1945) work focused on the
interaction between workers and management. He discovered that workers felt a high
social need to coordinate with management which lead to cooperation in work flow and
acceptance by workers of management decisions. Fayo (1949) wrote extensively on the
functions of management and included coordination as one of the five key elements of
successful management. Although he did not place the same emphasis on cooperation, it
was included as an antecedent of coordination. Interdependence within organizations
follows in the chronology of the development of the literature on cooperation and
coordination. Thompson (1967) outlines a variety of pathways which organizations
develop to achieve coordination and cooperation within firms. Lorsch and Lawrence
(1969) followed Thompson's (1967) work by linking the strength and depth of these
pathway to organizational performance measures. This lends support to the conclusion
that a franchisor who follows the path of coordination and cooperation will develop a
more productive franchise system. It also addresses the value of the multiple CHAID
models developed in this study which form greater depth of pathways to franchisee
satisfaction. Following these pathways theoretically gives the franchisor ample
opportunity to enhance system performance.
Current literature takes the lead of Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) in describing the
detailed relationship between antecedents and outcome variables. Cooperation as a
prerequisite for an organization's competitive success through innovation is the clear
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conclusion of a 1990 study by Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector. The individual organization
as the unit of analysis has been the predominate form of study. The organizational
development literature has in recent years given rise to a number of definitions for
emerging organizational forms. The network organization (Powell, 1990), the virtual
organization (Davidow and Malone, 1992), the horizontal organization, (Byrne, 1993),
and the self-managed task team (Manz and Sims, 1993), all rely heavily on cooperation as
the foundation for success within their organizational form. However, there is little
written about the cause and effect of coordination and cooperation with partners using the
inter-organizational form as the unit of analysis. While the literature has concluded that
coordination and cooperation is important to organizational satisfaction, this study
illustrates that jjr organizational coordination and cooperation is an important ingredient
for satisfaction.
This study uses satisfaction as a surrogate for conflict. The work on cooperation
and conflict is less rich but still informative. Thomas (1992) found that cooperating
parties within organizations had less conflict and better performance results. Thompson's
(1967) study assumed that cooperation led to coordination and therefore better
performance. He found, based on these assumptions, that high levels of cooperation
correlate to higher levels of harmony among task participants within organizations. This
study does not presume, but finds, that cooperation and coordination are intimately linked.
Empirically supported models of franchisee conflict clearly illustrate that coordination and
cooperation cannot be decoupled without affecting satisfaction.
Until recently, cooperation was typically defined as individuals, groups, or
organizations concentrating on jointly followed processes in the formation of an alliance
for mutual gain (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford, 1995). Ring and Van de Yen (1994)
importantly extend that definition to include a willingness to continue the relationship.
Equally important is their conclusion that the continuing nature of cooperation requires a
constant re-evaluation and reshaping of the relationship to ensure cooperation and,
therefore, maintenance of the relationship. The series of CHAID models developed in this
study endorse Ring and Van de Ven' s (1994) definition by portraying the adjustments that
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cause the reshaping. Because these models are both descriptive and predictive, they
provide a guide to managing the relationship which is theoretically supported and practical
in their application.
From the variables which explain franchisee perceptions of coordination, it appears
that marketing has a key role. A franchisor marketing department which serves to
continuously perform marketing research and deliver findings at the local level to be used
in the implementation of advertising plans, will be seen by franchisees as well coordinated.
7.5 FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES AND TILE TOLERANCE ZONE
A primary tenet of transaction-cost analysis is that the nature of the transactions
between exchange partners defines the efficient boundaries of an organisation and
therefore the appropriate governance structure (Williamson, 1979). Williamson (1981)
points to transaction uncertainty, frequency, and specificity in his definition of appropriate
governance.
We find the inter-organisational form, or at least franchising as a single case
representation, is likewise bounded. That is, neither franchisor or franchisee has unlimited
resources available to monitor the transactions in the relationship. Therefore, neither party
has complete information regarding the action of the other party to the relationship.
Monitoring is necessary to assure partner opportunism, the extra-contractual seeking of
exchange advantage, is limited. Aichian and Woodward (1988) argue that calculating the
exact cost of transactions is impractical. This study accepts that argument but believes
that the perspective of the exchange party to therelative transactions is calculable and
useftil in the governance process. Additionally, inter-organisational structural differences
can be explained in terms of these relative transaction costs (Ouchi, 1972). Williamson
(1981) termed limited resources for monitoring transactions as "bounded rationality" and
argues for limiting the range of transaction contingencies between exchange partners as a
way of efficiently utilising resources. Franchising employs a contract (license agreement)
to allocate and define the inter-organisational transaction responsibilities and therefore act
as the limiting agent. Our findings disclose a highly discrete set of acceptable performance
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variables which suggests an empirically supported, franchisee described, boundary of
transaction efficiency. This rationalised transactional boundary, operationalised in this
study through scoring both importance and adequacy of franchisor provided services, is
linked to perceived efficiency via correlation with the conflict construct. There is a
definable (and modeled) pattern of correlation between franchisee perception of franchisor
transactional performance and cluster group membership. Understanding the issue of
resource scarcity, this model contextualises the transactions relative to other transactions
and to conflict. That is, absolute scoring of a variable on the Likert scale is only important
relative to other variable scores and to its correlation with conflict. We call this relative
scaling and establishment of transactional boundaries, within which franchisee satisfaction
as an exchange partner with the franchisor is achieved, the 'tolerance zone."
Cooperation can occur in at least two forms, formal and informal (Smith, Carroll,
and Ashford, 1995). This is underscored in our findings and supported by our analysis of
franchisor provided services. Not only does this study outline an informal structure of
cooperation, it is the first to discover and empirically support the nature and boundaries of
the cooperative system in franchising. Having defined franchisor provided services as the
key transactional points of interaction between the franchisee and franchisor, and then
developed a model of cooperation between the parties that establishes transactional
boundaries within which a spectrum of satisfaction ambivalence and anger manifests;
"franchise tolerance zone." It is the transactional space within which harmony and
efficiency is achieved because coordination and cooperation is seen in the context of
specific business objectives. That is, the best ways to maintain and build trade mark value
in a manner which satisfies the franchisee and induces a greater desire to maintain the
relationship. Enhanced productive benefits as a result of a lasting and harmonious
relationship are assumed.
Additionally, Browning, Beyer, and Shetler (1995) note that cooperation at any
level must ultimately be reduced to cooperation between individuals. The "players" in the
franchise tolerance zone, when reduced to the individuals, are most commonly the
franchisee and the franchisor's field personnel. Field personnel are the employees in the
214
franchisor support system who are charged with delivering many franchisor services
(Justis and Judd, 1989). The role of these individuals should be more coordination than
simply the delivery of services. Communicating the franchisor's position on any given
issue and then accepting input and feedback from the franchisee is a critical role. Our
models indicate that it is 	 critical responsibility of the field support personnel in
franchising. The informal adjustments in the relationship suggested by this model can be
refined by the dynamic organisation to become process oriented. Thus, incremental
changes become continuous and relationship breach less probable. The detailed process of
incremental change as described in the tolerance zone, which induces movement toward
greater franchisee satisfaction, are a valid contribution to the management literature.
Linkages between the pathways described in the tolerance zone model and higher levels of
perceived coordination are evident. Three of the four nodes spawned by the predictor
variable which scores the level of coordination in the relationship are explained by the
adequacy of franchisor services. Only the coordination score=3, or neutral, is explained
by franchise system affiliation. Explanation of the first node, coordination score=1,2,
comes from the adequacy of advice regarding inventory. The franchisor need only be
perceived as neutral (or better) in delivering advice on inventory to dramatically reduce
conflict. Adequate delivery of marketing information and analysis explains coordination
node=4. Again, the franchisor need only be scored as neutral regarding adequacy to
profoundly reduce conflict, as the satisfied cluster membership changes from 23% to 51%.
The highest scoring of coordination, '5' is explained by the adequacy of access to the
franchisor. There is no statistically significant difference between adequacy of access to
the franchisor scoring 1-4. However, if the franchisor is scored '5' for this variable, the
satisfied cluster reaches 90% Interestingly, this access is explained by the adequacy of
advice regarding local advertising cooperatives. Once more the franchisor only needs a
neutral score or better to achieve 71% satisfied cluster membership. Franchisees do not
have unreasonable expectations regarding the necessary steps to coordinate the
relationship on its most basic level. Also important in the interpretation of this variable is
that services which explain coordination are delivered by the field personnel. Even the
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adequacy of access to franchisor management is explained by a service delivered on the
local level. However, it should be noted that achievement of the highest scoring for access
to franchisor management has no explanatory independent variable.
Understanding the tolerance zone equips the franchisor with a pathway to
managing franchisee satisfaction in a resource scarce environment. Resources can be
applied in amounts appropriate to rationalise both strategic decisions and franchisee
satisfaction. Franchisor performance within the tolerance zone will ameliorate the need
for monitoring, reduce strict contractual interpretation and, therefore, necessarily increase
efficiency. The bounded rationality of the franchisees, the tolerance zone, can be met with
the bounded action of the franchisor, the allocation of scarce resources. This is the first
attempt to empirically define transaction-cost economics' bounded rationality in an inter-
organisational form.
Much in the literature discusses the dichotomous reality of conflict in p4
continued growth of franchising. One explanation of this phenomenon is franchisor
dynamic movement into and out of the tolerance zone.
A number of studies have concluded that franchisor support is an important aspect
of the relationship and that there is a delicate balance among support for franchisees,
franchisee independence, and franchisee satisfaction (Withane, 1991; Schul, 1980;
Goodman, 1980; Walker, 1971). We believe that transaction-cost analysis provides the
appropriate guidance, and our findings support, prioritisation and responsibility allocation
of transactions. Franchisees want cooperation and coordination in fulfilling their
entrepreneurial ambitions. Low levels of satisfaction manifest because cooperation and
coordination, specifically related to delineated franchisor provided services, not because of
unfulfilled need for independence.
7.6 PERCEIVED EXIT COSTS AND TRADE MARK VALUATION
Conflict significantly impacts the franchisee-franchisor relationship at both the firm
and system levels (Zeller, Achabel, and Brown, 1980). Our scaling of conflict and the
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subsequent clustering of cases indicates that when conflict becomes endemic in the
franchisees, there is a desire to exit the relationship.
Because our results indicate overall angry cluster membership of 29%, the role of
perceived exit costs as a structural constraint is important. This group of angry franchisees
may have a greater inclination to exit the relationship. Terminating the relationship may
obsolete the transaction specific assets. The obsolescence of transaction specific assets has
also been called irretrievable investments, represented by the expenditures of resources,
time, and effort, sacrifice, shared possessions, pledges, and public announcements that are
lost if the relationship is ended (Lund, 1985). Ping and Dwyer (1988) developed the
notion of switching costs, the economic and psychic costs of terminating the current
relationship. They argue that the existence of switching costs creates exit barriers and
perceptually render alternatives as less attractive. Our findings indicate that commitment
to the franchise is more relational than structural for franchisees. This conclusion is drawn
from the scoring of psychic exit costs. Franchisees have indicated that much of what is
thought to be transaction specific activity undertaken to build the trademark can be
transferred to the establishment of a new trademark. Even though lost customer goodwill
is scored high, operating procedures, employee training, and increased marketing budget
score low as exit barriers. Parenthetically, most franchises, and all those who participated
in this study, require all manuals, including training, operations, and marketing, to be
returned to the franchisor upon termination of the license agreement. Franchisees
internalise this information, thus allowing retrieval of the investment.
Franchisors may be well advised to invest in highly sophisticated methods of
information development and retrieval which take full advantage of the scale economies,
such as point of sale computing with proprietary software which integrates accounting and
management information systems, and video training devices which reach beyond the
franchisees to their employees and therefore cannot be completely internalised by the
franchisee.
Analysis of the exit cost factors, and factor loading, reveals that franchisees see the
value of the trade mark, and the subsequent customer goodwill, as a byproduct of the
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operations program. They do not appear to link marketing and trade mark value. Indeed,
one of the most surprising results of this study is that franchisees don't generally have an
opinion of the market value of their trade mark. This would seem to blur the value of the
franchise, specifically as opposed to a stand alone operation. This finding is important to
the franchisor because 1) the proper allocation of the productive benefits is difficult to
reconcile if the end value (sale and capital gain by the franchisee) is not recognised by the
franchisee and 2) the purpose of the franchise alliance is to build the trade mark value and
if franchisees are not measuring their success in a long term perspective (i.e., long term
value of the franchise as represented by the cash flow generated by the trade mark or
through sale of the franchisee firm) a major reason for franchising is not optimised.
7.7 SUMMARY OF KEY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PRACTITIONERS
This study delivers a strong message of caution to those who practice franchising.
With almost 30% of franchisees angry and prone to exiting the relationship, and an equally
large percentage of ambivalent franchisees, many franchise companies could be in peril.
Even with most license agreements clearly favouring the franchisor, enforcement of the
contract is costly and further deteriorates relationships. However, optimism can be
derived from the empirically demonstrated dynamic nature of franchisee attitudes.
Cooperation and process oriented coordination will enhance franchisee satisfaction. These
processes should be prefaced with the recognition by both parties that the franchise
relationship is formed to achieve specific business goals and is an alliance, not a
hierarchial organisational form. A perplexing result of this study is the overwhelming lack
of quantification of trade mark value on both a market and accounting basis. The
overarching rationale for the franchise alliance is development, maintenance, and
enhancement of the trade mark. This crucial point is only obliquely understood by
franchisees. In the development of processes to coordinate decision making, franchise
partners will be well served to define, reiterate, and measure goals for the trade mark.
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The "tolerance zone" is an understandable set of criteria for franchisor fulfilment of
obligations in a dynamic environment. Most striking in the models of franchisor provided
services is the clearly outlined path to franchisee satisfaction which appears to be
reasonable and therefore should be within franchisor management capabilities. We
recommend that processes established to ensure coordinated effort include a periodic
assessment of the tolerance zone.
Although there are implicit efficiencies in having a cooperative relationship with
franchisees, the models illustrate diminishing returns for allocation of resources to gain
franchisee satisfaction beyond certain core levels. That is, there appears to be a small core
of both perpetually satisfied and chronically angry franchisees. In the 19 models and 219
nodes only once is 100% satisfaction achieved. However, it is evident that reducing anger
to between 10-15% (half of the overall current level) and satisfaction to 60-70% (double
the current level) is achievable.
7.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The two principal limitations of the study are: 1) the data is limited to nine
franchise systems. Although 621 respondents are included, the universe of franchisees is
much larger and broader than represented in our sample and 2) Our analysis centres on
individual variables and draws them together through inference. Future research should
advance the propositions through hypothesis testing.
7.8 FUTURE RESEARCH
This research is ground breaking work in the study of franchising, making a
theoretically driven comprehensive analysis of conflict in the franchisee-franchisor
relationship. The stages of conflict, as revealed in the three distinct clusters of franchisees,
present a complete spectrum of the relationship. Thus, the insights into the relationship
span the entire spectrum of inter-organisational involvement. This study has developed
fertile ground for further research. The research question answer and propositions present
rich prospects for hypothesis testing. When linked, they describe a process of behavioural
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interactions which prescribe the potential for, and likelihood of, all of the stages of conflict
in the relationship. Theory has provided guidance for pursuing specific issues in the
relationship to propose, then support or deny certain propositions. The next
methodologically sound step is to use the supported propositions to derive hypotheses.
Through the use of structural equation modelling (SEM) we can continue the development
and refinement of the models examined empirically in this study. SEM allows for the
specification of regression structure among the latent variables in the model. The latent
variables are represented by their manifest variables, e.g., "conflict" as measured by the
four item construct. SEM reveals features of the latent variables that generate the
observed variables. With SEM we can present the latent variable models as hypotheses
and test their goodness of fit with the sample data. Therefore, we can confirm the
reliability and validity of the measures of conflict developed in this study with
confirmatory factor analysis. Thus, we develop a measurement model. There are a
number of latent variables stated or implied in this work, such as solidarity, mutuality, role
integrity, goal perspectives, and franchise tolerance. All of these latent variables can be
tested and confirmed in SEM.
Additionally, we can test the many causal models inferred by the CHAID analysis.
That is, we can test the assumptions drawn from our analysis of the results in Chapter 6
about the causality among the variables. We would be capable of developing a
comprehensive and "best" model which draws together the research question and three
propositions and explains the direct and latent variables at work in franchisee-franchisor
conflict.
Because the franchisee-franchisor is a highly dynamic relationship, a longitudinal
study would be interesting and informative. When the data files are recombined (study
and test files) a comprehensive CT-LAID analysis indicates that age of the franchise
organisation impacts conflict. Longitudinal studies could come in the form of recurring
surveys of targeted franchise inter-organisations or a representative event history analysis
targeting a significant relational event such as litigation or license agreement termination.
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APPENDIX I	 QUESTIONNAIRE
THE FRANCHISEE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRANCHISOR
THE MANAGEMENT SCHOOL
IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MEDICINE
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
LONDON, ENGLAND
The aim of this survey is to provide a greater understanding of the relationship between the franchisor and its
franchisees - from the view of the franchisee.
Data gathered from this survey will be treated with STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY and presented only in a
summary form without the name or affiliation of the respondent.
Would you like to receive a summary of the results from this survey?
NOEl YESE]
If yes, please write the name and address of the person you wish to receive the summary:
c Stephen Spinelli, Jr, Management School, Imperial College, University of London, 1993
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I. THE FRANCHISEE FIRM
This section is about you and your company and are neededfor class fying responses. ALL REPLIES ARE
CONFIDENTIAL.
I. How many territories do you currently operate?
___________	
territoiy(ies)
2. What year did you sign your franchise license agreement?
19
3. Have you ever owned another franchise?
NO[] YES[]
4. How many new territories will you develop in the next 5 years?
_____________ territoiy(ies)
5. Do you plan to purchase other existing territories in your franchise system?
NO[] YES[ I if yes, _________ potential territories
6. What is your position with the company? ________________________
7. How long have you held this position? _________ years
8. Your previous position (in this firm or previous employment)
9. How many years have you been involved in franchising?
______years with this firm ______years with other firms
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II. THE FRANCHISEE - FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHIP
Below are four statements about goals which ma'y be important to afranchise business at various stages of its
development. It is likely afranchisee will have a number of important goals at any given time, but ills unlikely
that all will be equally important.
Please rate the relative importance at this tune of each of the following goals describing the FRANCHISEE-
FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHIP for your particular franchise outlet(s). Please circle the appropriate number, 1
through 5. "1" is Unimportant, "5" is Very Important.
NOT	 VERY
IMPORTANT	 IMPORTANT
10. At this point in time,
developing a more cooperative
relationship with your
franchisor is relatively	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
11. Compared with other goals, given
current business conditions,
improving communications and
information sharing between
franchisee and franchisor is
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
12. Relative to other goals,
at this time, better coordinated
franchisee-franchisor
quality assurance is	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
13. Weighted against other goals,
strengthening the mutual
commitment between your
franchisor and you is
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
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5
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5
5
5
5
5
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III. FRANCHISOR PROVIDED SERVICES
14. How important are the following FRANCHISOR PROViDED SERVICES in helping you achieve your GOAlS.
The two scales below measure the importance of the service to you and the adequacy ofthefranchisor in providing
that service. Please circle the appropriate number on both of the 1 through 5 scales shown on the right and left of each
question.
NOT	 MOST
	
NOT	 MOST
IMPORTANT	 IMPORTANT
	
ADEQUATE	 ADEQUATE
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234
	
5
1234	 5
Programs and procedures for training employees............1
Training in accounting and record keeping ...............
Trainingin management skills .........................I
Provision of fmancial assistance and credit ...............1
Adviceon fmancial management .......................
Developing new products and services ..................
Promoting new products and services ...................
Effectivenational advertising ..........................
Market information (consumer research,local market
analysis) .......................................
Organizing local coops for advertising and promotion .......
Access to franchisor management ......................
Provision of standardized equipment ....................
Toact as a supplier of products ........................
Adviceon management problems ......................
Adviceon inventoly control ...........................
Clearly defined procedures for operating the franchise ......
Resolving disagreements and complaints quickly, eagerly and
fairly.............................................
Supportin new store development ......................
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IV. THE FRANCHISEES VIEW OF THE CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRANCHISOR
15. Below are thirteen statements describing the nature of the on-going interaction between the franchisee and
franchisor For each statement please circle the number on the I through 5 DISAGREE-AGREE Scale.
DISAGREE	 AGREE
My relationship with the franchisor is best described
as "arms length" than a cooperation of effort ........................1
	 2
The franchisor is just another supplier of products and/or services .......1
	 2
My relationship with the franchisor is generally well coordinated
and there is an expectation that the relationship will continue in
thelongrun.................................................1
	 2
The relationship between our organization and the franchisor is extremely
complicated being comprised of many diverse expectations about each
othersbehavior ...............................................1
	 2
The relationship with the franchisor involves many different
areas of commercial activity beyond buying and selling product .........1
	
2
The relationship with the franchisor created a complex
web of expectations between us over all kinds of issues ...............1
	 2
Our organization assures itself that the franchisor acts as we
expect by precisely monitoring their activities and performance .........1
	 2
The franchisor closely monitors our sales to assure the proper
royaltyis paid ................................................1	 2
Terms of the License Agreement are specified precisely and understood by
bothparties..................................................1
	 2
Our organization feels the same way about the franchisor before and after any
dispute..................................................1
	 2
Our organization has retained anger toward the franchisor because of past
disputes....................................................1 	 2
If it was up to me we would not be a part of the franchise system any
longer......................................................1
	 2
If I was the franchisor I would act in the same way as the franchisor does
now........................................................1
	 2
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3
	
4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3
	
4	 5
3
	
4	 5
3
	
4	 5
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V. INVESTMENT IN THE FRANCHISE
This sec lion addresses your investment in the franchise relationship.
DISAGREE	 AGREE
16. If! left the franchisor I would spend a lot of effort converting
thestore..................................................1
	 2
17. If I left the franchisor I would have to spend a lot of time, money
and effort to set up alternative suppliers ..........................1
	 2
18.Terminating my license agreement would involve considerable
legalexpense ..............................................1
	 2
19.Terminating the license agreement would cost my company time, money
andcustomer goodwill ......................................1
	 2
20. The costs involved in exiting the franchise relationship would probably
behigh...................................................1
	 2
21. I have personally invested a lot of time and effort in the relationship
withthe franchisor ..........................................1
	 2
22. A lot of the company's energy, time, and effort have gone into building
and maintaining the relationship with the franchisor ...............1
	 2
23. Much of the company's investment with the franchisor is unique to
therelationship ............................................1
	 2
24. Terminating my license agreement will increase my marketing
budget...................................................1	 2
25. Ending my relationship with the franchisor will increase my training
costs.....................................................1 	 2
26. Ending my relationship with the franchisor will require modification
ofthe operating procedures ...................................1	 2
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3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
3	 4	 5
[]$30,00l-50,000
[1 $110,001-130,000
[]$190,001-210,000
[]$300,00l-350,000
[]$600,00l-700,000
[]$50,001-70,000
[]$130,001-150,000
[1 $2 10,001-230,000
[1 $350,00 1-400,000
[]$700,00l-800,000
VI. FINANCIAL INFORMATION:
This informaton is needed to c1assii' your answers and to make an assessment of the financial relationship between
you and the franchisor.
27. What is your company's sales mthe 12 months ended Dec. 31,1992?
[1 S0-50,000	 [I $50,001-100,000	 [1 S100,00l-250,000
[]$250,001-500,000	 []$500,001-750,000 	 [JS750,001-1,000,000
[]S1,000,001-1,500,000	 []$1,500,001-2,000,000	 []$2,000,001-2,500,000
[]$2,500,001-3,000,000 	 [] $3,000,001-3,500,000 	 []$3,500,001-4,000,000
[] $4,000,001-4,500,000	 [I $4,500,001-5,000,000	 [I S5,000,001-5,500,000
[]S5,500,001-7,500,000	 []$7,500,001-10,000,000 	 [lOVER $10,000,000
28. What are your annual fixed expense per outlet?
	
[]$1,000-1O,000	 []$10,001-30,000
[]$70,001-90,000 []$90,001-1 10,000
[]$150,001-170,000 []S170,001-190,000
[]$230,001-250,000 []$250,001-300,000
[]$400,001-500,000 [1 $500,00l-600,000
[]OVER $800,000
29. What are your variable expense per unit of product or service for each $ of sales?
[] 1-10%	 [] 11-15%	 [] 16-20%	 [] 21-25%
[] 26-30%	 [131-35%	 [] 36-40%	 [] 41-45%
[] 46-50%	 [] 5 1-55%	 [] 56-60%	 [1 61-65%
[] 66-70%	 [] OVER7O%
30. What is your profit margin per unit of service or product for each $ of sales?
	
[1 0- 1%	 []2-4%	 [15-7%
	
[1 11 - 13%	 [] 14-16%	 [] 17-19%
	
[1 23 -25%	 [126-28%	 [129-31%
	
[]35-37%	 []38_40%	 []OVER4O%
[18-10%
[120-22%
[J32-34%
31. What is your promotions expense for eveiy pound of sales?
[1 0 - 1%	 []2-4%	 []5-7%
[] 11-13%	 [114-16%	 [] 17-19%
[1 23-25%	 [1 26-28%	 [129-31%
[]35-37%	 []38-40%	 []OVER4O%
[]8-l0%
[1 20-22%
[]32-34%
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32. The value of being a part of a franchise company can be descnbed in many ways. We are looking at both the value
as recorded on your balance sheet	 the portion of value in your business you think the "market" would pay you for
being a part of a franchise system versus being a stand alone business. Please fill in a value under both of these
headings.
"Balance Sheet"
	 "Market"
Customer Goodwill (trademark, franchise rights)
33. The primary product you sell:_______________________________
THANK YOU HELPING TO IMPROVE THE FRANCHTSEE-FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHIP
VII. OPTIONAL COMMENTS
If there are additional issues or perspectives you believe are important please use the space below to comment. Your
input has served to help build a greater understanding of franchising and is appreciated.
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APPENDIX II	 KEY TO STUDY VANABLES
Table 11.1	 Key to Study Variables
Variable Name
	 Variable Label
	 Full Description
adacct	 Adequacy of training in accounting	 Adequacy of training in accounting
and record keeping.
adcrdt	 Adequacy of financial 	 Adequacy in providing financial
assistance/credit	 assistance and credit.
adequip
adfair
Adequacy of equipment provision
Adequacy of disagreements
resolution
Adequacy of provision of
standardized equipment.
Adequacy of resolving disagreements
and complaints quickly, eagerly, and
fairly.
adfinma Adequacy of advice on financial
management
Adequacy of advice on financial
management.
adinv
adlclad
admgmt
Adequacy of inventory control advice Adequacy of advice on inventoiy
control.
Adequacy of local coops organizing
	 Adequacy of organizing local coops
for advertising and promotion.
Adequacy of training in management Adequacy of training in management
skills	 skills.
adnikinf	 Adequacy of market	 Adequacy of market information
information/analysis	 (consumer research, local market
analysis).
adnaf	 Adequacy of national advertising
adnewd	 Adequacy of new store development
support
adnwpr	 Adequacy of new product/service
development
Adequacy in effective national
advertising.
Adequacy of support in new store
development.
Adequacy of developing new
products and services.
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Variable Name
	
Variable Label
	 Full Description
adops Adequacy of operating procedures Adequacy of clearly defined
procedures for operating the
franchise.
adprob
adprom
adsuply
adtrain
adzorm
Adequacy of management problems
advice
Adequacy new product/service
promotion
Adequacy as a supplier of products
Adequacy of training
Adequacy of access to management
What is the adequacy of advice on
management problems?
Adequacy of promoting new products
and services.
Adequacy of the franchisor to act as a
supplier of products.
Adequacy of programs and
procedures for training employees.
Adequacy of access to franchisor
management.
qiouts	 How many terntories do you operate? How many territories do you
currently operate?
q21_a	 What year did you sign your
	 What year did you sign your
agreement?	 franchise license agreement?
q3prezee	 Have you ever owned another 	 Have you ever owned another
franchise?	 franchise?
q4newte
q5dev
q6title
q7yrsjob
q8prejob
How many new teintories next five
years?
Plan to purchase existing territories?
What is your company position?
How long have you held this
position?
What was your previous position
How many new territories will you
develop in the next five years?
Do you plan to purchase other
existing territories in your franchise
system?
What is your position with the
company?
How long have you held this position
(in years).
Your previous position (in this firm
or previous employment).
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Variable Name	 Variable Label
	 Full Descnption
q9yrszee	 How many years in franchising?
	 How many years have you been
involved in franchising?
qi Ocoop A more cooperative relationship At this point in time, developing a
more cooperative relationship with
your franchisor is relatively
qi lcomm	 Improvmg communicationslmfo	 Compared with other goals, given
sharing	 current business conditions,
improving communications and
infoimation sharing between
franchisee and franchisor is...
qi 2qual	 Improving coordinated quality
	 Relative to other goals, at this time
assurance	 better coordinated franchisee-
franchisor quality assurance is...
ql3comit	 Strengthening mutual commitment	 Weighted against other goals,
strengthening the mutual
commitment between your franchisor
and you is
ql4acct	 Importance of training and 	 Importance of training in accounting
accounting	 and record keeping.
qI 4crdt	 Importance of fmancial assistance 	 Importance of provision of financial
and credit	 assistance and credit.
ql4equip	 Importance of provision of
standardized equipment
ql4fair	 Importance of resolving
disagreements fairly
qI 4fmma
ql4inv
qi 4lclad
Importance of advice on fmancial
management
Importance of advice on inventoiy
control
Importance of organizing local coops
for advertising
Importance of provision of
standardized equipment.
Importance of resolving
disagreements quickly/fairly.
Importance of advice on fmancial
management.
Importance of advice on inventoxy
control.
Importance of organizing local coops
for advertising and promotion.
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Variable Name
	
Variable Label	 Full Description
ql4mgmt	 Importance of training in	 Importance of training in
management skills	 management skills.
ql4mkinf	 Importance of market information &
	 Importance of market information
analysis	 (consumer research, local market
analysis).
ql4naf
qi 4newd
ql4nwpr
ql4ops
qi 4prob
qi 4prom
ql4suply
Importance of effective national
advertising
Importance of support in new store
development
Importance of developing new
products and services
Importance of clearly defined
operating procedures
Importance if advice on management
problems
Importance of promoting new
products and services
Importance of supplying product or
services
Importance of effective national
advertising.
Importance of support in new store
development
Importance of developing new
products and services.
Importance of clearly defined
procedures for operating the
franchise.
Importance of advice on management
problems.
Importance of promoting new
products and services.
Importance of franchisor to act as a
supplier of products.
ql4train
ql4zorm
ql 5expct
Importance of training employees
Importance of access to franchisor
management
Complicated by diverse expectations
Importance of programs and
procedures for training employees.
Importance of access to franchisor
management.
The relationship between our
organization and the franchisor is
extremely complicated being
comprised of many diverse
expectations about each other's
behavior.
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Variable Name
	
Variable Label	 Full Description
qI 5angr	 Organization angiy about past	 Our organization has retained anger
disputes	 toward the franchisor because of past
disputes.
ql5arms Best described as 'arms length' My relationship with the franchisor is
best described as "arms length" than
a cooperation of efforl
ql5bynd Many areas beyond buy/sell product The relationship with the franchisor
involves many different areas of
commercial activity beyond buying
and selling product.
qi 5cmplx
ql5coor
ql Sjust
qI 51_a
ql Smonit
ql5noze
Created a complex web of issues
Well coordinated and will continue
Franchisor is just another supplier
Agreement terms precise/well
understood
Organization monitors franchisor
I would not be part of franchise
system
The relationship with the franchisor
created a complex web of
expectations between us over all
kinds of issues.
My relationship with the franchisor is
generally well coordinated and there
is an expectation that the relationship
will continue in the long run.
The franchisor is just another supplier
of products and/or services.
Terms of the license Agreement are
specified precisely and understood by
both parties.
Our organization assures itself that
the franchisor acts as we expect by
precisely monitoring their activities
and performance.
If it were up to me we would not be a
part of the franchise system any
longer.
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ql5same
qI 5same2
qi 6cnvrt
ql7altsu
ql8bond
qi 9logo
Variable Name	 Variable Label	 Full Description
ql5pymts	 Franchisor monitors sales/royalty 	 The franchisor closely monitors our
payments	 sales to assure the proper royalty is
paid.
q2Ocost
q2lprsnl
q22enrgy
Feelings toward unchanged by
dispute
I would act as franchisor does
Exiting costly in store conversion
Exiting costly in alternative suppliers
Exiting costly in legal expense
Exiting costly in goodwill
Personal investment in the
relationship
Company invested effort in
relationship
Our organization feels the same way
about the franchisor before and after
any dispute.
If! were the franchisor I would act as
the franchisor does now.
If I left the franchisor I would spend a
lot of effort converting the store.
If I left the franchisor, I would have
to spend a lot of time, money, and
effort to set up alternative suppliers.
Terminating my license agreement
would involve considerable legal
expense.
Terminating the license agreement
would cost my company time, money
and customer goodwill.
I have personally invested a lot of
time and effort in the relationship
with the franchisor.
A lot of the company's energy, time,
and effort has gone into building and
maintaining the relationship with the
franchisor.
Exiting costs high
	 The costs involved in exiting the
franchise relationship would probably
be high.
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Variable Name
	
Variable Label	 Full Description
q23unik	 Company investment unique to 	 Much of the company's investment
relationship	 with the franchisor is unique to the
relationship.
q24mktb	 Exiting will increase marketing
budget
q25train	 Exiting will increase training costs
Terminating my license agreement
will increase my marketing budget.
Ending my relationship with the
franchiser will increase my training
costs.
q26ops
q27rev
Exiting will require procedures
change
Company's 12 month sales ending
12/31/93
Ending my relationship with the
franchisor will require modification
of the operating procedures.
What is your company's sales in the
12 months ended Dec. 31, 1993?
q28fiexp
q29vrexp
Annual fixed expense per outlet
Variable unit expense per $ of sales
What are your annual fixed expense
per outlet?
What are your variable expense per
unit of product or service for each $
of sales?
q3Oprof Profit margin per unit per S of sales What is your profit margin per unit of
service or product for each dollar of
sales?
q3 Iprom
q32bsval
q32mkt
Promotions expense per $ of sales
$ Value customer goodwill-Balance
Sheet
$ Value customer goodwill-Market
What is your promotions expense for
evely dollar of sales?
What is the balance sheet value of
customer goodwill (trademark,
franchise rights).
What is the market value of customer
goodwill (trademark, franchise
tights).
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Variable Name	 Variable Label	 Full Description
q32mktuk	 Market value of trademark unknown The market value of the trademark is
unknown.
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APPENDIX III	 CHOOSING A CORRELATION MATRIX
In the SPSS system, by default, both RELIABILITY and FACTOR are performed on a
matrix of Pearson correlations. The Pearson correlation is valid for interval or ratio scales, but
will underestimate the true correlation between ordinal variables where their underlying
distribution may be bivariate normal. Therefore, when one or more of the variables to be
analyzed are ordinal, choosing the right type of moment matrix is important. Because ordinal
variables do not have an origin, the most meaningful moment matrices are correlation matrices.
Accordingly, a correlation appropriate for ordinal variables must be considered.
Four types of correlations are provided by SPSS PRELIS. Correlation (continuous) is
a Pearson correlation matrix based on raw scores, on ordinal variables treated as if they come
from continuous interval-scaled variables. Correlation (ordinal) is a Pearson correlation
matrix with observations on ordinal variables replaced by normal scores determined from the
marginal distributions. Optimal is a Pearson correlation with observations on ordinal variables
replaced by optimal scores determined for each pair. Polychor is a matrix of polychoric
correlations.
The first three of these correlation types correspond to scoring systems for the
categories and the product moment correlation computed for this scoring system. The
polychoric correlation is not a correlation between two sets of scores but is a maximum
likelihood estimate of the correlation in the latent bivariate normal distribution representing the
two ordinal variables.
In a Monte Carlo study conducted by Joreskog & Sorbom (1989) on ordinal variables
derived from normally distributed data, a number of correlations were tested to see which was
"best," i.e., consistently closest to the true p. Of the correlations investigated by JOreskog &
Sörbom which included all the correlations described above as well as Spearman's rank
correlation and Kendall's tau-b, the polychoric correlation was found to be the best (most
consistent) estimator of the truep for ordinal data derived from a normally distributed
variable. Where appropriate, polychoric correlation matrices generated by SPSS PRELIS are
used in this study.
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APPENDIX IV	 RELIABILITY TESTING
IV. 1 Cronbach's Alpha
One of the most commonly used reliability coefficients is Cronbach's alpha (a). Alpha
may be said to estimate the correlation between scores (item responses) on two halves of a test
for any randomly chosen halves. The computation of alpha is based on the average correlation
of (standardized) items within a scale,
s	 N-nS --
where k is the number of items in the scale and f is the average correlation between items:
or the average covariance among (unstandardized) items on a scale.
s	 IN-nS7 Ni
where 33 is the average covariance between items and 	 ? is the average variance of
the items.
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APPENDIX V	 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR CONFLICT CONSTRUCT
A matrix of polychoric correlation coefficients was prepared by SPSS PRELIS. The matrix
was then submitted to SPSS RELIABILITY for analysis.
Table V.!	 SPSS RELIABILITY Output
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
Mean Std Dev	 Cases
1. Q15ANGR	 2.4454	 1.4173	 613.0
2. QI5NOZE	 2.2577	 1.4571	 613.0
3. Q15SAME	 2.7602	 1.2003	 613.0
4. Q15SAME2	 3.5905	 1.3408	 613.0
Covariance Matrix
Q15ANGR Q15NOZE Q15SAME Q15SAME2
Q15ANGR	 2.0089
Q15NOZE	 1.2499	 2.1230
Q15SAME	 .6416	 .5065	 1.4408
QI5SAME2	 .8960	 .9080	 .5320	 1.7978
Correlation Matrix
Q15ANGR Q15NOZE Q15SAME Q15SAME2
Q15ANGR 1.0000
Q15NOZE	 .6052	 1.0000
Q15SAME	 .3771	 .2896	 1.0000
Q15SAME2	 .4715	 .4648	 .3305	 1.0000
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
NofCases	 613.0
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale	 11.0538 16.8384 4.1035
	 4
Item Means	 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Max/Mm Variance
2.7635 2.2577
	 3.5905	 1.3328 1.5903	 .3470
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Mean Square F
	
Prob.
Item Variances Mean Minimum Maximum Range Max/Mm Variance
1.8426 1.4408	 2.1230	 .6822 1.4735	 .0899
Inter-item
Covanances Mean Minimum Maximum Range Max/Mm Variance
.7890 .5065	 1.2499	 .7434 2.4676	 .0737
Inter-item
Correlations	 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Max/Mm Variance
.4231 .2896	 .6052	 .3156	 2.0897	 .0120
Item-total Statistics
Scale	 Scale	 Corrected
Mean	 Variance Item-	 Squared Alpha
if Item	 if Item	 Total	 Multiple	 if Item
Deleted	 Deleted	 Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q15ANGR	 8.6085	 9.2545
Q15NOZE	 8.7961	 9.3865
Q15SAME	 8.2936	 12.0374
Q15SAME2	 7.4633	 10.3687
Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation Sum of Sq.
	 DF
	
.6465	 .4399	 6310
	
.5969	 .4085	 6614
	
.4034	 .1734
	
7611
	
.54 10	 .2946	 6938
Between People
Within People
Between Measures
Residual
Nonadditivity
Balance
Total
Grand Mean
	
2576.2772	 612
	
2572.5287	 1839
	
638.1370	 3
	
1934.3916	 1836
	
10.1092	 1
	
1924.2825	 1835
	
5 148.8059	 2451
2.7635
4.2096
1.3989
	
212.7123 201.8929	 .0000
1.0536
0010.1092	 9.6401	 .0019
1.0487
2. 1007
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RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
Tukey estimate of power to which observations
must be raised to achieve additivity 	 =	 1.3393
Hotelling's T-Squared = 586.3579	 F = 194.8 139
	 Prob. = .0000
Degrees of Freedom: 	 Numerator = 3 Denominator = 610
Reliability Coefficients 4 items
Alpha = .7497	 Standardized item alpha = .7458
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Eigenvalue	 Pct of Var Cum Pct
2.28807
	
57.2	 57.2
APPENDIX VI	 FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR CONFLICT CONSTRUCT
Table VI.! SPSS RELIABILITY Output
FACTOR ANALYSIS -----------
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with nussmg values
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis (PC)
PC extracted 1 factors.
Factor Matrix:
Factor 1
Q15ANGR	 .83368
QI5NOZE	 .80246
Q15SAME2 .75326
Q15SAME	 .61783
Final Statistics:
Variable	 Communality * Factor
*
Q15ANGR	 .69502 *	 1
Q15NOZE	 .64394 *
Q15SAME	 .38171 *
Q15SAME2 .56740 *
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
>Warning# 11310
>OnJy one factor was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.
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APPENDIX VII CLUSTER ANALYSIS FOR CONFLICT CONSTRUCT:
THREE CLUSTER SOLUTION
Table VII.! SPSS QUICK CLUSTER Output
Initial Cluster Centres.
Cluster Q15ANGR Q15NOZE Q15SAME Q15SAME2
1	 5.0000	 5.0000	 1.0000	 3.0000
2	 1.0000	 1.0000	 1.0000	 1.0000
3	 1.0000	 4.0000	 5.0000	 5.0000
The maximum distance by which any centre has changed is .0942
Minimum distance between initial centres is 6.0000
Iteration	 Change in Cluster Centres
1	 2	 3
1	 2.3999 2.1754 2.4151
2	 .3862	 .1308	 .1755
3	 .3467	 .0473 .3568
4	 .2240	 .0964 .2983
5	 .1165	 .1574 .2692
6	 .1920	 .1599	 .3115
7	 .0397	 .1755	 .1711
8	 .1127	 .0583	 .1256
Final Cluster Centres.
Cluster Q15ANGR Q15NOZE
1	 1.4179	 1.3284
	
2 2.2716	 1.6078
	
3 3.8167	 4.1333
missing value 8
Q15SAME Q15SAME2 N
	
2.1393	 2.0697
	
201
	
2.8664	 42716
	
232
	
3.3167	 4.4111
	
180
Number of Cases in each Cluster.
Cluster unweighted cases weighted cases
1	 201.0	 201.0
2	 232.0	 232.0
3	 180.0	 180.0
Missing	 8
Valid cases	 613.0	 613.0
Dependent Variable = "CONFLICT"
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FOUR CLUSTER SOLUTION
Initial Cluster Centers.
Cluster Q15ANGR Q15NOZE Q15SAME Q15SAME2
1	 1.0000	 5.0000	 5.0000	 5.0000
2	 5.0000	 5.0000	 5.0000	 1.0000
3	 1.0000	 1.0000	 1.0000	 1.0000
4	 5.0000	 1.0000	 3.0000	 5.0000
Convergence achieved due to no or small distance change.
The maximum distance by which any center has changed is .09 15
Current iteration is 8
Minimum distance between initial centers is 5.6569
Iteration	 Change in Cluster Centers
1	 2	 3	 4
1	 2.4265 2.3803 1.9393 2.03 18
2	 .4057 1.3269	 .1865	 .3 130
3	 .4871	 .4235	 .0393	 .2056
4	 .1154	 .1350	 .1156	 .2274
5	 .0000	 .1222	 .0785	 .1560
6	 .0663	 .0903	 .0764	 .1350
7	 .0000	 .0736	 .1135	 .1489
8	 .0000	 .0259	 .1009	 .1054
Final Cluster Centers.
Cluster Q15ANGR Q15NOZE Q15SAME Q15SAME2
1	 1.9452	 4.1781	 3.0411	 4.0959
2	 4.5161	 4.0484	 3.3226	 4.4274
3	 1.3610	 1.2195	 2.1024	 2.2000
4	 2.4550	 1.5498	 2.9716	 4.2749
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Number of Cases in each Cluster.
Cluster	 unweighted cases weighted cases
1
	 73.0
	 73.0
2
	 124.0	 124.0
3
	 205.0	 205.0
4
	 211.0	 211.0
FIVE CLUSTER SOLUTION
Number of Cases in each Cluster. (Cont.)
Cluster	 unweighted cases weighted cases
Missing	 8
Valid cases	 613.0	 613.0
Initial Cluster Centers.
Cluster Q15ANGR Q15NOZE Q15SAME Q15SAME2
I
2
3
4
5
4.0000
1.0000
5.0000
1.0000
4.0000
1.0000
5.0000
5.0000
1.0000
2.0000
1.0000
2.0000
1.0000
5.0000
5.0000
2.0000
1.0000
5.0000
1.0000
5.0000
Convergence achieved due to no or small distance change.
The maximum distance by which any center has changed is .0929
Current iteration is 8
Minimum distance between initial centers is 5.0000
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4
2.2275
.3070
.4309
.23 75
.1787
.0592
0502
0762
5
1.6622
.1131
.3087
.2373
.2 105
.2648
1854
0620
Iteration	 Change in Cluster Centers
1	 2	 3
1	 2.5161 2.0318 1.6965
2	 .3010	 .2867	 .5274
3	 .2009	 .1705	 .3401
4	 .1092	 .3839	 .1429
5	 .0882	 .2016	 .2094
6	 .1583	 .3797	 .1705
7	 .1785	 .1626	 .0411
8	 .0000	 .1066	 .0732
Final Cluster Centers.
Cluster Q15ANGR Q15NOZE Q15SAME Q15SAME2
1
2
3
4
5
1.0788
2.0000
4.433 1
1.9770
2.7 195
1.2 182
4. 1000
4. 1024
1.32 18
1.5 854
1.7576
2.6286
3.4016
3.0000
3 .20 12
2.9030
3.9000
4. 5433
1.8161
4.3 537
Number of Cases in each Cluster.
unweighted cases weighted casesCluster
1
2
3
4
5
Missing
Valid cases
165.0
70.0
127.0
87.0
164.0
8
613.0
165.0
70.0
127.0
87.0
164.0
613.0
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APPENDIX VIII GENERALISABILITY OF THE RESULTS TEST OF TWO MEANS
We standardize the difference of the two means using the sample standard deviation and
sample n.
s	 IN-nS -- .41-I	 NN-1
Using a two-tailed test at a 0.05 significance level we will fail to reject H 0 if:
	
S	 IN-nS- - ..41
	
I 
,/Fi	 NN-1
and the sample size is 30 or greater.
\Vhere the sample size is less than 30 we will use the t distribution and fail to reject H0
if:
Where the ratio of sample size to population size is greater than 0.05 we adjust the standard
error of x by including the finite population correction (fkc) factor:
s	 IN-nSI
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APPENDIX IX GENERAL MODEL PREDICTORS OF CONFLICT
Variable	 p-value
Well coordinated and will continue	 1.60e-51
Best described as "arms length"	 6.50e-40
Adequacy of disagreement resolution	 1.30e-30
Franchise system affiliation	 7.00e-30
Adequacy of management problem advice 	 4.20e-28
Just another supplier 	 5.1 Oe-28
Adequacy of access to franchisor management 	 1.40e-23
Complex web of expectations 	 1.20e-19
License agreement terms precise and understood	 5.30e-18
Adequacy of advice on financial management 	 7.70e-18
Adequacy of operating procedures 	 1.80e-17
Complicated by diverse expectations 	 3.60e-15
Adequacy as a suppliers of products 	 4.40e-15
Adequacy of new store development support 	 4.80e-15
Adequacy of training in management skills
	 1.5 Oe- 14
Adequacy of new product promotion
	 4.30e-14
Adequacy of new product development 	 5. 60e- 14
Adequacy of market information/analysis	 1 .60e- 13
Adequacy of training in accounting
	 2.80e-13
Adequacy of training programs and procedures
	
1.90e-12
Adequacy of financial assistance and credit
	
4.70e-12
Adequacy of national advertising
	 3.30e-11
Adequacy of inventory control advice
	
4.40e- 10
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A more cooperative relationship
Exiting will increase training costs
Exiting costly in finding alternative suppliers
Adequacy of equipment provision
Exiting will require procedure changes
Promotion expense per unit of sales
Adequacy of organising local coops
Company's last 12 months sales
Importance of financial assistance and credit
Having owned another franchise
Exiting will increase marketing budget
Exiting costly in store conversion
Profit margin per unit of sales
Annual fixed expense per outlet
Franchisee monitors the franchisor
6.20e-09
6. 90e-09
4.lOe-08
2.20e-06
3.30e-06
3.3 Oe-06
1.50e-05
8.00e-05
3 .40e-04
4.40e-04
9.80e-04
1 .50e-03
1 .60e-03
2.60e-03
3.50e-03
Importance of clearly defined operating procedures
	 3. 70e-03
Exiting costly in customer goodwill 	 7.20e-03
Importance of access to franchisor management
	
2.58e+01
Importance of organising local advertising coops
	
0.0 18
Exiting costly in legal expense
	 0.04 1
Strengthening mutual commitment
	 0.041
Franchisor monitors sales/royalties
	 0.047
(All variables below the significance level of .05)
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